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Abstract 
 
This thesis, structured into four separate but related papers, uses survey birth history 
data  to  examine  marital  and  fertility  change  in  post-Soviet  Central  Asia,  with  a 
particular focus on Tajikistan.   
 
The first paper, ‘Through civil war, food scarcity and drought: fertility and nuptiality 
during periods of crisis in post-Soviet Tajikistan’, presents recent trends in marriage 
and  fertility  rates  in  Tajikistan  since  1989.    The  fluctuating  pattern  of  change 
illustrates the importance of three specific crises: the period of peak fighting in the 
civil war in 1992, which led to a decrease in birth registration but may also have 
contributed to a real decline in fertility in the worst affected areas in 1993; a food 
crisis in 1995, leading to immediate and significant declines in marriage and fertility; 
and a drought in 2000-01, which also led to marriage and fertility declines.   
 
Given the significant changes in nuptiality in Tajikistan, the next stage of the thesis 
places  these  changes  within  a  wider  Central  Asian  context.    The  second  paper, 
‘Marrying more and earlier: age-period interaction in trends of first union formation 
in transitional Central Asia’, documents the significant increase in rates of first union 
formation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, showing that this increase was most marked at younger ages.  The third 
paper,  ‘Tajikistan  shows  the  biggest  collapse  of  all:  comparing  declines  in  union 
formation in post-Soviet Central Asia’,  examines rates of  first union formation in 
these  countries  in  the  post-Soviet  period.    It  finds  a  significant  decline  in  union 
formation across the region, but also clear differences between the republics in terms 
of the extent of the decline.  Tajikistan, which experienced the most severe post-
Soviet declines in food security, had the highest rate of union formation in the late-
Soviet period but the lowest rate by the turn of the millennium.   
 
The fourth paper, ‘Spousal separation, selectivity and contextual effects: exploring the 
relationship  between  international  labour  migration  and  fertility  in  post-Soviet 
Tajikistan’ contributes to the sparse literature on the impact of temporary migration 
on fertility in origin areas.  Fertility and migration models are solved simultaneously 
to account for cross-process correlation.  There is clear  evidence  for  a short-term 
disruptive effect of spousal separation, but it is too early to assess the implications for 
completed fertility.   
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The  collapse  of  socialism  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  offers 
‘potentially rich material for an examination of the effects of dramatic sociopolitical 
and economic change on marital and fertility behaviour’ (Agadjanian 1999:30).   
___________________________________________________________   2 
1. Introduction 
This thesis aims to describe and understand recent national-level trends in marriage 
and fertility in Tajikistan.  There is an established literature on marriage and fertility 
change in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe.  In contrast, relatively little is 
known  about  the  demography  of  post-Soviet  Central  Asia  –  and  the  few  existing 
studies have tended to focus on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  Indeed, of 
all the former socialist countries in Europe and Central Asia, perhaps least of all is 
known about trends in Tajikistan
1. 
 
This thesis, structured into a series of four papers, helps to address this research need. 
 
Chapter  2,  ‘Through  civil  war,  food  scarcity  and  drought:  fertility  and  nuptiality 
during periods of  crisis in post-Soviet Tajikistan’, establishes the nature of recent 
demographic change in the country.  It uses survey birth history data to calculate 
trends  in  marriage  and  fertility  rates  since  the  late  1980s,  a  span  of  years 
encompassing three particular periods of crisis.  The changes in marriage rates, in 
particular, are found to be significant. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 help to place these changes in nuptiality in Tajikistan within a wider 
Central Asian context.  Chapter 3, ‘Marrying more and earlier: age-period interaction 
in trends in first union formation in transitional Central Asia’, focuses on trends in 
marriage during the transitional years immediately before and after the end of the 
Soviet Union – the perestroika and early-independence period.  Chapter 4, ‘Tajikistan 
shows the biggest collapse of all: comparing declines in first union formation in post-
Soviet Central Asia’, focuses specifically on the post-Soviet years. 
 
                                                 
1 In each of the other Central Asian Republics, a nationally representative Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) has been carried out, under the auspices of MEASURE DHS, in the post-independence 
period.  Results from the analysis of the fertility data from these surveys have been published by 
Kasiev et al. (1998), Sharmanov and Weinstein (2000), Nazarov et al. (2001), and Kamilov et al. 
(2004) for Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respectively.  However, MEASURE 
DHS have not carried out a DHS in Tajikistan.  A smaller-scale demographic survey was carried out 
under the auspices of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), but the results were never widely 
circulated.     3 
Chapter  5,  ‘Spousal  separation,  selectivity  and  contextual  effects:  exploring  the 
relationship  between  international  labour  migration  and  fertility  in  post-Soviet 
Tajikistan’, returns the focus from the regional to the country level.  While chapters 2-
4 are more descriptive, chapter 5 examines the association between two aspects of 
Tajikistan’s post-Soviet demography.  By illustrating the scale of labour migration, 
and reflecting on its possible impact on fertility, it serves to introduce an important 
area for future research. 
 
Each chapter is designed to be ‘free-standing’, capable of being read and understood 
independently.  Each contains information on the substantive context, a review of the 
relevant literature, and an explanation of how the paper adds to existing research.  
These will not be further elaborated on here.   
 
Instead, this introductory section aims to explain the thinking behind the methods 
used in this thesis.  First, it explains in detail the reasons for using survey birth history 
data in preference to vital registration data.  Second, it explains the particular focus on 
examining aggregate-level temporal trends from a period perspective, and the reasons 
for favouring particular demographic measures over others.  Finally, there is a brief 
introduction to Tajikistan - including a map, which may be of interest to the reader 
when specific places or regions are mentioned within one of the chapters. 
 
1.1 Rationale for using survey data 
 
Survey  birth  history  data  are  preferred  to  official  vital  registration  data  for  two 
reasons.  First, and most importantly, there are problems with the under-registration of 
marriages and births in Central Asia.  Second, birth history data allow the calculation 
of trends in marriage and fertility unaffected by compositional effects associated with 
migration and changing population composition.  
1.1.1 Inadequacy of official data: the problems of underregistration 
 
Under-registration of births has traditionally been a problem in Central Asian vital 
registration  figures  (Anderson  and  Silver  1989).    Jones  and  Grupp  (1987:39) 
document the sources of error.  The first relates to the fact that registration has always   4 
been  primarily  dependent  on  citizens’  initiative  since  the  primary  purpose  of  the 
Soviet system was ‘not to compile a statistical record for demographic purposes, but 
to establish legal certification for Soviet citizens’.  Registration coverage has therefore 
been dependent on the particular balance of incentives and disincentives to register at 
a particular place and time.  In Central Asia, opponents during the early stages of 
Soviet  rule  advocated  non-registration  of  female  births  as  a  means  to  evade  laws 
regarding school attendance and age at marriage.  The lack of incentive to register a 
child who dies soon after childbirth, meanwhile, also contributes to under-registration.  
A second source of error relates to the efficacy of the registration machinery, and the 
quality of information transmission, as duplicate records of births are forwarded from 
the  local  registry  agencies  to  raion  (district)  and  then  oblast  (regional)  statistical 
offices.  Since this is apt to vary over time, so too is the coverage and quality of vital 
registration  data.    In  Tajikistan,  quality  was  seen  to  improve  as  the  Soviet  era 
progressed,  with  data  from  the  1970s  onwards  seen  as  more  complete  than  in 
preceding decades (Jones and Grupp 1987:44).  This is because the use of maternity 
homes’ or hospitals’ medical records provided a valuable cross-check of the citizen-
initiated register.  As the proportion of births in a medical institution increased as time 
progressed,  so  did  the  potential  for  validation  of  the  register.    A  third  source  of 
underregistration,  compared  to  the  World  Health  Organisation  criteria  adopted  by 
most  countries,  has  been  the  ‘less  rigorous’  Soviet  definition  of  live  birth,  where 
births  ending  in  infant  death  are  more  likely  to  be  classified  as  stillbirths  or 
miscarriages  (Aleshina  and  Redmond  2003:6).    In  Tajikistan,  this  definition  has 
continued to be used in the post-independence period.  
 
Temporal  variation  in  coverage  makes  the  analysis  of  fertility  change  using  vital 
registration data difficult.  While the coverage of vital registration in Tajikistan had 
increased by the 1970s, since independence in 1991 it has decreased.  A fee for birth 
registration was introduced – a particular disincentive for registration in a context 
where living standards were decreasing.  As of 2000, this fee was equivalent to $3 – 
the  average  monthly  salary  of  a  health  worker  (United  Nations  Development 
Programme 2000).  In the Soviet era, registrations were likely to be updated when a 
hitherto unregistered child entered school (Jones and Grupp 1987), at the age of seven 
in Tajikistan (Dikaev 2005).  After independence, however, primary school enrolment 
declined, partly because of the introduction of charges for textbooks and meals and   5 
the growth of fees to supplement teacher wages (Falkingham 2000; United Nations 
Development  Programme  2000).    Some  parents  could  not  afford  to  educate  their 
families, so their children remained unrecorded (Davlatova 2002).  Meanwhile, as the 
healthcare  system  has  deteriorated  and  costs  for  services  have  increased,  so  the 
proportion  of  births  that  take  place  in  a  medical  institution  has  progressively 
decreased – from 94% in the years to 1989, to 58% in 1998-9, with concomitant rises 
in the proportion of births in the home (Falkingham 2003).   This undermines the 
potential for validation of the citizen-initiated register.   
 
In sum, the quality of vital registration data has decreased.  In terms of fertility, only 
75% of children aged under 6 years in 2000 in Tajikistan had been registered (United 
Nations Children's Fund 2001).  In terms of marriage, official registration has always 
been ‘of little importance to Tajiks’ compared to the religious ceremony nikoh (Harris 
2004:39).    Dikaev  (2005)  reports  one  estimate  which  suggests  only  half  of  all 
marriages are registered.  Overall, the ‘reliability and relevance’ of vital registration 
data have become ‘a cause of concern for both the Government and the international 
community’ (United Nations Population Fund 2004:2).   
 
1.1.2 Out-migration and changes in population composition 
 
Not only are estimates of marriage and fertility rates from survey data unaffected by 
under-registration - they are also a more accurate picture of past demographic change 
among the currently resident population.  In common with other ex-Soviet republics, 
Tajikistan  experienced  a  significant  out-migration  of  the  non-titular  (non-Tajik) 
population in the years immediately preceding and subsequent to independence.  Jews 
and  ethnic  Germans  settled  in  Israel,  the  United  States  and  Germany  (Harris 
1998a:657).    The  emigration  of  Uzbeks  and,  in  particular,  Russians  was  also 
significant: by April 1993, about 300,000 Russians are estimated to have left (Kolstoe 
1995).  In the 1989 census, 388,481 Russians were recorded as living in Tajikistan 
(7.6% of the total population), compared to just 68,171 (1.1%) in the 2000 census; for 
Uzbeks,  the  corresponding  figures  were  1,197,841  (23.5%)  and  936,703  (15.3%), 
though some of this may reflect ethnic reidentification of Uzbeks as Tajiks in 2000 
(Rowland 2005).     6 
Since  Russian  fertility  has  always  been  appreciably  lower  than  that  among  the 
ethnically Tajik population, the change in population composition caused by Russian 
out-migration may have an upward influence on fertility as measured by registration 
data  (or  a  downward  influence  if  population  totals  used  as  denominators  in  the 
calculation of rates do not take adequate account of their emigration).  The decline in 
the urban Russian population was even more acute in Tajikistan than elsewhere in 
Central  Asia  (Rowland  2005)  and  therefore  the  compositional  effect  on  vital 
registration trends is potentially the most significant.  To illustrate, the increase in the 
crude birth rate in Dushanbe evident in official figures in the early 1990s (Figure 1.1) 
probably  reflects  the  increasingly  Tajik  composition  of  the  capital  as  Russians 
emigrated in large numbers.   
 
Figure 1.1 Crude birth rate
1 in Tajikistan’s five regions, 1991-2005 
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1 Live births per 1,000 people.  Source: Goskomstat (2006)  
 
Since in many ways it is the currently resident population which is of most interest in 
demographic analysis – now overwhelmingly Tajik (79.9%, compared to 62.3% in 
1989) - survey data allow the calculation of trends in marriage and fertility unaffected 
by  compositional  effects  introduced  by  migration  and  changing  population 
composition.   7 
1.2 Rationale for approach 
 
The majority of the thesis (chapters 2-4) is based on the description of aggregate 
trends in marriage and fertility, from a period perspective. 
 
1.2.1 Description of aggregate change over time 
 
The  focus  on  aggregate  change  over  time,  as  Ní  Bhrolcháin  and  Dyson  (2007:1) 
argue,  lies  at  the  core  of  the  demographic  tradition:  ‘aggregate  phenomena  and 
demographic change through time should be at the heart of demography, and therefore 
represent a central object of causal investigation in the discipline’.  But, as they point 
out,  most  recent  demographic  research  has  neglected  both  the  aggregate  and  the 
temporal.  To a large extent, this has reflected the preponderance of household survey 
data, which tend to be cross-sectional in nature and which tend to collect information 
on individual rather than aggregate level variables.  A typical approach has attempted 
to explain variation in a demographic outcome in a regression framework using these 
individual-level covariates.  Causal analysis at a higher level has been neglected.  This 
is important since relationships at an individual level need not hold at an aggregate 
level, and since potentially interesting macro-level explanations are ignored.  In the 
current context, marriage and fertility in Tajikistan could be explained as a function of 
age, region, ethnicity, educational status and income – at the expense of analysing the 
aggregate changes over time, and the way in which these relate to macro-level social 
and economic changes during perestroika and after independence.   
 
The approach in chapters 2-4 of this thesis, therefore, represents a conscious attempt 
to  consider  the  aggregate  and  the  temporal.    Trends  in  marriage  and  fertility  are 
interpreted, in the words of Ní Bhrolcháin and Dyson (2007:29), ‘in the nature of old-
fashioned  quantitative  investigation’,  using  ‘a  form  of  bricolage,  knitting  together 
diverse strands of evidence’. 
 
1.2.2 Period perspective 
 
This  thesis  takes  a  period,  rather  than  cohort,  perspective  to  the  measurement  of 
marriage and fertility change.  Statistically, it is the period perspective which provides   8 
the  prime  source  of  temporal  variation  in  fertility  rates:  there  is  more  empirical 
evidence for consistency in the fertility behaviour of different cohorts at a particular 
point in time than for a particular cohort across different points in time (Ní Bhrolcháin 
1992; 1996:600).  Even Ryder (1983:739), traditionally seen as a champion of the 
cohort approach, recognises that the form of the measure should be specific to the 
hypothesis.  In this case, interest lies in assessing the potential impact of the particular 
circumstances of the perestroika and post-independence periods, and the associated 
dramatic social and  economic changes, on marriage and  fertility  rates.   Trends in 
marriage  and  fertility  are  the  ‘dependent  variable’  requiring  explanation  (Ní 
Bhrolcháin  2008)  and,  since  changes  in  particular  periods  are  the  potential 
explanators, it would seem wise to adopt a period framework when measuring these 
trends (Ní Bhrolcháin 1992; 1996). 
 
1.2.3 A ‘fair’ representation of temporal change 
 
Given the focus on analysing trends in marriage and fertility, the period measures 
used  in  this  thesis  must  provide  a  ‘fair’  representation  of  temporal  change  (Ní 
Bhrolcháin 2008:14).  For this reason it is important to relate the event (first marriage, 
or a birth of a particular order) to the correct ‘exposure’ (only those women ‘at risk’ 
of experiencing the event).  The resulting ‘intensities’ of marriage and childbearing 
represent decremental type 1 rates (‘taux de première catégorie’), rather than the non-
decremental type 2 ‘incidence’ rates (‘taux de  deuxième catégorie’)  which do not 
exclude from the exposure those women who have already experienced the event.  
Since the proportion of women ‘at risk’ fluctuates over time, trends in incidence rates 
are  influenced  by  these  purely  compositional  changes,  providing  a  potentially 
misleading  guide  to  changes  in  underlying  intensities.    Feeney  and  Yu  (1987), 
analysing  trends  in  order-specific  fertility  in  China,  show  the  difference  that  this 
compositional effect can make.  Similarly, Sobotka (2004) presents various scenarios 
of change in first birth patterns, comparing trends based on incidence and intensity 
rates, to illustrate the importance of relating the occurrence of demographic events to 
the correct exposure. 
 
In classical demographic analysis, intensity rates have been calculated using life-table 
methods.    More  recently,  event  history  analysis,  a  generalisation  of  life-table   9 
techniques, has come to prominence (see Hoem 1993).  This has the advantage of 
accommodating multiple covariates in a regression framework without necessitating 
the calculation of life-table functions for particular population subgroups separately.  
It  also  accommodates  covariates  which  may  change  over  the  life  course.    In  this 
thesis, rates of first union formation to women who have never been in a union, and 
rates of first births to childless women within union, are calculated using exponential 
proportional hazards (PH) models (see, for example, Harrell 2001; Rodríguez 2007).  
The exponential PH model is extended in chapters 3 and 4, adding an interaction 
between  calendar  period  and  age  group,  relaxing  the  assumption  of  proportional 
hazards  in  order  to  examine  trends  in  union  formation  for  different  age  groups.  
Trends in higher order births in chapter 2 are estimated using a discrete-time logistic 
model: unlike the models for first union and first birth, where women drop out of 
exposure after experiencing the event, women remain ‘at risk’ of a further birth at 
each  parity.    In  this  case,  the  compositional  influence  on  the  temporal  trend  is 
removed by controlling for changes in the distribution of women by age, parity and 
duration since previous birth.  
 
Recent developments in the literature have proposed that, as well as controlling for 
compositional changes in the population at risk, fertility measures should adjust for 
changes in the timing of childbearing.  Such a timing effect, it is argued, results in 
period measures that represent ‘distorted versions’ (Ryder 1971:115) of true fertility 
levels, misleadingly depressed in periods where cohorts are ‘postponing’ births and 
misleadingly inflated when births are being ‘brought forward’.  Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998:275) propose dividing order-specific total fertility by the change in the order-
specific mean age at childbearing to obtain the total fertility ‘that would have been 
observed in a given year had there been no change in the timing of births during that 
year’.  Kohler and Philipov (2001) extend this adjustment to incorporate changes in 
the variance, as well  as the mean, of the age-fertility schedule,  while  Kohler  and 
Ortega (2002) apply this more general adjustment to childbearing intensities rather 
than  incidence  rates.    Winkler-Dworak  and  Engelhardt  (2004)  apply  comparable 
adjustments for the analysis of trends in first marriages. 
 
It is important to note the reason  for these  adjustments.  Bongaarts  and Feeney’s 
(1998:286)  primary  motivation  is  to  provide  a  better  measure  of  ‘the  level  of   10 
completed fertility implied by current childbearing behavior’; similarly, Kohler and 
Ortega (2002:93) aim ‘to assess the cohort fertility that results from period fertility 
patterns’.  In other words, their aim to is learn about the longer-run implications of 
current fertility rates for completed family size.  But where the aim is to describe and 
understand trends in marriage and fertility rates, these rates become the dependent 
variable rather than as a tool to aid forecasting.  In this context, the changes in the 
timing of fertility [or marriage] ‘are not distorting to measures of period fertility [or 
marriage] because real tempo change is part of what we.. should be trying to explain’ 
(Ní Bhrolcháin 2008:17)
2.  In this thesis, therefore, instead of adjusting the relevant 
demographic  measures,  the  effect  of  any  change  in  the  timing  of  marriage  or 
childbearing is retained.  
 
1.2.4 A ‘textured’ account of fertility change 
 
Single figure summary measures of the level of fertility in a particular period ‘may 
conceal parity-, age- or duration specific probabilities that go beyond pure differences 
of level’ (Ní Bhrolcháin 2001:6).  This is true both of the conventional total fertility 
‘rate’,  a  synthetic  measure  based  on  a  hypothetical  cohort  experiencing  the  age-
specific  incidence  rates  of  a  particular  period,  and  of  analogous  synthetic  cohort 
measures which adjust for changes in the composition of women by parity, age and/or 
duration  since  previous  birth  (for  example,  those  based  on  the  period  parity 
progression system of measurement: Feeney and Yu 1987; Ní Bhrolcháin 1987).  For 
example, and of particular relevance to the study at hand, research on post-socialist 
fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in the early 1990s 
shows a marked distinction between the dramatic decline in higher order births, on the 
one hand, and the robustness of first order births on the other (Bulgaru et al. 2000; 
Steshenko  2000;  Perelli-Harris  2005)  –  a  distinction  that  a  synthetic,  aggregated 
measure  alone  would  fail  to  make.      It  is  clear  that  ‘fertility  is  not  a  unitary 
phenomenon’ (Ní Bhrolcháin 1996:249).   
 
                                                 
2 Indeed, ‘if a “change in pace” occurs during a particular period, this should be reflected in the fertility 
measure(s) for that period.  Such change should not be ascribed to some notional underlying cohort – it 
is a property of the period’ (Ní Bhrolcháin 1992:612).     11 
Disaggregated rates are therefore needed to illuminate the particular trends in each 
stage of fertility behaviour.  These component trends will differ ‘to the extent that the 
separate  stages  of  family  formation  are  influenced  by  different  external  factors  – 
whether social, cultural or economic – and that.. trends in these determinants are not 
uniform’ (Ní Bhrolcháin 1996:249).  This resonates with Agadjanian’s (1999:426) 
hypothesis  that,  when  faced  with  periods  of  crisis,  ‘people  do  not  change  all 
components of their demographic behaviour equally and uniformly’ and that changes 
in nuptiality may  not necessarily  mirror changes in wider reproductive behaviour.  
Therefore,  as  well  as  presenting  trends  in  total  fertility,  this  thesis  presents 
disaggregated rates to explore possible differences in the component fertility trends: 
rates of first union formation (to women who have never been in a union), rates of 
first births (to childless women within union), and progression to higher order births 
(for those who have already had a child).  This not only ensures that each event is 
related  to  the  correct  exposure;  it  also  represents,  compared  to  a  single  synthetic 
measure alone, ‘a much richer output of indexes… useful in description and analysis’ 
(Hoem 1993:290) and hence a more textured account of fertility change. 
 
1.3 Introduction to Tajikistan 
 
Mountainous and landlocked Tajikistan, after Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the third 
most populous state in Central Asia, had a total de jure permanent population of 6.1 
million according to the 2000 census, 74% living in rural areas (Rowland 2005).  As 
Harris  (2004:24-25)  summarises,  Tajikistan  is  geoculturally  divided  into  two:  the 
majority speak Tajik and, nominally at least, follow Sunni Islam; a minority in the 
physically isolated GBAO (Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast; see Figure 1.2) 
speak Pamiri and are Ismaili.  In pre-Soviet times, the oasis culture of the Tajiks (and 
Uzbeks) contrasted with the semi-nomadic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs; by 1920, the whole 
of what is now Tajikistan had come under Soviet rule (Harris 2006:25).  At the time 
of  independence  in  1991,  Tajikistan  was  the  poorest  of  all  Soviet  republics  yet, 
compared  to  many  developing  countries,  had  relatively  high  human  development 
indicators, including almost universal literacy, reflecting the Soviet legacy of social 
development (Falkingham 2000).  Since then, Tajikistan has experienced the most 
acute social and economic problems of any post-socialist country, including a civil 
war between 1992 and 1997 and periods of acute food shortages.  Therefore, of all the   12 
countries  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union,  Tajikistan  offers 
particularly ‘rich material for an examination of the effects of dramatic sociopolitical 
and economic change on marital and fertility behaviour’ (Agadjanian 1999:30). 
 
Figure 1.2 Map of Tajikistan  
 
Source: http://geology.com/world/tajikistan-map.gif   13 
2. Through civil war, food scarcity and drought: fertility and 
nuptiality during periods of crisis in post-Soviet Tajikistan 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The post-Soviet republics of Central Asia have been neglected in the demographic 
literature.    This  paper  uses  survey  birth  history  data  to  reconstruct  marriage  and 
fertility rates in Tajikistan since independence, and in particular during three specific 
crisis periods: the period of peak fighting in the civil war in 1992, which led to a 
decrease in birth registration but may also have contributed to a real decline in higher-
order fertility in the worst affected areas; a food crisis in 1995, leading to immediate 
and  significant  declines  in  marriage  and  fertility  rates;  and  a  drought  in  2000-01, 
which led to a further decline in marriage and fertility rates.  The paper serves to 
illustrate the demographic impact of periods of acute social and economic crisis.  It 
ends by emphasising the importance of context to an understanding of post-socialist 
demographic change, given Tajikistan’s lack of agricultural self-sufficiency which left 
the population particularly vulnerable to the collapse of Soviet central planning.   
 
Keywords: post-Soviet, Central Asia, Tajikistan, fertility, nuptiality, civil war, food 
crisis, drought 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The  collapse  of  socialism  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  offers 
‘potentially rich material for an examination of the effects of dramatic sociopolitical 
and  economic  change  on  marital  and  fertility  behaviour’  (Agadjanian  1999:426).  
There  are  a  number  of  studies  examining  recent  marital  and  fertility  changes  in 
Central and Eastern Europe (for example, Conrad et al. 1996; Kučera et al. 2000; 
Macura 2000; Kohler and Kohler 2002; Sobotka 2002; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003; 
Sobotka  2004;  Perelli-Harris  2005;  Kotowska  et  al.  2008;  Sobotka  et  al.  2008; 
Zakharov  2008).    However,  the  post-Soviet  republics  of  Central  Asia  have  been 
relatively neglected in the demographic literature (Gentile 2005).  This paper seeks to 
address this research need by analysing marriage and fertility change in post-Soviet 
Tajikistan. 
 
Tajikistan, after Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the third most populous state in Central 
Asia, had a total de jure permanent population of 6.1 million according to the 2000 
census, 74% living in rural areas (Rowland 2005).  In terms of the study of post-
Soviet fertility change, Tajikistan is of particular interest.  First, traditionally it had the 
highest  fertility  of  the  Soviet  republics.  Census  data  show  that  Tajikistan  had  the 
highest average annual rates of population growth in the Soviet Union in each of the 
periods 1959-1970, 1970-79 and 1979-1989 (Anderson and Silver 1989).  Studies in 
Eastern Europe have documented the effect of post-socialist and post-Soviet change, 
and the effect of dramatic social and economic crisis, in a context where fertility was 
already  at  or  approaching  replacement  level.    The  effect  on  ‘pre-transitional’ 
populations  like  Tajikistan  (Anichkin  and  Vishnevskii  1992:61)  is  less  well 
documented.    Second,  of  all  the  ex-socialist  and  ex-Soviet  states,  Tajikistan  has 
experienced the most acute social and economic problems since independence.  In 
particular, Tajikistan’s population has been subject to three specific shocks: a civil 
war between 1992 and 1997; a food crisis in 1995; and a drought in 2000-01, which 
also  led  to  severe  food  shortages.    Tajikistan’s  experience  therefore  offers  an 
opportunity to contribute to the literature on the demography of conflict and of food 
crises. 
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2.1.1 Post-socialist fertility decline in Europe and Central Asia 
 
Post-socialist fertility decline in Europe has been substantial.  Ex-communist Europe 
is now the lowest fertility region in the world after the dramatic decline in period 
fertility during the 1990s, with total fertility ranging between 1.1 and 1.4 in 2002 
(Sobotka  2002).      Declines  in  countries  of  Central  Europe,  which  experienced  a 
relatively successful post-socialist economic transition, have been attributed more to 
new opportunities, ideational change and the ‘Westernisation’ of fertility behaviour.  
Here, the decline in fertility has been characterised by the postponement of first births.  
 
In  contrast, declines in  southeastern Europe and ex-Soviet European states, which 
have experienced the most difficult post-socialist transition, have been attributed more 
to the depth of social and economic crisis in these countries (Macura 2000; Philipov 
and Dorbritz 2003; Sobotka 2004).   Shrinkage in national economies, together with 
the  removal  of  the  three  pillars  of  the  former  socialist  system  –  guaranteed 
employment, subsidised and stable pricing, and social benefits and services (Standing 
1996:230) – combined to bring dramatic declines in living standards.  In Belarus, for 
example, ‘the slowing of the economy, skyrocketing inflation, destabilisation of the 
production  sphere,  increasing  unemployment...  impoverishment  of  the  population’ 
and associated uncertainties generated by the crisis ‘undoubtedly’ affected fertility 
(Shakhotska 2000:36).  Unlike in Central Europe, in the first half of the 1990s first 
order birth rates in ex-Soviet and southeastern Europe were robust, and total fertility 
decline was driven by reductions in second and higher birth orders (see, for example, 
Steshenko  (2000),  Perelli-Harris  (2005)  for  Ukraine;  Bulgaru  et  al.  (2000)  for 
Moldova; Kohler and Kohler (2002) for Russia; Stankuniene (2000) for Lithuania; 
Katus et al. (2000) for Estonia; Aassve et al. (2006) for Albania), though increases in 
the mean age at first birth in these countries since the mid-1990s are indicative of a 
decline in period first order rates (see TransMONEE 2006). 
 
Central Asia is culturally, historically and demographically very different from post-
Soviet  Europe.    Nevertheless,  both  regions  have  emerged  from  what  Sobotka 
(2002:42) has termed the ‘socialist greenhouse’ – an environment which had served to 
encourage childbearing, or at least undermine reasons to reduce it.  Further, during 
this transition countries in both regions have faced severe economic crises.  But while   16 
a number of academic studies have documented fertility change in post-socialist and 
post-Soviet Europe, there is not a comparable literature on fertility change in post-
Soviet Central Asia.  The available evidence, however, suggests that fertility trends in 
post-Soviet  Central  Asia  show  certain  parallels  with  those  in  post-Soviet  Europe.  
First, there are indications of substantial declines in period fertility.  Vital registration 
data collated by UNICEF (TransMONEE 2006) suggest larger absolute declines than 
in  post-Soviet  Europe, and  comparable  relative  declines:  between  1989  and  2003, 
total fertility fell from 4.3 to 2.6 in Turkmenistan, from 3.8 to 2.5 in Kyrgyzstan, and 
from 2.8 to 2.0 in Kazakhstan; between 1990 and 2003, from 4.1 to 2.4 in Uzbekistan; 
and  between  1989  and  2000,  from  5.1  to  3.7  in  Tajikistan.    Second,  there  are 
indications that, as in post-Soviet Europe, fertility reached a peak in 1987 and then 
declined thereafter (Becker and Hemley 1998; Agadjanian 1999).  Third, in the first 
half of the 1990s fertility decline specifically involved the reduction of higher order 
births.    Thus  Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003:471)  argue  that  post-independence 
economic  hardship  in  Uzbekistan  in  the  early  1990s  acted  to  discourage  births 
‘beyond the minimally acceptable one child’.  Similarly, Agadjanian et al. (2008a) 
show that first birth rates in Kazakhstan were relatively stable, in comparison to rates 
at higher orders, until the mid-1990s, consistent with an increase in the share of first 
births in total fertility during this period (Becker and Hemley 1998).  From the mid-
1990s,  however,  there  is  evidence  for  a  decrease  in  the  rate  of  first  births  within 
marriage in Kazakhstan (Agadjanian et al. 2008a), and a decrease in the first marriage 
rate in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Dommaraju and Agadjanian 2008).  However, no 
information is available on order-specific change in post-Soviet Tajikistan.  Changes 
in nuptiality in Tajikistan, and their contribution to fertility change, have also not been 
addressed. 
 
2.1.2 Fertility during food crises and civil war 
 
There is strong evidence that food crises reduce fertility in the short-term.  Galloway 
(1988), examining the response of vital rates to annual fluctuations in grain prices in 
nine pre-industrial European countries, finds a decrease in fertility most evident one 
year after the price shock, and a fertility rebound in the second year.  There was also a 
very  close  correspondence  between  the  rise  in  food  prices  and  a  decline  in 
conceptions during the South Asian famines of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries   17 
(Dyson 1991a; 1991b).  Similarly, Lindstrom and Bernahu (1999) find evidence for a 
decrease in conception probabilities during years of drought and famine in Ethiopia in 
the 1970s and 1980s, often followed by a rebound in the following year.  
 
Direct evidence to assess the relative importance of biological factors,  such as an 
increase  in  amenorrhoea  and  spontaneous  abortion  because  of  malnutrition,  and 
behavioural factors, such as a decrease in marriage rates, an increase in migration and 
spousal separation, or an increase in conscious fertility control, is often lacking in 
studies  of  this  kind.    However,  Bengtsson  and  Dribe  (2006),  for  a  pretransitional 
population in Sweden, argue that the strong fertility response in the first six months 
after a grain price shock points to the importance of deliberate fertility control, and the 
ability to anticipate years of economic difficulty.  Dyson (1991a) finds evidence for a 
similar  almost  ‘anticipatory’  fertility  response  which,  in  contrast  with  the  more 
delayed mortality effects, tends to favour behavioural explanations over biological 
ones.  Indeed, Bongaarts (1980) and Menken et al. (1981) conclude that while periods 
of  severe  famine  and  starvation  can  significantly  reduce  fecundity,  chronic 
malnutrition has only a minor biological effect on fertility levels.  Thus Lindstrom and 
Bernahu  (1999)  attribute  declines  in  marital  fertility  to  a  combination  of  the 
unintentional  influence  of  increases  in  spousal  separation  through  temporary 
migration and the intentional decision temporarily to postpone births in crisis periods.  
Since we know that nuptiality tends to decrease during years of grain price shocks 
(Galloway 1988), decreases in the marriage rate can also be an important contributor 
to decreases in overall fertility levels. 
 
These behavioural factors are also likely to play an important role during periods of 
military  conflict.    Lindstrom  and  Bernahu’s  (1999)  study  showed  that,  as  well  as 
fluctuating during periods of famine, conception probabilities decreased during peak 
years of military unrest.  Agadjanian and Prata (2002) similarly find evidence for a 
drop  in  fertility  during  wartime  in  Angola,  followed  by  a  subsequent  post-war 
rebound.  On the other hand, Khlat et al. (1997) find no evidence for a significant 
decline in fertility in Beirut, Lebanon, during the civil war – though these results 
should be treated with a certain caution given the assumptions made in the indirect 
estimation of fertility levels (National Research Council 2004).  Differing responses 
to  war  reflect  Sillanpää’s  (2002)  argument  that  the  demographic  impact  varies   18 
according to the length and severity of the conflict, together with the ability of the 
population to adapt and the extent of spousal separation. 
 
2.2 Post-Soviet Tajikistan: economic decline, civil war and food crises  
 
Tajikistan has experienced acute social and economic problems since independence.  
The extent of the crisis is difficult to overstate.  Tajikistan had been dependent on 
subsidies from Moscow during the Soviet era – making up 47% of total government 
revenues, the highest proportion in the USSR;  it also had the highest inter-republic 
trade  deficit  (Foroughi  2002).    The  withdrawal  of  subsidies  and  the  disruption  of 
trading relationships, together with the transition to a free-market economy, led to 
dramatic economic declines (Falkingham 2005).  By 1996, GDP was just 39% of 
1989 levels (TransMONEE 2006), the biggest decline in Central Asia, while its GDP 
per capita of $1,041 (purchasing power parity) in 1998 made it one of the poorest 
countries  in  the  world  (United  Nations  Development  Programme  2000).    Annual 
average  inflation  was  4%  in  1990,  then  increased  to  112%  in  1991,  the  year  of 
independence, before soaring to 1,157% in 1992 and 2,195% in 1993 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1997a).  It did not decline to double figures until 1997.  Real wages 
in 1994 were estimated to be 6% of 1989 levels, which represents the most dramatic 
decline  in  any  post-socialist  or  post-Soviet  country  (TransMONEE  2006).  
Unemployment  increased  (Falkingham  2000)  while  the  system  of  social  welfare 
collapsed (United Nations Development Programme 2000; De Soto et al. 2001).  Vast 
swathes of the population were plunged into poverty.  By the end of the millennium, 
95% of the population were classed as living below the official minimum subsistence 
level (Falkingham 2003).  The ability of the population to adapt through subsistence 
agriculture has been hampered not only by the difficult mountainous terrain, but also 
by the inherited Soviet system of collectivised land geared towards the production of 
cotton (see Duncan 2000).   
 
In  sum,  Tajikistan  -  which  was  the  poorest  of  the  Soviet  republics,  with  average 
income  in  1988  around  50%  of  that  in  the  Russian  Federation  (Atkinson  and 
Micklewright 1992:134) - has also experienced the most severe social and economic 
problems since independence, with a population among the least able to adapt to the 
changes thrust upon it.  No sphere of Tajik life has been left unaffected.  Education   19 
has  been  in  decline,  with  enrolment,  attendance  and  attainment  all  impacted 
(Falkingham 2000; United Nations Development Programme 2000).  The health care 
system has deteriorated (Falkingham 2003) while outbreaks of infectious disease have 
increased.    Life  expectancy  declined  for  both  men  and  women  (United  Nations 
Children's Fund 2001:7).   
 
In addition, over and above dramatic economic decline and social change, Tajikistan’s 
population has been subject to three specific shocks: a protracted civil war, lasting 
until 1997 but with peak fighting in the latter half of 1992, which represented the most 
bloody civil unrest in the post-Soviet republics; a food crisis in 1995, stemming from 
an acute shortage of grain; and a drought in 2000-01, which also led to severe food 
shortages.  This paper aims to assess whether there is evidence to suggest that these 
periods of crisis had a negative effect on marriage and fertility levels. 
 
2.2.1 Civil War 
 
Figures  for  the  number  of  casualties  in  the  civil  war,  between  supporters  of  the 
Communist party government and a coalition of groups in ‘opposition’, are hard to 
establish;  the  International  Crisis  Group  (2001)  estimate  that  60,000  to  100,000 
people were killed between 1992 and 1997, from a total population of 5.1 million (at 
the time of the 1989 census).  Many more were displaced by the conflict: 500,000-
600,000 people were internally displaced, mainly people in and around Kurgan-Tyube 
fleeing  to  the  capital  Dushanbe  (and  some  to  Gorno-Badakhshan  Autonomous 
Oblast);  an  estimated  70,000-100,000  fled  to  Afghanistan  (Foroughi  2002;  Lynch 
2002), the majority of whom had returned to their permanent place of residence by the 
end of 1993.  The most severe fighting took place in the last six months of 1992 in 
Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab (both in what is now the region of Khatlon) (Brown 1998), 
though the capital Dushanbe and the Region of Republican Subordination (RRS) were 
also  affected.    By  the  beginning  of  1993,  the  outcome  of  the  civil  war  had  been 
effectively decided after Communist forces took control of Dushanbe (Atkin 1997).   
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2.2.2 Food crisis in 1995 
 
By  the  mid-1990s,  the  economic  crisis  had  already  affected  household  food 
consumption.  Falkingham et al. (1997) cite unpublished World Bank data, based on 
Family Budget Surveys, to illustrate the decline in per capita food consumption in 
Tajikistan: from 1990 to 1993, there was a decrease of 50% in meat consumption, 
with  declines  of  40%  for  milk,  19%  for  vegetables  and  20%  for  bread.    This  is 
reflective of a change in diet composition, in which expenditures on bakery products 
and vegetables were more stable than those on protein  (Babu and Reidhead 2000), 
which Howell (1996) interprets as a ‘reductive’ response to the economic crisis.  The 
population became more dependent on the traditional staple of bread, the cheapest 
source of calories. 
 
Throughout the Soviet  era, Tajikistan was dependent on the import of grain from 
other  republics;  in  the  early  post-Soviet  years,  with  food  security  no  longer  the 
responsibility of Soviet central planning, trading links and payment mechanisms took 
time to be fully established.  As the World Food Programme (1996) reports, stocks of 
grain were drawn down to very low levels and the government was unable to establish 
any strategic reserves, while imports were severely restricted: 
 
‘Tajikistan  has  a  very  limited  ability  to  mobilise  adequate  cereal  supplies 
through commercial imports.  The accumulated debt exceeds GDP, and nether 
the  Government  nor  the  central  bank  have  significant  foreign  currency 
reserves.  Production of the main barter commodities – cotton and aluminium 
– has fallen sharply and is inadequate to cover essential imports…  Trading 
partners are not willing to provide cereals on credit terms.  The capacity to 
import has been further reduced by high world market cereal prices and poor 
harvests in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, the traditional suppliers.  
Cereal prices are higher than they have been for a decade.  With Tajikistan 
land-locked,  the  sources  of  cereals  are  limited.’  (World  Food  Programme 
1996, paragraph 24)  
 
The poor cotton crops in 1994 and 1995 contributed to the crisis.  Around 420,000 
tonnes of cotton seed had been delivered by the end of October 1994, around half the   21 
Soviet-era level  (Economist Intelligence Unit 1994a), with a similarly low crop in 
1995  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit  1996b).    This  further  limited  the  ability  of 
government to fund grain imports.  Imports in 1994-1995, nearly half of which were 
aid, were just half of the 1993-1994 level, leading to sharp declines in total cereal 
availability (Table 2.1).  Shortages of flour and basic foodstuffs, leading to social 
unrest in Dushanbe and other major cities, were reported in late 1994.  Russian troops 
were  drafted  in  to  guard  the  flour  and  bread  factories  in  Dushanbe  (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1994a). 
 
Table 2.1 Average cereal availability and utilisation in Tajikistan 1990-95 (thousand 
tons) 
  Average  1990-
92 
1993/4  1994/95 
Total availability  1720  1135  674 
  Opening stocks  350  80  26 
  Production  270  255  239 
  Imports  1100  800  409 
       
Utilisation  1720  1135  674 
  Food use  870  660  498 
  Feed use  400  309  60 
  Other uses  200  140  110 
  Closing stocks  250  26  6 
(Per  capita  consumption, 
kg/pa) 
(160)  (120)  (90) 
Source: FAO Global Information and Early Warning System, in World Food Programme (1996) 
 
The acute shortage of grain at this time prompted dramatic increases in bread prices.  
During the Soviet period, subsidised food prices had helped to maintain food security.  
Following independence, the first government of Tajikistan lifted controls on 80% of 
goods in January 1992 (Kaser 1997), but bread prices continued to be partly state-
controlled.  However, rationed state bread only provided for a fraction of people’s 
needs.  The price of open market bread, meanwhile, increased sixfold in the first six 
months  of  1995  (Grand  et  al.  2001).      In  May  1995,  at  the  same  time  as  a  new 
currency was introduced, the government announced a 150% increase in the price of 
state bread and flour products; in August, it announced the complete lifting of these 
price controls, with the Tajik prime minister arguing the move was unavoidable given 
that  bread  products  were  ‘four  or  five’  times  higher  in  neighbouring  Uzbekistan 
(Economist  Intelligence  Unit  1995b:40).    The  impact  of  these  price  rises  was 
accentuated by a severe shortage of cash in the republic.  Many state employees had   22 
not been paid since January 1994, while others had only been paid in kind (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1995a).  Meanwhile, the devaluation of the new national currency 
from May 1995 contributed to the bankruptcy of most of the collective (kolkhoz) and 
state (sovkhoz) farms, which were the main source of livelihood for rural households.  
Until 1995, the kolkhoz had still been able to pay their workers a small salary, despite 
the decrease in production and the disruption caused by the civil war (Grand et al. 
2001).   
 
The food crisis was widespread and acute.  The preceding years of economic crisis 
had  left  the  population  even  more  reliant  on  bread,  and  therefore  particularly  to 
vulnerable to changes in its availability and price.  The scarcity of flour, rationing of 
bread and increase in prices in 1995 was therefore a major problem: ‘families found 
themselves compelled to sell their last livestock and any other valuables they still 
possessed in order to purchase a few sacks of flour to feed their families for a couple 
of months’ (Harris 1998a:665).  Harris (2004:29) argues that ‘many people suffered 
significant hunger over a period of many months’, and that it was only the aid from 
international relief agencies that prevented famine
3.  
 
The shortage of grain persisted into early 1996, with further significant increases in 
bread prices (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996a).  However, the food supply crisis in 
1995 prompted the government to increase the production of wheat on kolkhoz farms 
and to allocate 50,000 hectares of farmland for household use (Grand et al. 2001).  It 
also prompted households to change their behaviour.  Harris (1998a:665-6)  notes 
that, after 1995, villagers decided to devote more of their private household plots to 
growing wheat, rather than vegetables.  The increase in the price of wheat also served 
to stimulate production.  Therefore, domestic grain output rose to a record 548,000 
tonnes  in  1996,  up  from  249,000  in  1995  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit  2001c).  
                                                 
3 There is historical precedent for the 1995 food crisis in Tajikistan.   As Harris describes (Harris 
2006:26), in the early part of the twentieth century, just as in the Soviet period, the population in what 
is now Tajikistan was reliant on grain imports after the Tsarist government persuaded local farmers to 
plant cotton rather than grain.  Just as in 1995, these imports were then disrupted – in this case during 
WW1 when the train lines were cut, stopping grain arriving from the north.  In the absence of any 
international aid, there was a serious famine, estimated to have killed almost a million people (Etherton 
1925:154).   23 
Consistent with this increased local availability, ‘wheat prices have risen by less than 
inflation,  and  there  has  been  no  evidence  of  severe  shortages  since  May  1996’ 
(Economist  Intelligence  Unit  1997b:30).    Indeed,  at  the  time  of  a  later  report 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1998b), bread had been in general widely available, and 
prices had stabilised, since mid-1996.  
 
2.2.3 Drought in 2000-01 
 
Domestic grain production remained high in 1997 and, although heavy rains damaged 
part of the crop in 1998 and 1999, production levels were still much higher than 
before the agricultural changes prompted by the food crisis in 1995.  But while land 
reform had increased the area of land devoted to wheat, yields were falling owing to a 
lack of credit for purchasing agronomic inputs (Economist Intelligence Unit 2000).  
Tajikistan  remained  far  from  grain  self-sufficiency,  with  an  estimated  300,000-
500,000 tonnes of wheat flour imports required annually for minimum consumption 
needs  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit  1998a).    International  aid  provided  100,000 
tonnes per  year.  In 1997 and 1998 Tajikistan liberalised its previously restrictive 
trade  regime  (McHugh  and  Gürgen  1999),  which  helped  to  facilitate  commercial 
imports and kept a ceiling on bread prices (Economist Intelligence Unit 1998a).  But 
food security remained  a big issue.  Flour prices remained high in comparison to 
household income.  In rural areas, in the absence of income from the kolkhoz, many 
came to rely heavily on their own wheat production from household plots.  More 
generally,  the  suite  of  social  and  economic  shocks  in  the  post-Soviet  era  had 
undermined any capacity to cope with further shocks such as a poor harvest.   
 
In 2000 and 2001, Tajikistan suffered a severe drought, estimated to be the worst for 
70 years.  Annual rainfall was below the long term average across the country.  Most 
significantly, rainfall in March and April in both years – the key months for the wheat 
crop cycle - were low, averaging less than half of the long term average (FAO/WFP 
2001).   This led to an almost total failure of the rainfed wheat crop and, as a result of 
low river levels stemming from reduced glacial snow reservoirs combined with poorly 
maintained  irrigation  systems,  significant  drops  in  the  irrigated  wheat  yield 
(FAO/WFP 2000).  Overall, wheat production dramatically declined from 475,000 
tonnes  in  1999  to  255,000  thousand  tonnes  in  2000  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit   24 
2001c:40) and 300,000 tonnes in 2001 (World Food Programme 2003).  This had a 
serious effect on food security.  There was a 63.6% increase in price of foodstuffs in 
2000 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2001c).  Especially vulnerable were those in rural 
areas whose household crop had failed.  The situation was particularly acute in the 
second year of drought in 2001, as people had exhausted whatever coping strategies 
remained
4.  As many as one million people faced malnutrition and potential starvation 
(Economist  Intelligence  Unit  2001a)  and  were  dependent  on  international  aid.  
Following the drought conditions in the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 cropping season, 
rain during the 2001/02 cropping season was in line with the long term average, and 
production in 2002 recovered to 1999 levels. 
 
2.3 Tajikistan’s fertility in historical perspective 
 
Figure 2.1 Total fertility in Tajikistan based on vital registration data, 1959-2000 
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Note: Rates pre-1989: plotted rate in 1975 refers to 1974-5; 1976 refers to 1975-6, etc.  No data found 
for 1987 and 1988.  Sources: Jones and Grupp (1987) for 1959-1974; Vestnik Statistiki (Goskomstat 
multiple years) for 1975-1986; TransMONEE (2006) for 1989-2000. 
                                                 
4 The head of the International Federation of Red Cross’ mission in 2001 reported that ‘people have 
already sold parts of their homes including doors and windows. They now have nothing left to sell.. We 
have seen children digging among rat holes in wheat fields, searching for grain hoarded by the rodents 
for the winter’ (IRINCAS 2001).   25 
Traditionally in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, demand for children has 
been high (Tabyshalieva 1997).  But in Pre-Soviet times, and into the Soviet era until 
after World War II, realised family size was limited by high levels of infant and child 
mortality associated with epidemics of measles and other diseases (Harris 2004). It 
was not until the 1960s that living standards and medical facilities were sufficient to 
reduce mortality and effect rapid population growth (Harris 2002).  Fertility rates also 
increased  (Anichkin  and  Vishnevskii  1994),  with  vital  registration  data  showing 
increases of 50% by the mid-1970s (Lutz and Scherbov 1994) (Figure 2.1).  This 
probably reflects a real increase in fertility - owing to a reduction in breastfeeding, 
improvements in nutrition and a reduction in the spousal age difference - but also 
increasingly  complete  birth  reporting  as  the  Soviet  registration  system  developed 
(Jones and Grupp 1987).   
 
Patriarchal and patrilocal social relations have been important in underpinning a high 
demand  for  children.    Men’s  status  is  dependent  on  the  number  of  their  (male) 
children, while a wife’s standing in a family also improves with childbearing.  It is 
therefore perhaps the ‘social traditions that have grown up round Islam, rather than 
the  religion  itself’  (Harris  2002:225),  that  have  encouraged  large  family  sizes.  
Further, in rural areas, children provide a much needed source of labour.  Soviet era 
influences  have  also  played  an  important  role:  as  Harris  (2002:218)  summarises, 
‘benefits paid to mothers of large families, cheap housing, free education and health 
care, free plots of land for members of communal and state farms, and the low costs 
of essential food stuffs all made it possible for most families to afford the economic 
costs  of  many  children  without  too  much  hardship’.    In  many  ways,  the  system 
represented an artificial ‘greenhouse’ environment, in which state population policy 
was important in shaping family decisions and, even amongst the urban population, 
reproduction  was  not  impacted  by  career  choices  (Sobotka  2002).    Indeed,  the 
pronatalist  Soviet  regime,  concerned  about  the  low  fertility  of  its  European 
population, made no attempt to take account of the very different demographic trends 
in its Central Asian populations (Barbieri et al. 1996).  Ironically, it was perhaps in 
Central Asia that its pronatalist policies had most influence.   
 
It  was  not  until  the  mid-1970s  that  family  planning  programmes  began  to  be 
introduced following concern about high population growth rates in the region.  In   26 
Tajikistan, the intrauterine device  (IUD) was introduced  around 1980 – but while 
demand was high among women, they often met resistance from their husbands or 
mothers-in-law and, in any case, supplies were limited (Harris 2002).  Nevertheless, 
according to vital registration data, fertility peaked in 1976 at 6.3 children per woman 
and had declined to 5.45 by 1984.  Pre-independence declines in fertility were largely 
restricted to those aged 35 years and over and probably largely reflected trends in the 
urban  population,  where  access  to  modern  contraceptives  was  easier  (Harris 
2002:219).  Thereafter, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, fertility increased slightly 
following  the  introduction  of  family  policy  measures  (United  Nations  Economic 
Commission for Europe 2000:182), reaching a peak in 1987.  Fertility subsequently 
started to decline, mirroring wider Soviet trends, and had reached a figure of 5.04 by 
the time of independence in 1991 (TransMONEE 2006).  Despite this decline, by the 
end of the Soviet era, Tajikistan was still regarded as ‘pre-transitional’ (Anichkin and 
Vishnevskii 1992:61).  Central Asia had the highest fertility rates in the Soviet Union, 
with Tajikistan showing the highest rates of all (Turner 1993) and the ideology of 
large families ‘well established’ among the local population (Harris 2002:219).     
 
2.4 Data and Method 
 
Under-registration of births has traditionally been a problem in Central Asian vital 
registration figures (Anderson and Silver 1989), and the quality of registration data 
has declined further since independence.  Aleshina and Redmond (2003) report that, 
even in a context of ex-Soviet countries, under-registration in Tajikistan is particularly 
acute.  In total, only 75% of children under 6 in 2000 had been registered (United 
Nations  Children's  Fund  2001).    Overall,  the  ‘reliability  and  relevance’  of  vital 
registration data have become ‘a cause of concern for both the Government and the 
international community’ (United Nations Population Fund 2004:2).   Owing to an 
increase  in  the  under-registration  of  births,  in  the  post-independence  period  ‘total 
fertility rates in Tajikistan are probably much higher than most [vital registration] 
statistics  would  suggest’  (Gentile  2005:8).    However,  some  attempt  to  correct  for 
under-registration is made.  Indeed, many children who are unregistered at the time of 
birth  are  registered  at  a  later  date,  often  at  the  age  of  seven  when  children  start 
attending school, since non-registered children cannot be enrolled.  Annual estimates 
of fertility are corrected to reflect these late registrations; at the end of 2007, the   27 
estimate for 2000 was in the process of being corrected.  The vital registration figures 
are much improved by this adjustment, but should still be used with an element of 
caution. 
 
This  paper  therefore  uses  birth  and  marriage  histories  from  two  nationally 
representative sample surveys, in preference to vital registration data, to reconstruct 
marital and fertility trends since independence: the 2003 Tajikistan Living Standards 
Survey  (TLSS),  and  the  2005  Multiple  Indicator  Cluster  Surveys  (MICS).    Both 
surveys included a female questionnaire, for women aged 15-49 at the time of the 
survey, with a section on the fertility history of respondents.  The numbers of women 
interviewed were 6,196 and 10,626 respectively.  Unlike the MICS, where only the 
dates of a woman’s first and most recent births were recorded, the TLSS contains a 
complete birth history – making it most suitable for analysing trends in total fertility 
and higher order births.  Meanwhile, unlike the TLSS, the MICS recorded the month 
and  year  of  a  woman’s  first  marriage,  making  it  the  most  suitable  for  analysing 
changes in nuptiality and first births within marriage
5.   
 
Use of survey data is not without its drawbacks.  First, since the surveys collected 
birth history information for women aged 15-49 years at the time of the survey, data 
are truncated in periods before the survey, with fertility rates based on a progressively 
younger sample of women as we go back in time (see Ní Bhrolcháin 1993).  To 
ensure comparability across time for periods before the survey, rates are calculated 
based on the births and exposure of women aged 15-34 years, for periods where the 
age distribution of women is complete up to age 35 years (1989 onwards)
6.  This is 
likely  to  yield  a  conservative  estimate  of  fertility  decline,  since  it  excludes  any 
                                                 
5 Many religious wedding ceremonies (nikoh) in Tajikistan are not officially registered (Dikaev 2005).  
Therefore, in the MICS survey, women were asked the question ‘In what month and year did you first 
marry or start living with a man as if married?’  This is a more accurate reflection of the date of union 
than  the  date  of  marriage  registration  and,  given  the  significant  under-registration  issues,  a  more 
complete  one.    Throughout  this  thesis,  the  terms  ‘rate  of  first  marriage’  and  ‘rate  of  first  union 
formation’ are used interchangeably; both refer to measures calculated on answers to this question.    
6 Truncation is less of an issue for trends in first unions and first births, which are concentrated at a 
relatively young age in Tajikistan: traditionally an unmarried woman over the age of 20 is in danger of 
being considered an ‘old maid’ (Tabyshalieva 1997:52).  Therefore, these rates are calculated based on 
events and exposure for women aged 15-29 years inclusive, for 1986 onwards.   28 
reductions in fertility among women aged 35 and over.  Second, reported birth history 
data are vulnerable to the omission or displacement of births (Potter 1977) - though 
this is perhaps less of an issue in Tajikistan, with the Soviet legacy of very high 
literacy  levels,  than  elsewhere  in  the  developing  world.    Unlike  the  2005  MICS, 
women’s dates of birth are not provided in the 2003 TLSS.  Only the woman’s age x, 
in  completed  years,  is  provided.    For  the  purposes  of  the  analysis,  the  woman  is 
assumed to be exactly x and a half years old at the time of the survey.   
 
The starting point in the analysis is the calculation of annual total fertility estimates 
for  15-34  year  olds  (hereafter  TFR15-34)  using  the  TLSS.    Importantly,  fertility 
estimates from surveys are subject to sampling variability (Dyson and Murphy 1985).  
It is therefore important to assess the statistical significance of differences between 
adjacent annual estimates.  Following Handwerker (1988) and Ren (2004), standard 
errors for each of the annual estimates of total fertility, and the covariance between 
adjacent estimates, are calculated using Tukey’s jackknife, with replicates based on 
the survey primary sampling units.  In turn, these are used to calculate confidence 
intervals for the difference in total fertility between two adjacent years of interest.    
 
Interest also lies in unpacking changes in overall fertility into the component trends in 
first unions, first births within unions, and higher order births.  Rates of first union 
formation (hereafter,  ‘rates of first marriage’), specific to those women who have 
never been in union (hereafter, ‘unmarried’ women), are calculated using a simple 
proportional hazards model:   
 
exp{ } ij j i λ λ β ′ = x                         (2.1) 
 
In this model, ij λ  is the hazard corresponding to woman i in age group j,  j λ  is the 
baseline  hazard  for  age  group  j,  andexp{ } iβ ′ x is  the  relative  risk,  a  proportionate 
increase or decrease in the rate associated with the covariate characteristics i x
7.  The 
chosen age groups chosen broadly reflect ‘early’ (15-17), ‘peak’ (18-20) and ‘late’ 
(21-29) ages at first union.  Since interest lies in describing overall trends in union 
                                                 
7 See Rodríguez (2007) for a helpful introduction to proportional hazard models.   29 
formation, dummy variables for calendar year are the only other covariates included.  
A similar model, with the same baseline categories, was used to describe trends in the 
rate of first births to childless women.  To more specifically examine rates of first 
birth to childless women within first union, a model was specified with process time t 
representing  time  since  first  union  and  the  baseline  hazard  divided  into  years  (12 
months or less since union; 13-24; 25-36; 37-48; 49-60 and more than 60 months)
8. 
 
Trends in higher order fertility are analysed using discrete-time logistic regression
9 
(Yamaguchi 1991).  A woman months table was created.  For each month t of woman 
i’s childbearing history between the ages of 15-34, the table contains her age, parity, 
and the time in months since her previous live birth.  The model is specified as:  
 
0 log
1
it
k kit l lit
k l it
p
P X
p
β β β
 
= + +   −   ∑ ∑                  (2.2) 
where pit is the probability of a live birth
10 to woman i in month t and Pkit is a vector 
of dummy variables representing period effects in the form of calendar years with 
coefficients βk.  Xlit represents a vector of controls for parity, age, age squared and 
duration since previous birth (less than one year; one to two years; two to four years; 
four to seven years; and greater than seven years), with coefficients βl.  Since the 
                                                 
8 In the MICS survey, the month but not the date of first union was recorded.  In calculating exposure 
time between date of first union and date of first birth, unions were assumed to take place on the 15
th of 
the month.  In total, 332 first births (8% of the total of 4,216 between 1986 and 2005 in the sample) 
were excluded: 15 first births to women who had never been in first union, and 317 births with an 
estimated conception date before marriage.   
9 Higher order births are pooled together in this model to increase the power of tests for differences in 
fertility between periods. 
10 Modelling the log-odds of a birth in a given month is preferred to shifting back the date of birth by 
nine months and modelling the log-odds of a conception.  Focusing only on conceptions does not 
account  for  any  period  effects  on  fertility  acting,  for  example,  through  changes  in  the  rate  of 
spontaneous abortions.    Ideally, one would use a series of models to estimate separately period effects 
on conceptions within union, and on spontaneous abortion after conception, but these data are not 
available.   30 
focus  is  on  higher  order  births,  all  woman  months  at  parity  0  are  excluded  from 
analysis
11.   
 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 2.2 Fertility trends in Tajikistan, 1989-2002, based on three different sources 
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Note: for explanation of child-women ratio, see footnote 13 (page 30). 
Sources:  vital  registration:  TransMONEE  (2006);  survey:  analysis  of  TLSS  (2003)  data;  census: 
calculations using data published in Tajikistan State Committee on Statistics (2001). 
 
Figure 2.2 presents variations in fertility levels in Tajikistan since 1989 according to 
three  different  sources:  vital  registration  (TFR15-49)
12,  TLSS  survey  (TFR15-34)  and 
                                                 
11 A covariate for the  woman’s highest educational  level  was also included but, since  made it  no 
difference to the nature of the temporal trend, was not retained.  A multilevel model was fitted which 
included a random parameter to allow for the correlation of observations across months at the woman 
level.  Since this parameter was not significant, the multilevel model was not used. 
12 No official registration data on age-specific fertility rates for Tajikistan are available after 1995 from 
TransMONEE (2006), precluding calculation of the TFR15-34 for direct comparison with the survey 
estimate.   31 
census  (child-woman  ratio15-44
13).      Trends  revealed  by  each  of  the  sources  – 
especially  the  census  and  survey  data  –  show  considerable  agreement.    All  three 
sources show a decline in fertility since independence in 1991.  The survey and census 
data suggest that fertility had also been declining in the years immediately before 
independence, consistent with 1987 being a peak fertility year across the Soviet Union  
(Becker and Hemley 1998; Agadjanian 1999).  Most interestingly, all three sources 
show that the post-Soviet trend has been far from a consistent, year-on-year decline.  
Indeed, fertility levels have fluctuated, to an extent which is unusual in comparison to 
the Soviet era (Figure 2.1), illustrating the importance of particular crisis periods. 
 
2.5.1 Civil War 
 
Vital  registration  data  show  a  very  sharp  fall  in  TFR15-49  from  1991  to  1992, 
compared to the more gradual decline apparent in survey and census data (Figure 2.2).  
This  probably  reflects  the  breakdown  in  the  registration  system  during  the  most 
intense period of fighting in the civil war in the latter half of 1992 – a conclusion 
which is supported by regional registration data (Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1) showing 
that this decline was particular to Khatlon, RRS and Dushanbe, the three regions most 
affected by the war.  The survey and census data show a decline in fertility from 1992 
to 1993, but at a similar rate to the decline in preceding years, suggesting that the 
intense fighting had little impact on aggregate fertility levels.  Similarly, while the 
odds of a higher order birth was significantly lower in 1992 than in the preceding year 
(odds ratio 0.84; 95% CI, 0.72-0.98; p=0.024
14), this is not especially distinctive in 
the context of previous year-on-year declines (Figure 2.3).  Overall, at the national 
                                                 
13 The census in Tajikistan took place in January 2000, time t.  Here the child-woman ratio in 1999 is 
calculated as the number of children aged 0 years at t per 1,000 women aged 15-34 years at t.  In the 
same way, the child-woman ratio for 1998 is the number of children aged 1 year at t per 1,000 women 
aged 16-35 years at t. Whipple’s index provided no evidence for strong age heaping in the census data.  
The ratio calculated here is conditional on survival of the children, as well as the women, until the time 
of the census so does not control for any changes in infant mortality across the period. 
14  This,  and  subsequent,  p-values  from  model  estimates  are  results  of  Wald  tests  assessing  the 
significance of a calendar year coefficient at the 5% level, compared with a reference comparison year.  
Standard errors were adjusted to take account of the surveys’ sample design.   32 
level, there is more evidence for a decrease in birth registration than a decrease in 
fertility as a result of the conflict. 
 
Figure 2.3 Relative risks of a first birth within union
1, 1986-2004; and odds ratios of 
a higher order birth
2, Tajikistan 1989-2002 [Reference year: 1989] 
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1 For women aged 15-29 inclusive.  Results of piecewise-constant hazard model.  See table A2 in 
Appendix for model coefficients. 
2 For women aged 15-34 inclusive.  Results of logistic regression controlling for parity, duration since 
previous live birth, age and age squared.  See table A1 in Appendix for model coefficients. 
Source: 1 analysis of MICS (2005); 2 analysis of TLSS (2003).   
 
Nevertheless, at the regional level, there is some evidence for a greater decline in 
fertility  in  1993  in  Khatlon,  RRS  and  Dushanbe,  the  places  most  affected  by  the 
conflict.  Limits placed on disaggregation by sampling variability preclude survey 
estimates specific by annual period and region.  However, the ‘child-woman ratio’ 
census estimates by region in Figure 2.4 do indeed show the greatest decline in these 
three regions – and only in these regions is there a significant rebound in fertility in 
1994.  Therefore, there is some indication, in line with the findings of Lindstrom and 
Bernahu (1999) and Agadjanian and Prata (2002), of a decline in births in places 
affected  by  intense  military  conflict,  followed  by  a  post-conflict  rebound.    This 
probably reflects the impact of spousal separation.  Meanwhile, detecting the direct 
effect on fertility of war-related mortality is compromised by the retrospective nature   33 
of the census and survey data, which is conditional on female survival to the date of 
data collection. 
 
Figure 2.4 Regional fertility trends in Tajikistan, 1989-1999: estimates using the 
2000 census 
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Note: for explanation of child-women ratio, see footnote 13 (page 30). 
Source: calculations using data published in Tajikistan State Committee on Statistics (2001).  
 
2.5.2 Food crisis and drought 
 
There is a sharp decrease in fertility between 1995 and 1996 (survey difference in 
TFR15-34 0.77; 95% CI, 0.38-1.15; p<0.001).  From 1994 to 1995 there were sharp 
declines in first marriages to unmarried women (relative risk 0.70; 95% CI 0.55-0.89; 
p=0.003) (Figure 2.5).  Given the very strong link between first marriage and first 
birth in Tajikistan
15, this was a major contributor to the fertility decline in 1996.   
 
                                                 
15 Across all the women in the survey to have had a first birth within marriage, almost 40% (65%) had 
their child within the first year (18 months) of marriage.   34 
Figure 2.5 Relative risks of a first union
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1 For women aged 15-29 inclusive.  Results of piecewise-constant hazard model.  See table A3 in 
Appendix for model coefficients. 
Source: analysis of MICS (2005). 
 
However, as Figure 2.3 shows, there were also declines in the rate of births within 
marriage.  There is strong evidence for a decline in first births to childless women 
within marriage from 1995 to 1996 (relative risk 0.69; 95% CI 0.55-0.87; p=0.002).  
Together with the decline in the rate of first marriage, this had a cumulative impact on 
the decline in the overall rate of first births to childless women from 1995 to 1996 
(relative risk 0.62; 95% CI 0.50-0.78; p<0.001) (Figure 2.6).  The odds of a higher 
order birth also fell significantly from 1995 to 1996 (odds ratio 0.84; 95% CI 0.74-
0.96;  p=0.008)  (Figure  2.3).    Overall,  there  is  a  suite  of  converging  evidence  - 
including distinctive decreases in overall fertility apparent in vital registration, census 
and TLSS survey data, and distinctive decreases in the rate of first marriage and rate 
of childbearing within marriage from MICS and TLSS data – which is consistent with 
a reduction in fertility because of the 1995 food crisis.   
 
As we might expect, since the population as a whole had been reliant on imports for 
its  grain  supply  (including  in  rural  areas,  where  cotton  dominated  agricultural   35 
production), census data suggest that the demographic effect of the grain shortage in 
1995 was spatially pervasive (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.6 Relative risks of a first birth
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1 For women aged 15-29 inclusive.  Results of piecewise-constant hazard model.  See table A4 in 
Appendix for model coefficients. 
Source: analysis of MICS (2005). 
 
Since the vital registration figures for 2000 onwards are yet to be adjusted for under-
registration,  and  the  census  took  place  in  2000,  only  survey  data  are  available  to 
investigate  the  most  recent  fertility  trends  (Figure  2.2).    Nevertheless,  the 
distinctiveness of the estimated decrease in total fertility from 2000 to 2001 (survey 
difference  in  TFR15-34  0.65;  95%  CI,  0.27-1.03;  p<0.001)  is  consistent  with  the 
importance of the drought.  Interestingly, there is no evidence for a decline in the rate 
of marriage, or in the rate of childbearing within marriage, during the first year of the 
drought.    During  the  second  year,  however,  when  the  population  experienced  the 
cumulative impact of two consecutive poor harvests, there are significant declines.   
From 2000-2001, there is a decline in the rate of marriage (relative risk: 0.68; 95% CI 
0.53-0.88; p=0.003) (Figure 2.5), the rate of first births within marriage (relative risk: 
0.73; 95% CI, 0.59-0.91, p=0.004) (Figure 2.3), the overall rate of first births (relative   36 
risk: 0.74; 95% CI, 0.60-0.92, p=0.007) and the odds of a higher order birth (odds 
ratio 0.83; 95% CI, 0.73-0.94; p=0.004) (Figure 2.3).   
 
The strong marriage and fertility responses to the crisis in 1995 and the drought in 
2000-01  in  Tajikistan  provide  further  support,  following  from  Galloway  (1988), 
Lindstrom  and  Bernahu  (1999)  and  Bengtsson  and  Dribe  (2006),  to  suggest  that 
periods of acute food shortage and high prices can have a significant demographic 
impact.    Further,  just  as  Bengtsson  and  Dribe  (2006)  and  Dyson  (1991a;  1991b) 
document an immediate, almost ‘anticipatory’ fertility response to food shortage, so 
the response is also immediate here.  The 1995 crisis developed over the winter of 
1994-95, when imports were only half of the 1993-94 level (Table 2.1).  Fertility 
declined significantly in 1996 (Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.6).  The swift nature of the 
response  to  the  crisis  points  towards  the  importance  of  behavioural  factors  in  the 
fertility decline.  Indeed, during the 1995 crisis an acute drop in the marriage rate was 
a key contributor to the fertility decline – especially so given that in Tajikistan births 
outside of marriage are rare.   
 
However,  there  is  also  evidence  for  a  decrease  in  the  rate  of  first  births  within 
marriage, and a decrease in higher-order births, in 1996 and 2001.  Contraceptive 
prevalence in Tajikistan is low: in 1991, among sexually active individuals, current 
use  of  modern  methods  was  estimated  at  3%  (Turner  1993).    By  1999  this  had 
increased to an estimated 30% (Falkingham 2000), with use confined to women at 
higher ages and parities.  However, prevalence in 1995 was almost certainly lower 
than this, and contraceptive use at older ages would not explain the decrease in the 
rate of first births within marriage.  If the reduction in births represented the deliberate 
postponement of childbearing, this must largely reflect the use of traditional methods.  
Bengtsson  and  Dribe  (2006)  judge  that,  in  a  population  in  pre-industrial  Sweden 
without modern methods, deliberate control was the main mechanism through which 
fertility was related to economic fluctuations. 
 
Biological  explanations  should  also  be  considered.    While  Bongaarts  (1980)  and 
Menken et al. (1981) conclude that chronic malnutrition has only a minor biological 
effect on fertility levels, acute malnutrition can have a significant impact.  Stein and 
Susser  (1975)  document  trends  in  fertility  during  the  Dutch  Famine  in  1944-5,   37 
illustrating a distinct fall in the number of births nine months after the onset of acute 
starvation  in  the  worst  affected  areas.    They  identify  a  ‘threshold’  calorific  value 
below which the nutritional impact on fertility becomes evident and conclude that the 
famine probably affected one or more of  the ‘preconditions’ for fecundity: on the 
woman’s side, her capacity for ovulation, fertilisation and nidation; for the couple, the 
man’s  capacity  for  ejaculation  and  insemination.    While  they  consider  ineffective 
nidation (resulting in spontaneous abortion) as the least likely of the preconditions to 
have been a major cause of infecundity in the Dutch Famine context, other studies do 
place  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  nutrition  to  levels  of  intra-uterine  mortality.  
Pebley et al. (1985), for example, examining data for rural Bangladesh, reports that 
mother’s nutritional status – in terms of both pre-conception weight and weight gain 
during pregnancy – is significantly related to foetal mortality.  Pregnancies conceived 
during May and June have a higher risk of failure than those conceived at other times, 
which may be related to the timing of conception in relation to the ‘lean’ period of 
June to October, before the rice is harvested.  Scott and Duncan (2002), meanwhile, 
use historical data for England from a number of parishes for particular periods from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth century to examine the seasonal relationship between 
nutrition and pregnancy outcomes.  They conclude that ‘the regular oscillation in the 
grain prices and the annual hungry season could cause periods of acute malnutrition in 
the working classes which could fall in one or more of the trimesters of pregnancy, 
with serious consequences for the unborn child’ (p.232), including, at worst, perinatal 
death. 
 
The psychological stress of a crisis can induce amenorrhea.  Cai and Feng (2005), for 
example, find evidence for an increase in foetal loss during the Cultural Revolution 
among well-nourished urban Chinese women, showing that the biological impact of 
periods of turmoil are not restricted to direct nutritional effects but can also act via an 
increased level of social stress.  A decrease in coital frequency, through a loss of 
libido  or  temporary  spousal  separation  because  of  migration,  is  a  further  possible 
reason for the decreases in births within marriage in 1996 and 2001.  Hionidou (2002) 
argues that contraception was not a major factor in the decrease in conceptions during 
famine on the Greek island of Syros, but that the decrease instead largely resulted 
from a loss of libido stemming from the psychological effect of the crisis.  Saito 
(2002),  meanwhile,  cites  literary  evidence  for  an  increase  in  the  ‘floating’  male   38 
population, in search for food and work, during famines in Japan, with the separation 
of  men  and  women  a  major  factor  in  fertility  declines  in  these  periods.    Indeed, 
Menken et al. (1981) advocate more vigorous searches for data which are able to 
provide evidence for the temporary separation of spouses during food crises.  In the 
Tajik case, Harris (1998a:661) points to the mid-1990s as a time in which men in the 
Gharmi villages of Khatlon decided to become migrant workers in other parts of the 
Soviet Union, while reports at the time suggest that the drought in Tajikistan in 2000-
01 prompted many men to leave the country to find work (OCHA 2000; World Food 
Programme  2001).    Given  the  low  prevalence  of  modern  contraceptive  methods, 
temporary labour migration may have been a contributor to the decline in the rate of 
childbearing within marriage from 1995 to 1996, and from 2000 to 2001.    
 
There are, therefore, many possible mechanisms for the decrease in the rate of first 
births within union, and in the odds of a higher order birth, in 1996 and 2001.  As 
Bongaarts  (1980:568)  concludes,  ‘a  lack  of  sufficiently  detailed  data  makes  it 
impossible to estimate accurately the contributions made to the fertility decline from 
each of these factors’.  It seems likely that a combination of factors were responsible, 
but  explanations  involving  biology  (whether  through  acute  malnutrition  or 
psychological  stress)  and  spousal  separation  seem  more  reasonable  than  those 
focusing  on  deliberate  postponement,  given  the  low  prevalence  of  modern 
contraception.   Whatever the reason for the declines, there is evidence for a rebound 
in higher order fertility, and in the rate of first births within marriage, following the 
1995 and 2000-01 crises (Figure 2.3).  In contrast, there was a longer lasting impact 
on marriage levels (Figure 2.5).  Indeed, the 1995 case in particular not only involved 
food shortage but a number of more lasting economic changes.  Food shortages eased 
from  mid-1996  but  bread,  following  the  end  of  subsidies,  was  now  much  more 
expensive than before.  Further, the bankruptcy of most of the collective (kolkhoz) and 
state (sovkhoz) farms, following the rapid inflation in 1995, led to persistent under- or 
non-payment of workers in the following years (Grand et al. 2001).  These changes, 
particularly  in  the  Tajik  context  when  the  ceremony  itself  is  traditionally  very 
expensive  and  a  focus  for  conspicuous  demonstrations  of  wealth  (Tett  1996), 
undermined people’s ability to finance the costs of a wedding and family formation.   
Galloway (1988) also notes that the effects of economic crisis on marriage can be 
prolonged, while Palloni et al. (1996:107) argue that ‘when the economic effects of   39 
the crisis are long-lasting, a more permanent disequilibrium in the marriage markets 
sets in, and the making up of postponed marriages ceases to be a feasible option.  The 
consequence is an increase in the proportion of members who never marry’.  This 
describes the Tajik situation well; sustained low marriage rates since the mid-1990s 
will inevitability translate to an increase in the never-married.   Large scale labour 
migration, as well as influencing fertility within marriage, is likely also to be a factor 
in the prolonged marriage decline, given qualitative accounts of a sharp imbalance in 
the sex ratio (for example, Harris 1998a).  Indeed, labour migration from Tajikistan 
has become widespread: Olimova and Bosc (2003), using survey data, estimate that in 
26% of Tajik households at least one household member had worked abroad at some 
point between 2000 and 2003.   
 
2.5.3 Overall trend 
 
Just  as  in  Kazakhstan  (Agadjanian  et  al.  2008a),  Uzbekistan  (Agadjanian  and 
Makarova 2003) and ex-Soviet Europe (for example, Perelli-Harris 2005), fertility 
decline in Tajikistan in the early 1990s was driven by reductions at higher orders 
while first order rates were stable (see Figure 2.7, which summarises the component 
trends in total fertility).  In contrast, from the mid-1990s, fertility decline has been 
effected through a decrease in the rate of first births to childless women.  In turn, 
since - outside of particular crisis periods - the rate of first births to childless women 
within marriage has remained relatively stable (Figure 2.3), and since conceptions 
outside of marriage are rare
16, this has been driven by a decrease in the rate of first 
marriage  (Figure  2.5).    Meanwhile,  rates  of  birth  at  higher  orders  have  remained 
relatively stable since the mid-1990s (Figure 2.3).  It should be acknowledged that, 
since the analysis is restricted to women aged 34 and under, there could have been a 
significant  reduction  in  fertility  at  higher  ages  which  has  remained  undetected.  
Nevertheless, for the ages considered, it is clear that the decline in higher order births 
to in the late 1980s and early 1990s has not been sustained (Figure 2.7). 
                                                 
16  332  first  births  (8%  of  the  total  in  the  sample)  were  estimated  to  have  been  conceived  before 
marriage (see footnote 8, page 29).    40 
Figure 2.7 Total fertility (TFR15-34) trends by birth order in Tajikistan, 1989-2002 
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Source: analysis of TLSS (2003). 
 
This lack of decline at higher orders may reflect unmet need for contraception rather 
than a lack of impetus among the population for fertility decline.  Indeed, the women 
in villages in which Harris (1998b:200) conducted her research ‘made it very clear 
that their major concern was control over their fertility’.  In the poorer families, ‘both 
men and women.. are desperate to limit their fertility.  Although their ideal number of 
children remains four to six, most young couples know they will not be able to cope 
with  so  many  without  a  large  improvement  in  their  financial  situation  and  that 
realistically  they  should  have  no  more  than  two’  (Harris  2002:220-221).    Thus, 
Harris’ (2002:220)  judgement is that fertility would fall further if adequate access to 
contraceptives  could  be  supplied.    It  is  true  that  contraceptive  use  has  increased.  
Results from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys carried out by UNICEF estimate 
modern prevalence at 27% in 2000 and 34% in 2005, with the IUD by far the most 
popular method and contraceptive use confined to women at higher ages and parities 
(TransMONEE  2006).    However,  this  remains  the  lowest  rate  in  Central  Asia, 
compared  to  42%  in  Uzbekistan  (in  2002),  39%  in  Kazakhstan  (1999),  36%  in 
Kyrgyzstan (1997), and 35% in Turkmenistan (2000) (Westoff 2005).    41 
2.6 Conclusions and future research 
 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  sparse  literature  on  the  demography  of  post-Soviet 
Central Asia.  It focuses on Tajikistan, a republic with the highest population growth 
rate during the Soviet era.  It finds parallels with the pattern of fertility change in other 
post-Soviet  republics  in  Central  Asia  and  Eastern  Europe,  with  fertility  decline 
initially driven by decreases at higher orders before first order declines from the mid-
1990s.   
 
The paper also contributes to the literature on the demography of conflict and of food 
crises.  It shows that the sharp decline in official fertility data during the peak in 
fighting in Tajikistan in 1992 probably reflects a decrease in birth registration, though 
there is also some evidence that the fertility decline from 1992 to 1993 was greatest in 
areas worst affected by the conflict.  Most significantly, it finds a suite of converging 
evidence consistent with a sharp reduction in nuptiality and fertility during the 1995 
food crisis.  It also finds evidence for a further reduction in nuptiality and fertility 
during the second year of the 2000-01 drought. 
 
Tajikistan’s  experience  illustrates  the  importance  of  context  in  understanding  the 
demographic effects of post-socialist economic crisis.  Mountainous Tajikistan has 
one of the lowest ratios of arable land per head in the world (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2001b) and, particularly at the time of independence, much of this was devoted 
to  the  production  of  cotton.    Therefore,  during  the  Soviet  era,  Tajikistan  was 
dependent  on  grain  imports.    This  lack  of  self-sufficiency  left  the  population 
particularly vulnerable to the collapse of Soviet central planning, which had assured 
minimum  consumption  levels  and  food  security.    When,  by  the  mid  1990s,  the 
government  could  no  longer  afford  to  import  sufficient  grain,  a  food  crisis  was 
inevitable.  In contrast, Kazakhstan, for example, was a net exporter of grain during 
the Soviet period, did not experience a comparable food crisis in the mid-1990s, and 
was not affected by the 2000-01 drought.  Its post-Soviet demographic experience is 
likely to be very different to that of Tajikistan.  Therefore, further research comparing 
the  particularities  of  marital  and  fertility  change  in  the  different  Central  Asian 
republics would be valuable.  The demography of post-Soviet Central Asia remains an 
under-researched field.   42 
3. Marrying more and earlier: age-period interaction in trends of 
first union formation in transitional Central Asia  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The literature on the recent demographic history of Central Asia is sparse.  This paper 
uses survey data to calculate trends in first union formation in the region during the 
transitional  years immediately before  and after the end of the Soviet Union – the 
perestroika and early post-independence years.  Results show a sharp increase in the 
rate  of  first  union  formation  in  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan,  with  rates 
peaking in the early 1990s at around a third higher than 1988 levels, and a smaller 
relative  increase  in  Kazakhstan.    There  is  also  evidence  for  a  clear  age-period 
interaction effect: increases were most marked at younger ages, while rates for older 
unmarried women remained relatively stable.  Possible explanations for the increase 
in union formation are discussed, including the impetus provided by the strengthening 
of ‘conspicuous consumption’ in wedding ceremonies, and the role of marriage as a 
reaction to the uncertainties of the transitional period. 
 
Keywords:  Central  Asia,  nuptiality,  union  formation,  perestroika,  post-Soviet, 
conspicuous consumption, uncertainty   43 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The republics of Central Asia experienced dramatic social and economic changes in 
the late- and post-Soviet years.  However, relatively little is known about the region’s 
demographic trends over the period (Gentile 2007).  This paper describes trends in 
first  union  formation  in  four  of  the  five  Central  Asian  republics:  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  While chapter 4 will focus solely on the post-
Soviet  period,  this  chapter  focuses  specifically  on  trends  in  first  union  formation 
during the transitional years immediately before and after the end of the Soviet Union 
– the perestroika and early post-independence years.  
 
3.1.1 Union formation in pre-Soviet and Soviet Central Asia 
 
Women in Central Asia have traditionally married at an early age.   In pre-Soviet 
times, girls often married in their early teens (Jones and Grupp 1987; Tett 1996). 
Marriages were arranged by close family members and involved the payment of a 
kalym or bride price paid by the bridegroom or his family (Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh 
2002:171; De Santi 2006).  Following marriage, women become part of the husband’s 
household,  typically  a  large  extended  family.    The  kelin  (‘incomer’)  had  a  lowly 
position within her new household, though her status improved with childbearing, 
particularly  if  she  gave  birth  to  sons  (Falkingham  2000).    The  Soviet  system 
attempted to transform family life in Central Asia.  However, while laws were passed 
banning marriage without the consent of the bride and banning the payment of kalym, 
these practices remained widespread throughout the Soviet era, and there were still 
occasional instances of polygamy (Atkin 1989; De Santi 2006).  Meanwhile, despite 
Soviet efforts to reduce wedding expenditure, the traditional elaborate and lengthy 
festivities remained popular. These examples illustrate that, despite widescale social 
change, tradition has remained important.  As in Eastern Europe, a sharp distinction 
arose between public and family life, with the family the only remaining ‘private’ 
institution and non-official form of socialisation (Sobotka 2002).   
 
It is equally true, of course, that there were dramatic increases in the participation of 
women  in  education  and  employment  during  the  Soviet  era.    The  spread  of 
compulsory education for women, first to age 14 years and then to age 17 years, was   44 
particularly important to the gradual increase in the age at first marriage – and more 
so  than  the  legislation  introduced  to  raise  the  legal  minimum  age  for  both  sexes, 
which could be subverted if so desired by delaying official marriage registration for 
several months or years after the nikoh Muslim ceremony (Tett 1996).  By the end of 
the 1980s, very early marriages were rare – with women typically marrying in their 
late teens or early twenties.  Overall, however, and partly because of isolation from 
trends towards Islamisation and feminism beyond the Soviet Union (Harris 2004), 
‘traditional  patterns  of  behaviour  continued  to  dominate  gender  relations’ 
(Falkingham 2000:9) – and this was reflected in demographic behaviour.  Marriage 
remained  nearly  universal  and  there  was  a  swift  progression  from  marriage  to 
childbearing  (Tabyshalieva  1997).    Non-marital  births  were  relatively  rare,  
particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, representing an estimated 4% and 7% of 
total  births  in  1989  respectively,  compared  to  12%  in  Kazakhstan  and  13%  in 
Kyrgyzstan  (TransMONEE 2006). 
 
There are also differences in nuptiality between the republics.  In pre-Soviet times, as 
Jones and Grupp (1987) explain, sex roles tended to be more egalitarian among the 
semi-nomadic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs - with women playing a more active economic 
role and with more independence in everyday life - than in the oasis cultures of the 
Uzbeks and Tajiks, where female roles were more restrictive, women occupied a more 
subordinate role within the household system and daughters were married off at an 
earlier  age.    These  differences  are  reflected  in  Soviet-era  education  and  labour 
statistics,  with  the  ratio  of  females  to  males  with  completed  secondary  education 
consistently  higher  in  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  than  in  Tajikistan  and  in 
Uzbekistan  from  1959  to  1979  (Jones  and  Grupp  1987:214),  and  with  a  higher 
proportion of working-age women involved in the non-agricultural workforce in the 
former  two  republics  (Jones  and  Grupp  1987:216).    Correspondingly,  while  the 
average age at marriage of females increased across Central Asia during the Soviet 
period (Coale 1993), rates of early marriage – in terms of the number married per 
1,000 women aged 16-19 – in 1970 were higher in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan than 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
17 (Jones and Grupp 1987:226).  
                                                 
17 The respective rates per 1,000 are 249, 217, 201 and 123 in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan.   45 
3.1.2 Union formation in transitional Central Asia 
 
Very few studies have examined trends in family formation in Central Asia in the 
years immediately preceding and subsequent to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
However,  Dommaraju  and  Agadjanian  (2008)  use  survey  data  to  calculate 
probabilities of first union formation over this period.  They show that the probability 
of first marriage for unmarried women in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
changed relatively little from the mid-1970s to towards the end of the 1980s.  In 
contrast,  they  note  a  sharp  increase  in  the  probability  of  marriage  from  1988  in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with rates peaking in the early post-independence years – 
though the increase in the rate of first union formation in Kazakhstan was relatively 
modest.    Dommaraju  and  Agadjanian’s  study  lends  support  to  the  findings  of 
Agadjanian  and  Makarova’s  (2003)  study  focusing  on  Uzbekistan.    Using 
retrospective survey data from 1996, they find that women who reached marriageable 
age  during  the  perestroika  period  before  independence  were  more  likely  to  have 
married by a given age than those from preceding cohorts. 
 
Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003)  present  four  possible  explanations  for  the 
distinctiveness of the perestroika period in terms of first union formation.  First, the 
trend  for  ‘conspicuous  consumption’  in  wedding  ceremonies  was  strengthened  as 
economic  restructuring,  including  the  legalisation  of  private  business  activity, 
promoted the accumulation of private wealth.  The aim of the ‘restructuring’ of the 
Soviet economy was to develop a more efficient Soviet, yet still socialist, economy 
which would provide an improved standard of living for its citizens (Buckley 1992).  
The focus was on decentralisation and increasing the scope for decision making at a 
local  level,  reflected  in  the  shift  in  control  of  state  enterprises  from  ministries  to 
workers’  collectives.    State  enterprises  became  free  to  determine  output  based  on 
demand.  Meanwhile the 1988 Law on Cooperatives, enacted to encourage individual 
entrepreneurial  behaviour,  permitted  private  ownership  of  businesses  in  certain 
sectors.  The widespread changes during the perestroika era were such that they were 
considered  a  watershed  in  people’s  lives:  indeed,  Koroteyeva  and  Makarova 
(1998:588)  argue  that  ‘the  deep  social  transformations  in  Uzbekistan were  in  fact 
initiated not so much by the economic reforms of the newly independent Uzbek state 
but  by  the  economic  climate  of  Gorbachev’s  perestroika  in  the  later  years  of  the   46 
Soviet system’.  During the Soviet-era economy of shortage there were limited outlets 
for  spending  money  and  this  situation  intensified  during  perestroika,  such  that  a 
‘monetary overhang’ – excess cash relative to available goods, given price controls – 
developed in the late 1980s (Klugman and Schieber 1996:13).  It is in this context in 
which, Agadjanian and Makarova (2003) argue, conspicuous consumption in wedding 
celebrations  gained  further  impetus.    While,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
marriages  were  already  a  platform  for  family  demonstrations  of  wealth,  their 
fieldwork  suggests  that  the  scale  of  celebrations  in  Uzbekistan  had  reached  new 
heights by the end of the 1980s – to such an extent that ‘the race to affirm and display 
the family’s socioeconomic position through lavish wedding ceremonies may have 
prompted  many  families  to  marry  off  their  daughters  earlier’  (p.459).    A  second 
possible reason for the increase in first union formation in Uzbekistan, according to 
Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003),  is  that  the  concomitant  increase  in  dowry 
requirements may have encouraged families to marry their daughter before any further 
increases.   
 
The third possible explanation relates to the increase in Uzbek nationalism during this 
period  -  which  may  have  helped  encourage  the  traditional  preference  for  early 
marriage, particularly in the early post-independence years.  Indeed, as Kandiyoti and 
Azimova (2004:237) argue, life-cycle ceremonies are important to Uzbek identity and 
weddings  at  this  time  became  occasions  in  which  the  return  to  ‘authentic’  Uzbek 
forms, including preference for ‘traditional’ rather than European dress, was evident.  
Fourth, the rapid changes of the perestroika period, and rumours of future changes, 
may have encouraged families to find a husband who would look after their daughter 
in uncertain times (Agadjanian and Makarova 2003).  Indeed, the role of uncertainty 
has been considered in explanations of demographic changes in post-Soviet Europe: 
Sobotka (2003; 2004) relates the lack of postponement of childbearing, compared to 
the increase in the female mean age at first birth in post-communist Central Europe, to 
poor economic prospects and uncertainty.  He draws on Friedman et al.’s (1994:382) 
theory  of  the  value  of  children,  which  presents  marriage  as  one  of  the  ‘global 
strategies’ in which rational actors seek to reduce uncertainty regarding ‘whole strings 
of future courses of action’ by ‘bind[ing] themselves to courses of action which are 
largely  independent  of  future  states  of  the  world’.    In  the  Central  Asian  context,   47 
arranging a marriage for a son, or particularly a daughter, in the uncertain years of 
transition may have been seen as an important means of securing their future.   
 
This paper seeks to build on the research of Agadjanian and Makarova (2003) and 
Dommaraju and Agadjanian (2008).  First, by using different survey data, it aims to 
corroborate  the  sharp  increase  in  rates  of  union  formation  during  the  transitional 
years.    Second,  by  including  Tajikistan  as  well  as  Uzbekistan,  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan in the analysis, it extends the description of trends to four of the five 
Central Asian Republics
18.  Tajikistan is an interesting case because it is the only one 
of these republics to have experienced a civil conflict in the years of transition.  The 
International Crisis Group (2001) estimate that 60,000 to 100,000 people were killed 
between 1992 and 1997, from a total population of 5.1 million (at the time of the 1989 
census).  As Brown (1998) reports, the most severe fighting took place in the last six 
months of 1992 and was concentrated in Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab (both in what is 
now the region of Khatlon).  Given past studies illustrating the demographic impact of 
war (for example, Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999; Agadjanian and Prata 2002), it will 
be  interesting  to  examine  the  distinctiveness  of  trends  in  first  union  formation  in 
Tajikistan,  particularly  at  the  time  of  the  peak  fighting  in  1992,  compared  to 
neighbouring republics.  Indeed, on the one hand, given the results of Agadjanian and 
Makarova (2003) and Dommaraju and Agadjanian (2008) for other countries in the 
region, we might expect a significant increase in the rate of union formation during 
the period – but, on the other hand, the civil conflict might be expected to have had a 
disruptive  influence  on  aggregate  trends  in  nuptiality.    Third,  by  including  an 
interaction between age and calendar  year in  models of first union formation, the 
paper considers possible differences in the trends of union formation for different age 
groups of unmarried women.  It therefore tests for a change in the age distribution of 
first union formation as well as examining the trend in the overall rate. 
 
                                                 
18 While MICS3 survey data for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are available for 
academic research, data for Turkmenistan are restricted (http://www.childinfo.org/mics3_surveys.html)   48 
3.2 Data and Method 
 
Official data on first union formation in Central Asia are inadequate for a reliable 
assessment of temporal trends.  In Tajikistan, for example, even before independence, 
the date of marriage registration with Soviet authorities was never a reliable indicator 
of  the  date  of  the  religious  ceremony  nikoh,  after  which  the  couple  would  live 
together.    Underage  marriages  were  concealed  from  the  authorities  by  delaying 
registration at the civil registry office (ZAGS), sometimes for several years.  Even for 
‘legal’  marriages,  there  might  be  a  gap  before  registration,  while  some  couples 
disregarded registration altogether.  As Harris (2004:39) summarises, compared to the 
nikoh, ‘civil registration was of little importance to Tajiks’ and was viewed simply as 
a  means  of  providing  access  to  resources  like  family  allowances.    In  the  post-
independence  context,  with  the  virtual  collapse  of  the  social  security  system  (see 
Falkingham 2000), the motivation for registration has further reduced – particularly 
given  the  introduction  of  a  registration  fee.    Qualitative  accounts  suggest  that 
polygamy in Tajikistan has increased since independence (Tabyshalieva 1997), but 
since this is illegal these unions are also unrecorded.  Overall, Dikaev (2005) reports 
one estimate which suggests that only half of  all marriages in Tajikistan are now 
officially registered.  Under-registration is also a problem in other Central Asian states 
(Dommaraju and Agadjanian 2008). 
 
Therefore, because of the inadequacy of official data, survey data are used to calculate 
rates of first union formation in late- and post-Soviet Central Asia.  The latest round 
of Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS3), carried out by UNICEF, represent the 
most recent data available.  They are nationally representative sample surveys with a 
women’s  questionnaire,  for  those  aged  15-49  at  the  time  of  the  survey,  which 
included questions on union formation.  Specifically, women were asked the question 
‘In what month and year did you first marry or start living with a man as if married?’  
This is a more accurate reflection of the date of first union than the date of marriage 
registration and, given the significant under-registration issues, a more complete one.   
Surveys  were  carried  out  in  Tajikistan  (2005),  Kyrgyzstan  (2005/6),  Kazakhstan 
(2006)  and  Uzbekistan  (2006),  with  10,626,  7,043,  14,719  and  14,205  women   49 
interviewed respectively.  In a small number of cases where month or year of first 
union was missing, these data were imputed
19. 
 
For each country, rates of first union, specific to those women who have never been in 
union  (hereafter,  ‘unmarried’  women),  are  calculated  using  a  simple  proportional 
hazards exponential model: 
 
exp{ } i i λ λ β ′ = x                         (3.1) 
 
In this model, i λ  is the hazard corresponding to individual i, λ  is the baseline hazard 
when i x =0, andexp{ } iβ ′ x is the relative risk, a proportionate increase or decrease in 
the rate associated with the covariate characteristics i x .  Taking logs, we obtain the 
additive log-linear model: 
 
log i i λ α β ′ = +x                           (3.2) 
 
where α  is the log of the baseline hazard.  Initially, since interest lies in describing 
overall trends in first union formation, dummy variables for calendar year are the only 
covariates  and  age  intervals  are  not  included.    This  is  equivalent  to  assuming  a 
constant baseline hazard across process time t, time since 15
th birthday.  However, 
since  each  survey  collects  information  for  women  aged  15-49  at  the  time  of  the 
survey, data are truncated in periods before the survey (see Ní Bhrolcháin 1993).  To 
ensure  comparability  across  time,  rates  are  calculated  based  on  first  unions,  and 
exposure to first unions, for women aged 29 or under, for periods where the age 
distribution of women is complete up to age 30.  Thus rates are reconstructed for a 
period  of  20  years  before  each  survey.    Since  first  unions  in  Central  Asia  are 
concentrated at a relatively young age - traditionally an unmarried woman over the 
                                                 
19 Age at first union, which was also asked in the surveys, was used as the basis for imputation.  The 
Tajikistan survey data contained the highest proportion of missing dates: of 6571 women ever to have 
been in a union, 282 months of union and 216 years of union were imputed, while 12 women missing 
both date of union and age at union information were excluded.   50 
age of 20 is in danger of being considered an ‘old maid’ (Tabyshalieva 1997:52) - 
truncation is not a significant problem.   
 
Interest also lies in examining trends in first union formation for different age groups.  
A piecewise exponential model can be specified where the process time t, time since 
15
th birthday, is split into age intervals j, assuming a constant hazard within these 
intervals: 
 
log ij j i λ α β ′ = +x                         (3.3) 
 
The age intervals chosen broadly reflect ‘early’ (15-17), ‘peak’ (18-20) and ‘late’ (21-
29)  ages  at  first  union.  Implicitly,  under  the  proportional  hazards  assumption,  the 
effect of the calendar year covariates is assumed to be the same for all age intervals j.  
However,  the  model  is  extended  to  allow  for  the  relaxation  of  this  assumption.  
Specifically, an interaction between the age intervals and calendar year is included in 
the model to allow for differences in trends in first union formation for different age 
groups of unmarried women:  
 
log ij j i j λ α β ′ = +x                         (3.4) 
 
where j β  represents the effect of a calendar period for age interval j.   
 
The survey also collected information on, for example, place (urban/rural) and region 
of residence, and the woman’s educational background, but these were not used as 
covariates  since  all  relate  to  the  time  of  the  survey  only.    Hoem  and  Kreyenfeld 
(2006a; 2006b) warn against an anticipatory approach which conditions on the future.  
In any case, the focus here is on national-level trends.   
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3.3 Results 
 
Figure 3.1 presents trends in first union formation for women in late- and post-Soviet 
Tajikistan,  Uzbekistan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan.    In  the  late  Soviet  period, 
marriage  rates  were  higher  in  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  than  in  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Kazakhstan,  reflecting  long-standing  cultural  differences  regarding  gender  and 
familial systems  (Jones and Grupp 1987).  In all four republics, there were increases 
in the rate of first union formation during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This is in 
line with Dommaraju and Agadjanian’s (2008) results for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan,  and  those  of  Agadjanian  and  Makarova’s  (2003)  study  focusing  on 
Uzbekistan.    The  increases  were  most  significant  in  Tajikistan,  Uzbekistan  and 
Kyrgyzstan, where rates peaked at around a third higher than 1988 levels (Table 3.1).  
The relative increase in the rate of first union formation in Kazakhstan was smaller, 
corroborating the relatively stable trend in first union formation over the period found 
by  Dommaraju  and  Agadjanian  (2008)
20.    Following  the  peak  in  the  early  post-
independence years, rates of first union formation declined sharply; this is discussed 
in more detail in chapter 4. 
 
To explore changes in the rate of first union formation for different ages in Central 
Asia, an interaction was included between calendar year and age group in the survival 
model of union formation for each country (equation 3.4).  In each case, adding these 
interaction terms significantly improved the fit of the model.  Results are presented in 
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2.  In all four republics, the increase in rates of first union 
formation in the early 1990s was most marked at younger ages.  Indeed, by the early 
                                                 
20 The relatively small increase in first union formation in Kazakhstan is not simply a function of its 
ethnic makeup.  It is true that Russians represent a bigger proportion of the population than in the other 
Central  Asian republics: of the  women interviewed in the survey, 26% lived in households  where 
Russian is the mother tongue of the household head, compared to 11%, 1% and 4 % in Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  respectively.    However,  interestingly,  Russians  in  Kazakhstan  have  had 
higher rates of first union formation than Kazakhs (Agadjanian 1999; Dommaraju and Agadjanian 
2008).  Indeed, when the hazard models presented in Section 3.2 were re-run examining rates of union 
formation for the titular ethnic group only in each country (i.e. considering models with an interaction 
between  ethnicity  and  year),  the  distinctiveness  of  the  Kazakh  pattern  remained:  Kazakhs  in 
Kazakhstan showed a much smaller increase in the rate of union formation during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s than Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and Tajiks in Tajikistan.   52 
1990s the rate of marriage for unmarried women at ages 15-17 was more than double 
the 1988 level in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and almost double the 1988 
level in Kazakhstan.  This ties in with the accounts of Koroteyeva and Makarova 
(1998:594) and Kuzibaeva (2001), who note an increase in marriages to young, and 
even underage, women in Uzbekistan during the transition years.  Moreover, while 
there are also significant increases in the rate of first union formation at ages 18-20 in 
all  four  republics  over  the  period,  the  rate  at  older  ages  (21-29)  was  –  with  the 
exception of Kyrgyzstan - relatively stable.  Therefore, the nature of the age-period 
interaction effect is clear.  While there was an increase in the overall rate of first union 
formation in the Central Asian republics, there was also a shift in the age at union 
distribution.  Compared to the late 1980s, unmarried women in the early 1990s were 
not only marrying more but also at an earlier age.     53 
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Figure 3.1 Rate of first union formation
1 in Central Asia (three-year moving average) 
1 Rates per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years inclusive. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
 
Table 3.1 Relative risks
1 of union formation in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate
2 
  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
1987    1.03  1.01   
1988  (131)   -  (132)   -  (163)   -  (150)   - 
1989  1.04  1.13  1.13  1.09 
1990  1.13  1.24  1.20  1.13 
1991  1.18  1.33  1.29  1.25 
1992  1.10  1.32  1.29  1.27 
1993  1.06  1.16  1.28  1.35 
1994  1.00  1.06  1.11  1.24 
1995  0.96  0.97  0.92  1.10 
1996  0.85  0.90  0.84  0.97 
1997  0.81  0.84  0.83  0.92 
1998  0.76  0.79  0.77  0.87 
1999  0.77  0.91  0.70  0.82 
2000  0.77  0.93  0.60  0.75 
2001  0.77  0.90  0.56  0.70 
2002  0.75  0.81  0.51  0.65 
2003  0.73  0.82  0.54  0.66 
2004  0.71      0.69 
Nu  6,473  3,429  4,506  6,691 
Nwy  56,953  25,727  38,098  50,617 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation. 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 
years inclusive. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period for sampled 
women. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
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Figure 3.2 Rate of first union formation
1 for different age groups in Central Asia (three-year moving average) 
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1 Rate (y-axis) per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women in age group.  Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
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Table 3.2 Relative risks
1 of union formation for different age groups in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate
2 
 
  Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
    15-17  18-20  21-29    15-17  18-20  21-29    15-17  18-20  21-29    15-17  18-20  21-29 
1987            1.10  1.00  1.06    0.98  1.06  0.97         
1988    (26) -  (162) -  (232) -    (32) -  (202) -  (236) -    (40) -  (308) -  (309) -    (34) -  (232) -  (317) - 
1989    1.10  1.07  1.01    1.28  1.05  1.23    1.42  1.10  1.02    1.04  1.12  1.10 
1990    1.54  1.20  1.05    1.66  1.13  1.32    1.63  1.16  1.09    1.37  1.19  1.06 
1991    1.82  1.26  1.11    2.19  1.37  1.16    1.92  1.30  1.11    1.73  1.41  1.03 
1992    1.82  1.19  1.02    2.39  1.37  1.08    2.00  1.30  1.12    2.04  1.49  0.94 
1993    1.81  1.21  0.93    2.06  1.33  0.87    2.35  1.29  0.97    2.21  1.66  0.94 
1994    1.90  1.16  0.80    1.72  1.10  0.97    2.36  1.06  0.75    2.03  1.57  0.91 
1995    1.92  1.11  0.77    1.38  1.11  0.86    1.93  0.89  0.62    1.63  1.42  0.91 
1996    1.77  0.90  0.74    1.13  1.04  0.81    1.55  0.82  0.65    1.26  1.24  0.89 
1997    1.48  0.87  0.72    1.05  0.99  0.72    1.46  0.82  0.67    1.17  1.12  0.91 
1998    1.19  0.84  0.70    1.01  0.87  0.72    1.52  0.72  0.62    1.13  1.02  0.84 
1999    1.06  0.85  0.74    1.22  0.91  0.88    1.34  0.63  0.59    1.03  0.88  0.88 
2000    0.92  0.81  0.77    1.22  0.92  0.92    1.01  0.53  0.54    0.77  0.80  0.83 
2001    0.83  0.81  0.77    1.16  0.83  1.00    0.78  0.51  0.51    0.58  0.71  0.82 
2002    0.78  0.78  0.75    0.77  0.76  0.96    0.65  0.45  0.47    0.42  0.64  0.76 
2003    0.82  0.73  0.75    0.63  0.72  1.05    0.67  0.46  0.49    0.38  0.61  0.77 
2004    0.78  0.69  0.76                    0.33  0.55  0.75 
Nu    704  2,493  3,276    533  1,582  1,314    834  2,266  1,406    909  3,363  2,419 
Nwy    22,961  16,981  17,012    12,519  7,755  5,453    19,052  11,325  7,720    25,381  15,910  9,326 
 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation for a given age group. 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women in age group. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period in age group for sampled women. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005).  56 
3.4 Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Explaining the increase in union formation 
 
There was a marked increase in the rate of first union formation in transitional Central 
Asia, particularly at younger ages.  Since the results initially noted for Uzbekistan are 
part of a wider regional trend, it makes sense to place Agadjanian and Makarova’s 
(2003) explanations within a wider Central Asian context. 
 
The  tendency  for  conspicuous  consumption  in  the  wedding  celebrations  is  not 
particular  to  Uzbekistan.    The  qualitative  research  of  Tett  (1996),  for  example, 
conducted  during  1990  and  1991,  suggests  that  this  tradition  is  also  strong  in 
Tajikistan.    The  village  in  Central  Tajikistan  where  she  carried  out  her  research 
reflected ‘a culture obsessed with marriage ceremonies.  Weddings, past and present, 
were  a  constant  topic  of  village  discussion.    They  were  the  most  elaborate  and 
expensive set of ceremonies ever performed in village life…[and] a central focus for 
the  village  social  calendar’  (p.120).    They  provided  ‘one  of  the  few  vehicles  for 
display of [wealth] that was thoroughly approved of by the villagers’ (p.188).  The 
tradition  of  gift  exchanges  was  well  established,  with  the  most  extensive  gifts 
associated with the dowry and the kalym (‘bride price’).  How much families had 
given became widely known: as Tett (p.182) points out, ‘skimping on the kalym or 
dowry was hard to hide, because the goods were displayed in the bride’s room after 
the bridal journey, hung in groups showing which side had given what.  Thus the 
women  who  attended…  could  rapidly  assess  the  relative  levels  of  expenditure’.  
Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003)  argue  that  in  Uzbekistan  during  the  perestroika 
period, when economic restructuring promoted the accumulation of private wealth, 
these customs were strengthened – reflected in increasingly lavish celebrations and 
gift exchanges – strengthening the role of marriage as a vehicle for displaying wealth 
to such an extent that marriage rates increased.  In a similar way, Tett notes that the 
scale of gift exchanges in Tajikistan had reached unprecedented levels by the end of 
the Soviet period as the dowries and kalym increased and the ceremonies ‘had become 
increasingly lavish and expensive’ (p.187).  She situates these inflationary pressures 
within the Soviet period more generally, and the associated rise in living standards 
coupled  with  the  lack  of  opportunities  to  display  wealth,  rather  than  solely  the   57 
peculiarities  of  the  perestroika  period.    Indeed,  Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003) 
acknowledge that the inflationary processes in Uzbekistan dated from the 1970s - but 
argue that they were accelerated during the perestroika years.  Overall, the impetus 
provided by this widespread conspicuous consumption, and secondly the desire to 
avoid even higher dowry costs in future, may have played an important part in the 
increase in rates of first union formation across Central Asia during the late 1980s. 
 
The  third  possible  explanation  relates  an  increase  in  anti-Soviet  nationalism  to  a 
resurgence of the traditional preference for early female marriage.  For example, in 
Tajikistan - as elsewhere in Central Asia - the policy of glasnost (‘openness’) gave a 
voice  to  nationalistic  opinion.    This  was  especially  manifest  in  the  push  for  an 
improvement in the status of the Tajik language.  As Akbarzadeh (1996) outlines, 
following intense opposition pressure Tajik was made the national language in July 
1989 - Tajikistan being the first of the Central Asian republics to take such a step.  
But overall nationalist sentiment remained rather weak in Tajikistan, and in Central 
Asia generally  compared to other regions of the Soviet Union: unlike the Baltics, 
Moldova  or  the  Ukraine,  there  were  no  mass-based  nationalist  or  anti-Russian 
movements (Juska 1999).  Indeed, Agadjanian and Makarova (2003) acknowledge 
that there is a danger of overstating the extent of nationalist resurgence during the 
period.  It is unlikely that this was a significant factor behind the increase in first 
union formation in the transitional years. 
 
The fourth explanation sees the increase in first union formation as, at least in part, a 
response to the anxieties and uncertainties of perestroika and the early independence 
years.  Agadjanian and Makarova (2003) place particular emphasis on the uncertainty 
regarding  cultural  norms  and  the  role  of  women  in  society.    Koroteyeva  and 
Makarova (1998:594) report that there were also implications for behaviour: while 
girls in Uzbek cities had previously tended to gather in public spaces like parks, it 
became  ‘inappropriate  and  inadvisable’  to  do  so  as  they  became  more  closely 
supervised to protect them from the ‘dangers’ of the city.  However, the uncertainty in 
the  transitional  years  was  pervasive,  not  just  concerning  women  but  extending  to 
other aspects of life and affected by the suite of concurrent changes.  Perestroika 
represented a time of reform and political machinations within the Communist party.     58 
The promise of improved life-styles contrasted sharply with day-to-day reality.  Thus 
Buckley (1992:7), discussing the impact on Soviet women, notes that ‘by 1989, to 
many women daily life seemed harder than ever before.  Glasnost has exposed many 
problems in need of analysis… it had revealed, condemned and deplored, but not 
delivered’.    There  was  also  increased  display  of  public  dissatisfaction  with  living 
standards.    In  Tajikistan,  for  example,  dissatisfaction  eventually  led  to  unrest  and 
rioting, starting in early 1991.  Overall, writing at the end of the perestroika period, 
Buckley (1992:8) concludes that ‘change in the USSR is currently rapid, turbulent, 
chaotic  and  unpredictable’.    In  such  a  climate,  a  rational  response  might  be  to 
postpone long-term commitments like marriage – but Sobotka (2004) usefully points 
out that the effect of uncertainty on family formation is complex and dependent on 
context.  In Central Asia, marriage represents an investment in a household’s future: 
as Tett (1996) argues for Tajikistan, family ties, centred around the household unit, 
were seen as a crucial means for adapting to the shortcomings of the economic system 
throughout  the  Soviet  era.    During  the  uncertain  years  of  perestroika  and  early 
independence, arranging a marriage would have been seen as a means of helping to 
secure a son’s or daughter’s future: as Koroteyeva and Makarova (1998:594) explain 
for Uzbekistan, ‘parents prefer that a daughter has a husband to take care of her in 
times of uncertainty’. 
 
3.4.2 Civil conflict in Tajikistan 
 
Interestingly, there is no evidence that the rate of first union formation in Tajikistan 
was affected by the peak in fighting during the civil war in 1992.  Figure 3.3 and 
Table  3.3  present  annual  (non-smoothed)  estimates  of  first  union  formation  in 
Tajikistan and neighbouring Uzbekistan, which unlike Tajikistan did not experience a 
civil war.  Trends in first union formation in Tajikistan closely mirrored those in 
Uzbekistan during the early 1990s.  While there is no evidence for the distinctiveness 
of Tajikistan’s trends over the period at a national level, this may reflect the crude 
scale of analysis in comparison to the localised nature of the conflict within particular 
regions.  Indeed, Agadjanian and Prata (2002) note the demographic impact of war in 
Angola was restricted to those regions most affected by the conflict, plus the capital 
Luanda.  In Tajikistan, the most severe fighting was concentrated in Kurgan-Tyube 
and Kulyab, both in what is now the region of Khatlon (Brown 1998) - but given the   59 
sample size involved there is a lack of statistical power to examine spatial differences 
in trends, even at the crude regional level. 
 
3.4.3 Age-specific rates of union formation  
 
The sharp increases in rates of first union formation for young women and particularly 
those aged 15-17, compared to the relative stability of trends at older ages, highlights 
the  importance  of  considering  age-specific  marriage  rates.    The  results  strongly 
suggest that the changes in the perestroika and early post-independence period did not 
affect all women uniformly; on the contrary, the changes had a particularly strong 
effect  for  younger  unmarried  women.    The  explanation  lies  in  the  strong  cultural 
expectation, even before perestroika, that women should be married at a relatively 
young age, albeit significantly later than in pre-Soviet times.  While some women 
married in their mid-twenties, ‘it was unusual for a girl to be any older and remain 
unmarried’ (Tett 1996:109).  Therefore, there has always been a strong pressure for 
women to be married by this age – or risk being labelled an ‘old maid’ (Tabyshalieva 
1997; Harris 2004:86).  What was new about the transition years was the impetus for 
even younger women, as well as those in their late teens and twenties, to be married.  
Whether  the  increased  propensity  for  family  formation  is  attributed  to  the 
strengthening of ‘conspicuous consumption’ or as a response to uncertainty, one or 
both of these acted to encourage a higher proportion of families to marry off their 
teenage daughters than in previous periods.   
 
More  generally,  these  results  also  provide  evidence  for  Agadjanian’s  (1999:426) 
hypothesis that, in times of social and economic change and uncertainty, ‘people do 
not change all components of their demographic behaviour equally and uniformly’ 
and  that  changes  in  nuptiality  may  not  necessarily  mirror  wider  changes  in 
reproductive  behaviour.    Indeed,  mirroring  wider  Soviet  trends,  fertility  rates  in 
Central Asia peaked in 1987 and then started to decline (Becker and Hemley 1998; 
TransMONEE 2006; chapter 2).  Therefore, the response of women to the changes of 
the transition years varied according to their stage of family building: at the same time 
as fertility was declining during the late 1980s and early 1990s, rates of first union 
formation were increasing.     60 
Figure 3.3 Rate of first union formation
1 in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (annual rates) 
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1 Rates per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years inclusive. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
 
Table 3.3 Relative risks
1 of union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, vs. 1988
2 
  Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
1986  1.17   
1987  1.04  1.01 
1988 (153)   -  (153)   - 
1989  1.15  0.93 
1990  1.45  1.27 
1991  1.24  1.11 
1992  1.42  1.30 
1993  1.45  1.33 
1994  1.23  1.34 
1995  0.85  0.97 
1996  0.85  0.92 
1997  0.97  0.95 
1998  0.83  0.84 
1999  0.67  0.76 
2000  0.73  0.80 
2001  0.50  0.64 
2002  0.54  0.63 
2003  0.57  0.65 
2004  0.61  0.67 
2005    0.69 
Nu  4,506  6,691 
Nwy  38,098  50,617 
1 Relative risks based on the annual rate of first union formation (no smoothing). 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years 
inclusive. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period for sampled 
women. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005).  61 
3.4.4 Relating Central Asia to Soviet Europe and the Caucasus 
 
The demographic trends in transitional Central Asia show certain parallels with trends 
in  late-Soviet  Europe.    Just  as  in  Central  Asia,  the  mean  age  of  women  at  first 
marriage declined across late-Soviet Europe and the Caucasus in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (TransMONEE 2006; Zakharov 2008:970).  Just as in Central Asia (for 
example,  chapter  2),  the  rate  of  first  births  within  marriage  remained  very  high, 
reflecting the continued swift progression from marriage to childbearing (for example, 
Perelli-Harris  2005).    In  Central  Asia,  consistent  with  an  increase  in  early  union 
formation  and  strong  progression  to  childbearing  within  marriage,  rates  of 
childbearing for 15-19 year olds increased across the region (TransMONEE 2006; 
Figure 3.4)
21.  Indeed, those countries shown in this paper to have experienced the 
most  significant  increases  in  family  formation  -  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan  and 
Uzbekistan – are also those which have experienced the most significant increases in 
early childbearing.  Just as in Central Asia, rates of childbearing for 15-19 year olds 
increased across (post-) Soviet Europe and the Caucasus in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, albeit by varying degrees (TransMONEE 2006). 
 
Therefore, while this paper has helped to place trends in individual Central Asian 
republics within the regional context, our understanding of the increase in first union 
formation during the transitional years would be developed by further extending the 
frame of reference to the whole (post-) Soviet context.  Undoubtedly the Central Asia, 
Caucasus and Eastern Europe regions are culturally, historically and demographically 
very different.  Nevertheless, there are indications that in all three regions there was 
an increase in family formation at young ages during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Further work examining the similarities between the trends in these regions would be 
most welcome.   
 
                                                 
21 These are official data, prone to under-registration (Anderson and Silver 1989).  Absolute levels of 
adolescent childbearing should be treated with caution, particularly given possibly different levels of 
under-registration in different republics.  The important message of the figure is that early childbearing 
increased  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  despite  a  probable  increase  in  under-registration  (for 
example, during the peak fighting in Tajikistan in 1992 (chapter 2)).   62 
Figure 3.4 Adolescent birth rate
1 in Central Asia, 1989-2003 
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1 Live births per 1,000 women aged 15-19 years. 
Source: TransMONEE (2006).  
 
In particular, it would be interesting to consider the extent to which there was an 
intensification of conspicuous consumption in wedding ceremonies across the Soviet 
Union  during  perestroika,  and  the  extent  to  which  Central  Asia,  with  its  strong 
tradition of gift exchanges, was distinctive in this respect.  Also, the Central Asian 
survey data analysed here has only very limited time-varying covariate information, 
such that it is difficult to evaluate the different explanations for the increase in union 
formation during the transitional period.  Any research which is able to make use of 
richer temporal data would be most valuable.  In particular, it would prove helpful in 
assessing the relative importance of the ‘conspicuous consumption’ and ‘uncertainty’ 
explanations.    Friedman  et  al.  (1994:383)  predict  that  marriage  and  childbearing 
represent a strategy for reducing uncertainty about the future particularly for those 
women whose ‘alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty [for example, through a 
stable career] are limited or blocked’
22; conversely, the ‘conspicuous consumption’ 
explanation would gain further support if it was shown that women from relatively 
                                                 
22 Kohler and Kohler’s analysis (2002), showing that women in Russia who were most affected by 
labour market crisis often had a higher probability of having a child than those less affected by such 
crises, supports this idea.  However, it was based on cross-sectional data. 
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wealthy  households  experienced  the  sharpest  increase  in  the  rate  of  first  union 
formation during the perestroika years.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
This paper adds to the sparse literature on the demography of transitional Central 
Asia,  specifically  focusing  on  the  perestroika  and  early  post-independence  years.  
Using recently available survey data, it builds on the research of Dommaraju and 
Agadjanian  (2008)  and  Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003),  corroborating  the  sharp 
increase  in  first  union  formation  in  Uzbekistan  and  Kyrgyzstan  and  the  smaller 
increase in Kazakhstan.  It extends the focus of analysis to four of the five Central 
Asian republics, showing that Tajikistan also saw sharp increases in the rate of first 
union formation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  It also finds clear evidence of an 
age-period interaction effect across the region: while there was an increase in the 
overall rate of first union formation in the Central Asian republics, this increase was 
most marked at younger ages, whilst rates at older ages were relatively stable.   
 
These  research  themes  could  usefully  be  developed  by  examining  trends  in 
Turkmenistan, the other Central Asian republic, and by further extending the frame of 
reference  to  consider  possible  similarities  in  the  nature  of  changes  in  first  union 
formation across different regions of the former Soviet Union during the transitional 
period.   
 
   64 
4.Tajikistan shows the biggest collapse of all: comparing declines in 
first union formation in post-Soviet Central Asia 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The republics of Central Asia experienced dramatic economic and social change after 
the end of the Soviet Union, but little is known about trends in union formation in the 
region.  This paper, based on the analysis of recently available survey data, presents 
rates  of  first  union  formation  from  the  late-1980s  to  mid-2000s  for  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan.    It  finds  a  significant  decline  in  union 
formation across the region, but also clear differences between the republics in terms 
of the extent of the decline.  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which experienced the most 
severe post-Soviet declines in food security, have also seen the sharpest declines in 
union formation.  Indeed, Tajikistan – which experienced the most acute nutritional 
declines of all -  had the highest rate of union formation in the late-Soviet period but 
the lowest rate by the turn of the millennium, reflecting a collapse in rates of union 
formation across age groups.   
 
Keywords: post-Soviet, Central Asia, Tajikistan, union formation, food insecurity, 
drought    65 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The collapse of communism and the associated changes in the countries affected offer 
‘potentially rich material for an examination of the effects of dramatic sociopolitical 
and  economic  transformations  on  marital  and  fertility  behaviour’  (Agadjanian 
1999:426).    However,  while  the  declines  in  union  formation  after  communism  in 
Central and Eastern Europe are well documented, there is not a comparable literature 
on nuptiality in post-Soviet Central Asia.  While chapter 3 focuses on the transitional 
period  immediately  preceding  and  subsequent  to  independence,  this  paper  focuses 
solely on the post-Soviet period
23. 
 
4.1.1 Union formation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
 
In  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  marriage  rates  declined  sharply  after  the  fall  of 
communism (Sobotka 2004).  In most countries this was accompanied by an increase 
in  the  rate  of  non-marital  union  formation  but,  since  this  did  not  fully  offset  the 
decline in marriage, the proportion of adults living in union decreased (Sobotka and 
Toulemon 2008).  Explanations for these changes in family formation have tended to 
stress the importance of post-communist economic crisis, or of ideational change, new 
opportunities and the ‘Westernisation’ of behaviour, or of both.   
 
Frejka (2008:166) links these two explanations to one underlying root cause:  ‘the 
replacement  of  the  state  socialist  regimes  by  market  economies  and  by  fledgling 
                                                 
23 Note that the data and method used in this chapter are the same as in chapter 3.  Some of the graphs 
and tables are also replicated.  The decision to separate the chapters reflects a judgement that the 
increase in the marriage rate during the transitional period, and the subsequent decline in the post-
Soviet years, are not ‘two sides of the same coin’ but should be related to the particular circumstances 
of  each  period,  which  requires  referring  to  different  substantive  literature.    As  Agadjanian  and 
Makarova (2003:461), commenting on the decline in marriage in Uzbekistan following the increase in 
the transitional years, argue: ‘at first glance, it appears that the increased stability of life following 
independence reduced the sense of anxiety and uncertainty which was characteristic of the late 1980s.  
However,  marriage  patterns  did  not  simply  revert  back  to  the  pre-crisis  ‘norm’.    Our  fieldwork 
strongly suggests that the post-independence trend towards postponing marriage is due primarily to the 
new economic constraints caused by the introduction of a market economy [emphases added]’. 
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democratic institutions of governance’.  This perspective is helpful in a number of 
respects.    First,  it  allows  for  a  creative  tension  between  economic  and  cultural 
explanations  which  accommodates  differences  among  different  post-communist 
countries.    Indeed,  ideational  change  is  considered  more  important  in  explaining 
demographic changes in Central Europe, which experienced a relatively successful 
transition, with the depth of social and economic crisis more important to changes in 
ex-Soviet European states (Macura 2000; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003; Sobotka 2004).  
Second, in a similar way, it allows for flexibility in assessing the relative importance 
of economic and cultural factors over time - and therefore for the possibility that, for 
example, cultural factors will come to dominate as the economic situation improves 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002).  Third, it also explicitly considers the importance of 
economic changes which do not fit neatly within ‘crisis’ explanations.  In particular, 
the longer-term transition from socialism and central planning to market economy 
conditions – encompassing, for example, more expensive housing, increased private 
responsibility  for  child  costs,  reduced  job  security  and  an  increased  pressure  to 
acquire more education – is seen as fundamental.  As Frejka (2008) points out, these 
emerging  market  conditions  represent  important  economic  influences  on  union 
formation which persist after, and become no longer necessarily associated with, the 
initial  post-communist  crisis  period  of  massive  inflation  and  sharp  increase  in 
unemployment.   
 
It  is  also  important  to  recognise  the  diversity  of  the  post-communist  context.  
Culturally, in Central and Eastern Europe there is a distinction between countries that 
are  more  secular  and  liberal  (e.g.  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Slovenia  and  the 
former  German  Democratic  Republic)  and  those  which  tend  to  be  more  socially 
conservative and where religion is more important (e.g. Poland, Romania, Slovakia) 
(Sobotka 2008).  This is reflected in recent demographic behaviour: the diffusion of 
non-marital unions is relatively slow in Poland (Kotowska et al. 2008) and Romania 
(Muresan et al. 2008), for example, compared to the Czech Republic (Sobotka et al. 
2008) and Slovenia (Stropnik and Šircelj 2008).  Economically, too, there have been 
big differences in the economic performance of former Communist states.  Sobotka 
(2003) notes that it is those countries that managed to maintain relative economic 
stability in the 1990s that also showed the most significant ‘postponement’ of family 
formation.  Overall, in terms of both behavioural and attitudinal measures relating to   67 
family formation, the  differences amongst post-communist countries are now such 
that their diversity stands out in comparison with the other European regions - Nordic, 
German-speaking and Southern and Western European - which show more compact 
clusters of union formation behaviour and attitudes (Sobotka 2008). 
   
4.1.2 Union formation in post-Soviet Central Asia 
 
While there is an established literature on union formation in post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe, there has been relatively little research on changes in post-Soviet 
Central Asia.  Agadjanian (1999) provides insights into ethnic differences in marriage 
behaviour  in  Kazakhstan.    Agadjanian  and  Makarova  (2003),  using  retrospective 
survey data from 1996, show that women in Uzbekistan who reached marriageable 
age  during  the  perestroika  period  before  independence  were  more  likely  to  have 
married by a given age than those from preceding cohorts - but, for those reaching 
marriageable age during the post-independence era, marriage dropped back to pre-
perestroika  levels.    Most  recently,  Dommaraju  and  Agadjanian  (2008)  provide  a 
valuable description of trends in marriage in Uzbekistan (up to 2001), Kazakhstan (up 
to 1998) and Kyrgyzstan (up to 1996).  Again, their results point towards an increase 
in the marriage rate during perestroika – particularly in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan – 
to a peak in the early post-independence years, followed by a subsequent decline.  
They suggest that, at least for Uzbekistan, this decline was not simply a short-term 
response  to  economic  crisis  but  rather  ‘a  long-term  change  in  marriage  patterns’ 
(p.205).  However, they acknowledge that ‘a clearer assessment of recent marriage 
patterns in Central Asia will have to wait for new data’ (p.210).   
 
This paper hopes to build on Dommaraju and Agadjanian’s (2008) research in three 
main  ways.    First,  by  using  more  recent  survey  data  and  extending  the  period  of 
analysis to the mid-2000s, a clearer assessment can be made as to the nature of post-
Soviet changes in nuptiality.  Second, by including Tajikistan as well as Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  in  the  analysis,  the  potential  for  cross-country    68 
comparison is extended to four of the five Central Asian Republics
24.  Tajikistan is an 
interesting case: it had the highest rate of population growth of all the Soviet republics 
at the time of independence (Anderson and Silver 1989).  It was also the poorest 
Soviet republic, with average income in 1988 around 50% of that in Russia (Atkinson 
and Micklewright 1992:134), and experienced the most severe economic crisis post-
independence  -  by  1996,  Gross  Domestic  Product  was  just  39%  of  1989  levels 
(TransMONEE 2006), the biggest decline in Central Asia.  Unlike the other republics, 
it also experienced a civil war, with peak fighting in 1992 but lasting until 1997, in 
which an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 people died (International Crisis Group 2001). 
Third, the paper relates the trends in marriage rates to the nature of post-Soviet change 
in the republics – and, in particular, to changes in food security.   
 
Given the declines in marriage rates and in the proportion of adults living in union in 
Eastern Europe (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008), declines in the rate of union formation 
in Central Asia are also expected.  On the one hand, one might predict that these 
declines would be more marked in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where sex roles have 
tended to be more egalitarian (Jones and Grupp 1987) and where enrolment in tertiary 
education has significantly increased in the post-Soviet period (TransMONEE 2006), 
than in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where female roles have traditionally been more 
conservative (Jones and Grupp 1987), Islam has a stronger tradition (Tazmini 2001), 
and rates of enrolment in higher education have declined (TransMONEE 2006).  On 
the  other  hand,  Uzbekistan  and,  in  particular,  Tajikistan  were  the  countries  most 
severely  affected  by  declines  in  food  security  in  the  post-Soviet  period  and  past 
research  demonstrates  that  periods  of  acute  food  shortage  can  have  a  significant 
negative effect on marriage levels (Lee 1981; Galloway 1988; Palloni et al. 1996).  
 
4.2 Context: Food insecurity in post-Soviet Central Asia 
 
The post-communist economic crisis is well documented.  In both Central and Eastern 
Europe  and  Central  Asia,  Gross  Domestic  Product  declined,  inflation  soared,  real 
                                                 
24 While Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) data for Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan  are  available  for  academic  research,  data  for  Turkmenistan  are  restricted 
(http://www.childinfo.org/mics3_surveys.html).   69 
wages  sharply  declined  and  unemployment  increased  (see  TransMONEE  2006).  
However, just as there were differences in the extent of the crisis between different 
countries – with, for example, those in Central Europe on the whole faring better than 
the ex-Soviet European states – so there were differences in the nature of the crisis.   
In particular, the implications of the crisis for food security were different for the ex-
Soviet states in Central Asia than for the ex-communist states in Europe.   
 
During the Soviet period, even though most people in the region live in rural areas 
and agriculture is the largest economic sector, Central Asia was not self-sufficient in 
basic agricultural foodstuffs.  This reflected the Soviet division of labour amongst its 
15 republics, assigning cotton production to Central Asia (in particular, to Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) at the expense of food production (Peimani 2006).  The 
region became heavily dependent on food imports from the rest of the Soviet Union.  
The end of the Soviet period meant the breakdown of these trading relationships; in 
addition, a severe shortage of foreign currency limited the Central Asian republics’ 
ability  to  fund  the  necessary  basic  imports.    Therefore,  they  became  increasingly 
dependent on locally produced food for meeting their food security needs (Babu and 
Sengupta 2006).  However, compared with other countries in transition, the Central 
Asian republics had the smallest share of arable land and the lowest amount of land 
per  rural  inhabitant  (Peimani  2006)  –  limiting  the  extent  to  which  local  food 
production  could  meet  the  countries’  needs.    While  food  availability  fell  in  post-
communist Europe, it did not fall below the minimum requirements established by the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organisation  of  the  United  Nations
25;  in  contrast,  the  food 
availability decline in Central Asia was such that these minimum energy levels were 
compromised  (Rokx  et  al.  2002).    The  result  was,  with  the  partial  exception  of 
Kazakhstan, a region ‘unable to feed its peoples’ (Peimani 2006:66). 
 
Accompanying  the  decline  in  food  availability  in  Central  Asia  were  changes  in 
accessibility.    Food  and  nutrition  programs,  that  had  ensured  minimum  food 
                                                 
25  Of  course,  nutrition  is  a  function  not  only  of  food  availability  but  also  of  accessibility.    Food 
availability  remained  above  minimum  energy  requirements  in  post-communist  Europe,  but  certain 
marginalised groups of the population in certain countries may still have had insufficient energy intakes 
(Rokx  et  al.  2002).    Nevertheless,  the  sharper  decline  in  post-Soviet  Central  Asia  does  serve  to 
illustrate the particular problem with food availability in this region, compared to post-socialist Europe.   70 
consumption levels during the Soviet period, were eliminated (Babu and Rhoe 2006). 
In addition, the liberalisation of previously subsidised food prices was particularly 
significant.    January  1992  saw  the  liberalisation  of  prices  across  the  then 
Commonwealth of Independent States (Kaser 1997), leading to dramatic rises in the 
cost of a number of foodstuffs (Rokx et al. 2002).  With real wages declining, an 
increasing proportion of family income came to be spent on food.  There was also a 
change  in  diet  composition,  with  particularly  sharp  decreases  in  meat  and  milk 
consumption  (Falkingham  et  al.  1997;  Pomfret  and  Anderson  1997;  Djalalov  and 
Gemma 2006) while expenditures on bread and vegetable products were relatively 
stable (Babu and Reidhead 2000).  This reflects a ‘reductive’ response to the crisis 
(Howell 1996) as the population became even more reliant on the traditional staple of 
bread as a cheap source of calories.  Therefore the liberalisation of bread prices, in 
1994 in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and in 1995 in Tajikistan (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1995b; Kaser 1997), which had remained subsidised in the early 
post-independence years, had a further negative effect on nutrition levels, particularly 
in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
Indeed, while all the Central Asian republics suffered from food insecurity in the early 
post-independence  years, the severity of the crisis varied.  The Soviet legacy was 
different.    In  terms  of  grain,  the  base  of  the  region’s  diet,  Kazakhstan  was  a  net 
exporter during the Soviet period and, indeed, remains the sixth largest producer in 
the world (Peimani 2006).  At the other end of the extreme, of all the Soviet republics 
Tajikistan was most dependent on subsidies from Moscow during the Soviet era and 
had the highest inter-republic trade deficit (Foroughi 2002), relying on other republics 
for the vast majority of its grain supply.  Uzbekistan, too, was a major importer of 
grain during the Soviet period, similarly relying on imports for around three-quarters 
of its supply (Economist Intelligence Unit 1997c).  In contrast, while Kyrgyzstan was 
also dependent on grain imports, this only tended to make up a third of the country’s 
total supply (Babu et al. 2006) since local production catered for most of the domestic 
need
26.  The republics also vary in terms of the proportion of their land which is 
                                                 
26 In 1992, just after independence, cereal production in Kyrgyzstan was 679,000 tonnes, compared to 
170,400 tonnes in Tajikistan, 964,000 tonnes in Uzbekistan and 18.3 million tonnes in Kazakhstan 
(FAO 2008b).  Considering their respective populations (4.3m, 5.1m, 19.9m and 16.7 million at the   71 
suitable for household subsistence arable use.  People with access to land to grow 
their own food have been better able to cope during times of economic stress -  but 
while  such  ‘gardening’  is  especially  common  in  the  ex-Soviet  Europe,  and  in 
Kazakhstan one-third of food is produced at home (Rokx et al. 2002), Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan  are  severely  limited  in  the  amount  of  land  suitable  for  household 
agricultural  use:  in  Tajikistan,  by  the  mountainous  terrain;  in  Uzbekistan,  by  the 
availability  of  irrigated  land  (Duncan  2000;  Spoor  2006).    Further,  while  both 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have devoted an increased share of agricultural land to food 
production, they also face pressure to maintain a large share for cotton, a valuable 
source  of  external  currency.    Overall,  the  differences  in  trends  in  food  insecurity 
between  the  Central  Asian  republics  are  illustrated  by  differences  in  the  share  of 
consumer expenditure devoted to food.  In 1991, a similar share of expenditure was 
spent on food in all five republics (between 40 and 50%).  By 1996, the share in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was around 55-60%, but in Tajikistan it had increased to 
approaching 90%; no data are provided for Uzbekistan after 1995, but in this year the 
share was 70%, well above that in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Djalalov and Gemma 
2006).  Indeed, relating to food security, Rokx et al. (2002:59) report that ‘certain 
areas  are  particularly  vulnerable  and  should  receive  top  priority’,  identifying 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as countries where nutritional status is ‘very poor’.   
 
The differences in food insecurity are also reflected in the estimated prevalence of 
undernourishment  in  the  different  countries
27  (FAO  2008a;  Table  4.1).    In 
Kazakhstan, levels have been relatively low throughout the period.  Kyrgyzstan has 
actually  made  significant  progress,  after  the  shock  of  the  initial  few  years  of 
independence, in reducing undernourishment.  But in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the 
                                                                                                                                            
time  of    the  1989  census),  this  translates  to  0.16  tonnes  of  locally  produced  grain  per  head  in 
Kyrgyzstan, and just 0.03 and 0.05 tonnes per head in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  For Kazakhstan, a 
traditional exporter of grain, the figure was 1.09.  
27 These are the only years for which estimates are available.   FAO’s estimates of the prevalence of 
undernourishment are ‘essentially a measure of food deprivation based on the calculation of three key 
parameters for each country: the average amount of food available for human consumption per person, 
the level of inequality in access to that food and the minimum number of calories required for an 
average  person’.    See  http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx  (Goal  1,  Target  1.C)  for  further 
details.   72 
prevalence  of  undernourishment  significantly  increased  from  1993-95  to  2001-03.  
Indeed, as FAO (2006:) conclude, of the post-communist countries in Europe, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, the most serious declines in food security have been in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  As the data show, Tajikistan was worst affected of all.  
 
Table 4.1 Prevalence of undernourishment
1 in the total population of four Central 
Asian republics (%) 
  1993-1995  2001-03 
Kazakhstan  3  8 
Kyrgyzstan  21  4 
Tajikistan  22  61 
Uzbekistan  8  26 
1 A measure of food deprivation based on three parameters: food availability, equality of access to 
food, and minimum required average human calorific intake.  See footnote 28.. 
Source: FAO (2008a) 
 
4.3 Data and Method
28 
 
Official data on first union formation in Central Asia are inadequate for a reliable 
assessment of temporal trends.  In Tajikistan, for example, even before independence, 
the date of marriage registration with Soviet authorities was never a reliable indicator 
of  the  date  of  the  religious  ceremony  nikoh,  after  which  the  couple  would  live 
together.    Underage  marriages  were  concealed  from  the  authorities  by  delaying 
registration at the civil registry office (ZAGS), sometimes for several years.  Even for 
‘legal’  marriages,  there  might  be  a  gap  before  registration,  while  some  couples 
disregarded registration altogether.  As Harris (2004:39) summarises, compared to the 
nikoh, ‘civil registration was of little importance to Tajiks’ and was viewed simply as 
a  means  of  providing  access  to  resources  like  family  allowances.    In  the  post-
independence  context,  with  the  virtual  collapse  of  the  social  security  system  (see 
Falkingham 2000), the motivation for registration has further reduced – particularly 
given  the  introduction  of  a  registration  fee.    Qualitative  accounts  suggest  that 
polygamy in Tajikistan has increased since independence (Tabyshalieva 1997), but 
since this is illegal these unions are also unrecorded.  Overall, Dikaev (2005) reports 
                                                 
28 The reader is invited to omit this section, which is identical to Section 3.2 in chapter 3 and has been 
replicated for convenience.   73 
one estimate which suggests that only half of  all marriages in Tajikistan are now 
officially registered.  Under-registration is also a problem in other Central Asian states 
(Dommaraju and Agadjanian 2008). 
 
Therefore, because of the inadequacy of official data, survey data are used to calculate 
rates of first union formation in late- and post-Soviet Central Asia.  The latest round 
of Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS3), carried out by UNICEF, represent the 
most recent data available.  They are nationally representative sample surveys with a 
women’s  questionnaire,  for  those  aged  15-49  at  the  time  of  the  survey,  which 
included questions on union formation.  Specifically, women were asked the question 
‘In what month and year did you first marry or start living with a man as if married?’  
This is a more accurate reflection of the date of first union than the date of marriage 
registration and, given the significant under-registration issues, a more complete one.   
Surveys  were  carried  out  in  Tajikistan  (2005),  Kyrgyzstan  (2005/6),  Kazakhstan 
(2006)  and  Uzbekistan  (2006),  with  10,626,  7,043,  14,719  and  14,205  women 
interviewed respectively.  In a small number of cases where month or year of first 
union was missing, these data were imputed
29. 
 
For each country, rates of first union, specific to those women who have never been in 
union  (hereafter,  ‘unmarried’  women),  are  calculated  using  a  simple  proportional 
hazards exponential model: 
 
exp{ } i i λ λ β ′ = x                         (4.1) 
 
In this model, i λ  is the hazard corresponding to individual i, λ  is the baseline hazard 
when i x =0, andexp{ } iβ ′ x is the relative risk, a proportionate increase or decrease in 
the rate associated with the covariate characteristics i x .  Taking logs, we obtain the 
additive log-linear model: 
 
                                                 
29 Age at first union, which was also asked in the surveys, was used as the basis for imputation.  The 
Tajikistan survey data contained the highest proportion of missing dates: of 6571 women ever to have 
been in a union, 282 months of union and 216 years of union were imputed, while 12 women missing 
both date of union and age at union information were excluded.   74 
log log i i λ λ β ′ = +x                         (4.2) 
where α  is the log of the baseline hazard.  Initially, since interest lies in describing 
overall trends in first union formation, dummy variables for calendar year are the only 
covariates  and  age  intervals  are  not  included.    This  is  equivalent  to  assuming  a 
constant baseline hazard across process time t, time since 15
th birthday.  However, 
since  each  survey  collects  information  for  women  aged  15-49  at  the  time  of  the 
survey, data are truncated in periods before the survey (see Ní Bhrolcháin 1993).  To 
ensure  comparability  across  time,  rates  are  calculated  based  on  first  unions,  and 
exposure to first unions, for women aged 29 or under, for periods where the age 
distribution of women is complete up to age 30.  Thus rates are reconstructed for a 
period  of  20  years  before  each  survey.    Since  first  unions  in  Central  Asia  are 
concentrated at a relatively young age - traditionally an unmarried woman over the 
age of 20 is in danger of being considered an ‘old maid’ (Tabyshalieva 1997:52) - 
truncation is not a significant problem.   
 
Interest also lies in examining trends in first union formation for different age groups.  
A piecewise exponential model can be specified where the process time t, time since 
15
th birthday, is split into age intervals j, assuming a constant hazard within these 
intervals: 
 
log log ij j i λ λ β ′ = +x                         (4.3) 
 
where  j λ  is the baseline hazard for age interval j.  The age intervals chosen broadly 
reflect ‘early’ (15-17), ‘peak’ (18-20) and ‘late’ (21-29) ages at first union. Implicitly, 
under the proportional hazards assumption, the effect of the calendar year covariates 
is assumed to be the same for all age intervals j.  However, the model is extended to 
allow for the relaxation of this assumption.  Specifically, an interaction between the 
age intervals and calendar year is included in the model to allow for differences in 
trends in first union formation for different age groups of unmarried women:  
 
log log ij j i j λ λ β ′ = +x                         (4.4) 
 
where j β  represents the effect of calendar period for age interval j.     75 
The survey also collected information on, for example, place (urban/rural) and region 
of residence, and the woman’s educational background, but these were not used as 
covariates  since  all  relate  to  the  time  of  the  survey  only.    Hoem  and  Kreyenfeld 
(2006a; 2006b) warn against an anticipatory approach which conditions on the future.  
In any case, the focus here is on national-level trends. 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Trends in overall rate of first union formation 
] 
Figure 4.1 presents trends in first union formation for women in late- and post-Soviet 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.  A number of specific results 
stand out.  First, in the late Soviet period, marriage rates were higher in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.  This is consistent with the results of 
Dommaraju and Agadjanian (2008), which showed that the predicted probability of 
first marriage for unmarried women had, in almost every year from the mid-1970s 
until  the  late-Soviet  period,  been  higher  in  Uzbekistan  than  in  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan.    These  differences  may  in  part  reflect  differences  in  economic 
development and levels of urbanisation.  However, they also might reflect longer-
standing cultural differences regarding gender and familial systems.  In pre-Soviet 
times, as Jones and Grupp (1987) explain, sex roles tended to be more egalitarian 
among the semi-nomadic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs - with women playing a more active 
economic  role  and  with  more  independence  in  everyday  life  -  than  in  the  oasis 
cultures of the Uzbeks and Tajiks, where female roles were more restrictive, women 
occupied a more subordinate role within the household system and daughters were 
married at an earlier age. 
 
Second,  in  all  four  republics  but  particularly  in  Tajikistan,  Uzbekistan  and 
Kyrgyzstan, there is a marked increase in the rate of first union formation in the late-
Soviet period, with the rate peaking in the early 1990s.  Again, this is in line with 
Dommaraju  and  Agadjanian’s  (2008)  results  for  Uzbekistan,  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Kazakhstan, which also illustrate the distinctiveness of this increase compared to the 
relative stability in first marriage rates from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, and 
those  of  Agadjanian  and  Makarova’s  (2003)  study  focusing  on  Uzbekistan.    This 
increase in marriage rates is the focus of the previous chapter and will not be further 
elaborated upon here.   76 
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Figure 4.1 Rate of first union formation
1 in Central Asia (three-year moving average) 
1 Rates per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years inclusive. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
 
Table 4.2 Relative risks
1 of union formation in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate
2 
  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
1987    1.03  1.01   
1988  (131)   -  (132)   -  (163)   -  (150)   - 
1989  1.04  1.13  1.13  1.09 
1990  1.13  1.24  1.20  1.13 
1991  1.18  1.33  1.29  1.25 
1992  1.10  1.32  1.29  1.27 
1993  1.06  1.16  1.28  1.35 
1994  1.00  1.06  1.11  1.24 
1995  0.96  0.97  0.92  1.10 
1996  0.85  0.90  0.84  0.97 
1997  0.81  0.84  0.83  0.92 
1998  0.76  0.79  0.77  0.87 
1999  0.77  0.91  0.70  0.82 
2000  0.77  0.93  0.60  0.75 
2001  0.77  0.90  0.56  0.70 
2002  0.75  0.81  0.51  0.65 
2003  0.73  0.82  0.54  0.66 
2004  0.71      0.69 
Nu  6,473  3,429  4,506  6,691 
Nwy  56,953  25,727  38,098  50,617 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation. 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years 
inclusive. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period for sampled women. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005).  77 
Third, in all four republics, there has been a sharp decrease in the rate of first union 
formation  since  this  peak  in  the  early  post-independence  years.    Dommaraju  and 
Agadjanian (2008) also noted an incipient decline in marriage rates in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but levels were still above or similar to those in the pre-
perestroika period.  The more recent results presented here show that, such has been 
the decline in first union formation, by the turn of the millennium rates in all four 
republics  were  significantly  lower  than  in  the  late  1980s  (see  Table  4.2,  which 
complements Figure 4.1 by providing relative risks of first union formation compared 
to the 1988 level).  Thus the marriage decline does not simply represent a reversion to 
a pre-perestroika norm. 
 
The results also show clear differences between the republics in terms of the nature of 
the  decline.    Most  notably,  Tajikistan,  which  had  the  highest  rate  of  first  union 
formation  pre-independence,  had  the  lowest  rate  by  the  early  years  of  the  new 
millennium.  This represents a dramatic collapse in the rate of first union formation: 
the rate in 2003 represented a fall of 46% from the late 1980s (Table 4.2), and of 58% 
from the peak in the early post-independence years.  Uzbekistan, too, experienced a 
particularly sharp decline: the risk of first union formation in 2003 was 34% lower 
than the late-1980s level, and more than 50% lower than the early post-independence 
peak.    In  contrast,  while  there  were  significant  declines  in  Kazakhstan  and 
Kyrgyzstan, these were smaller in comparison: for Kazakhstan (Kyrgyzstan) in 2003, 
the risk of first union formation was 27% (18%) lower than in the late 1980s, and 
around 38% (38%) lower than the peak.  Overall, there is a distinction in terms of the 
timing and scale of the decline: in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the decline started later 
and – especially in the case of Tajikistan - was particularly acute; in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan the decline started earlier but was smaller in scale
30.   
                                                 
30 These differences in the decline in the rate of union formation between the different republics are not 
simply a reflection of differences in ethnic composition.  Indeed, when the hazard models presented in 
Section 4.3 were re-run examining rates of union formation for the titular ethnic group only in each 
country  (i.e.  considering  models  with  an  interaction  between  ethnicity  and  year),  the  differences 
between the republics remained: Tajiks in Tajikistan experienced the sharpest decline in first union 
formation; Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan experienced the smallest, though still substantial, decline. 
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4.4.2 Trends in rate of first union formation for different age groups 
 
While  there  have  been  significant  declines  in  marriage  rates  in  post-communist 
Europe, a significant portion of the decline in period rates has been attributed to a 
‘postponement’ of marriage, particularly in Central Europe, since the decline in the 
marriage rate has been mostly at younger ages – such that the mean age at marriage 
has  been  increasing  (for  example,  Sobotka  2008;  Sobotka  and  Toulemon  2008).  
Indeed, if a subsequent increase in the marriage rate at later ages compensates to some 
extent for earlier declines at younger ages, a period decrease in marriage rates need 
not translate into a comparable decrease in the cohort measure of the proportion of 
women ever married.   To explore changes in the rate of first union formation for 
different ages in Central Asia, an interaction was included between calendar year and 
age group in the survival model of first union formation for each country (equation 
4.4).  In each case, adding these interaction terms significantly improved the fit of the 
model. 
 
In all four republics, the increase in rates of first union formation in the early 1990s 
was most marked at younger ages.  By the early-to-mid 1990s, rates for unmarried 
women  aged  18-20  had  exceeded  the  rates  for  those  aged  21-29  (for  Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) or had drawn level with them (for Kazakhstan) (Figure 
4.2; Table 4.3).  From the mid-1990s, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan decreases in the 
overall rates of first union formation were effected through decreases in the rate for 
the two youngest groups (15-17 and 18-20) while rates remained stable in the 21-29 
group, and even started to increase in Kyrgyzstan.  By the turn of the millennium, 
rates of first union formation were much higher for this older group than for those 
aged 18-20, indicative  of an increase in the mean age of first union formation to 
accompany the decrease in the overall rate.  In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, rates also 
fall more sharply amongst the youngest age groups from the mid-1990s but, unlike 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the decline in the rate at the older ages continued.  In 
particular,  Tajikistan  has  seen  sharp  declines  in  this  21-29  age  interval  since 
independence, part of a general collapse in the rate of first union formation across age 
groups.  
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In  Central  Asia,  as  elsewhere,  the  extent  to  which  -  consistent  with  the 
‘postponement’ scenario from the cohort perspective - any future increases in the rate 
of first union formation at older ages compensate for recent declines at younger ages 
is, essentially, an empirical question for future research.  However, the length of time 
in which period rates of first union formation have been at a level significantly lower 
than that of the 1980s would seem to indicate a long-term change in union behaviour 
rather than simply a temporary ‘timing’ effect.  This is most clear in  the case of 
Tajikistan, where an acute decrease in rates of first union formation, together with the 
preservation of the age-at-first-union distribution, will inevitably translate into a sharp 
increase in the proportion of women who remain never-married – a marked departure 
from the Soviet era, where marriage remained nearly universal, and from historical 
norms.   
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
4.5.1 Response to food insecurity  
 
Rates of first union formation have declined significantly across post-Soviet Central 
Asia.    Interestingly,  it  is  in  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan,  where  female  roles  have 
traditionally been more conservative (Jones and Grupp 1987) and where Islam has 
perhaps the strongest tradition (Tazmini 2001), that have seen the greatest declines in 
rates of first union formation.  Indeed, while Tajikistan is distinctive in terms of the 
scale of decline, the pattern of change in Uzbekistan shows certain parallels with the 
Tajik case - both in terms of the timing of decline and in outstripping the declines in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  In this context it is significant that, of the countries in 
transition,  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  have  seen  the  most  serious  declines  in  food 
security  (FAO  2006).    There  is  an  established  literature  on  the  demographic 
implications of food scarcity – and a decrease in the rate of union formation is an 
established response to such a crisis.  Galloway (1988), for example, examining the 
response to annual fluctuations in grain prices in nine pre-industrial countries, reports 
a clear decline in nuptiality during years of grain price shocks, while Lee (1981) notes 
comparable trends in historical data for England.  In a similar way, the particularly 
sharp declines in first union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan may in large part 
reflect a response to decreases in food security.  
8
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Figure 4.2 Rate of first union formation
1 for different age groups in Central Asia (three-year moving average) 
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1 Rate (y-axis) per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women in age group.  Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
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Table 4.3 Relative risks
1 of union formation for different age groups in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate
2 
 
  Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
    15-17  18-20  21-29    15-17  18-20  21-29    15-17  18-20  21-29    15-17  18-20  21-29 
1987            1.10  1.00  1.06    0.98  1.06  0.97         
1988    (26) -  (162) -  (232) -    (32) -  (202) -  (236) -    (40) -  (308) -  (309) -    (34) -  (232) -  (317) - 
1989    1.10  1.07  1.01    1.28  1.05  1.23    1.42  1.10  1.02    1.04  1.12  1.10 
1990    1.54  1.20  1.05    1.66  1.13  1.32    1.63  1.16  1.09    1.37  1.19  1.06 
1991    1.82  1.26  1.11    2.19  1.37  1.16    1.92  1.30  1.11    1.73  1.41  1.03 
1992    1.82  1.19  1.02    2.39  1.37  1.08    2.00  1.30  1.12    2.04  1.49  0.94 
1993    1.81  1.21  0.93    2.06  1.33  0.87    2.35  1.29  0.97    2.21  1.66  0.94 
1994    1.90  1.16  0.80    1.72  1.10  0.97    2.36  1.06  0.75    2.03  1.57  0.91 
1995    1.92  1.11  0.77    1.38  1.11  0.86    1.93  0.89  0.62    1.63  1.42  0.91 
1996    1.77  0.90  0.74    1.13  1.04  0.81    1.55  0.82  0.65    1.26  1.24  0.89 
1997    1.48  0.87  0.72    1.05  0.99  0.72    1.46  0.82  0.67    1.17  1.12  0.91 
1998    1.19  0.84  0.70    1.01  0.87  0.72    1.52  0.72  0.62    1.13  1.02  0.84 
1999    1.06  0.85  0.74    1.22  0.91  0.88    1.34  0.63  0.59    1.03  0.88  0.88 
2000    0.92  0.81  0.77    1.22  0.92  0.92    1.01  0.53  0.54    0.77  0.80  0.83 
2001    0.83  0.81  0.77    1.16  0.83  1.00    0.78  0.51  0.51    0.58  0.71  0.82 
2002    0.78  0.78  0.75    0.77  0.76  0.96    0.65  0.45  0.47    0.42  0.64  0.76 
2003    0.82  0.73  0.75    0.63  0.72  1.05    0.67  0.46  0.49    0.38  0.61  0.77 
2004    0.78  0.69  0.76                    0.33  0.55  0.75 
Nu    704  2,493  3,276    533  1,582  1,314    834  2,266  1,406    909  3,363  2,419 
Nwy    22,961  16,981  17,012    12,519  7,755  5,453    19,052  11,325  7,720    25,381  15,910  9,326 
 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation for a given age group. 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women in age group. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period in age group for sampled women. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005).  82 
Annual (non-smoothed) fluctuations help to further illustrate the parallels between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Figure 4.3).  In particular, 1995 seems to have been a 
watershed year in both countries.  In just one year, the rate of first union formation 
decreased  by  31%  in  Tajikistan  (p=0.003)
31  and  by  27%  in  Uzbekistan  (p<0.001) 
(Table  4.4).    The  context  of  this  decline  for  Tajikistan  is  described  in  chapter  2.  
Heavily dependent on imports of grain during the Soviet period, stocks of grain were 
drawn  down  rapidly  in  the  early  post-independence  years.    After  the  collapse  of 
central  planning,  trading  relationships  took  time  to  develop  and  the  indebted 
government struggled to fund the necessary grain imports – particularly following a 
poor cotton harvest in 1994 and the associated reduction in valuable foreign revenues.  
Imports in 1994-95, even after being supplemented by aid, were just half of the 1994 
level (World Food Programme 1996).  The shortage of grain in the republic prompted 
dramatic increases in prices.  The price of open market bread increased sixfold in the 
first six months of 1995 (Grand et al. 2001), while price controls on rationed state 
bread were lifted in August of the same year.  Overall, the scarcity of flour and bread, 
and price increases, in 1995 had an acute impact on the welfare of the population, 
such that ‘many people suffered significant hunger over a period of many months’ 
(Harris  2004:29),  and  it  was  only  aid  from  international  agencies  that  prevented 
famine.  Given past studies of the relationship between periods of food scarcity and 
nuptiality,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  rate  of  first  union  formation  dropped 
dramatically at this time. 
                                                 
31 This, and subsequent, p-values are results of Wald tests assessing the significance of a calendar year 
coefficient, compared with a reference comparison year.  Standard errors were adjusted to take account 
of the surveys’ sample design.   83 
Figure 4.3 Rate of first union formation
1 in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (annual rates) 
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1 Rates per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years inclusive. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005). 
 
Table 4.4 Relative risks
1 of union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, vs. 1988
2 
  Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
1986  1.17   
1987  1.04  1.01 
1988 (153)   -  (153)   - 
1989  1.15  0.93 
1990  1.45  1.27 
1991  1.24  1.11 
1992  1.42  1.30 
1993  1.45  1.33 
1994  1.23  1.34 
1995  0.85  0.97 
1996  0.85  0.92 
1997  0.97  0.95 
1998  0.83  0.84 
1999  0.67  0.76 
2000  0.73  0.80 
2001  0.50  0.64 
2002  0.54  0.63 
2003  0.57  0.65 
2004  0.61  0.67 
2005    0.69 
Nu  4,506  6,691 
Nwy  38,098  50,617 
1 Relative risks based on the annual rate of first union formation (no smoothing). 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years 
inclusive. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period for sampled women. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS (2005).  84 
The similarity of the demographic response in Uzbekistan, meanwhile, reflects the 
similarity of the pressures that it experienced.  Like Tajikistan, it had been dependent 
on  imports  for  the  majority  of  its  grain  during  the  Soviet  period  (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1997c).  Like Tajikistan, it was heavily reliant on cotton exports as a 
source of external revenue, and therefore vulnerable to changes in crop levels and in 
world prices.  Indeed, while in the early years of independence, the cotton sector was 
helped  by  rising  prices,  by  1995  this  trend  in  prices  was  reversing  (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1995c:61).  Like Tajikistan, imports of grain to Uzbekistan declined 
sharply from 1994 to 1995 - in this case by more than half (FAO 2008c; Figure 4).  
This decline seems to stem not only from difficulty in funding the necessary imports, 
but  also  from  over-optimism  in  estimates  of  domestic  wheat  production
32.    Like 
Tajikistan, bread prices were liberalised, although at the earlier date of November 
1994, leading to immediate and significant price rises (Economist Intelligence Unit 
1994b:70), which continued in 1995 (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995f:46).  Like 
Tajikistan, there were reports of food shortages by early 1995 - to such an extent that 
rationing, which had been abolished at the end of 1994, was re-introduced (Economist 
Intelligence  Unit  1995d:53;  Pomfret  and  Anderson  1997).    Overall,  just  as  in 
Tajikistan, the population had become even more reliant on bread during the early 
years of independence – and just as in Tajikistan, in 1995 the population were faced 
with a ‘perfect storm’ of decreases in overall grain availability accompanied by the 
liberalisation of bread prices.  The significant drop in nuptiality in this year should be 
understood within this context.   
                                                 
32 The aim to become more self-sufficient had led to an increase in the amount of land sown to wheat.  
The initial estimate of the 1995 harvest was 3.3m tonnes (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996d:53), a 
significant chunk of domestic demand of 4m tonnes.  At the end of the year it was officially recorded as 
2.85 million tonnes, a doubling of 1994’s 1.42m tonne crop (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995e:64).  
However, the figure for 1995 was subsequently revised downwards to 2m tonnes, the poor harvest 
reflecting  the  lowest  yield  in  a  decade  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit  1996d:53).    Faced  with  an 
unexpected shortfall in grain supplies in the winter of 1995-96, the government had no option but to 
order further grain from abroad, despite the fact that wheat prices at this point had reached a 16-year 
high (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996e:46).   85 
Figure 4.4 Quantity of cereal imports in four Central Asian republics, 1992-1999 
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Note: The populations for the different republics, according to the 1989 Soviet census, were: 
Uzbekistan – 19.9m; Tajikistan – 5.1m; Kyrgyzstan – 4.3m; Kazakhstan – 16.7m. 
Source: FAO (2008c). 
 
In both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the marriage rate remained at a low level after 
1995.  Even though food shortages eased somewhat from mid-1996 in Tajikistan, 
after the end of subsidies bread was much more expensive than before.  Further, the 
collapse of the collective and state farms, following the rapid inflation in 1995 after 
the introduction of a new currency, led to persistent under-and non-payment of wages 
in subsequent years (Grand et al. 2001).  Similarly in Uzbekistan, while in the first 
half of the 1990s agriculture provided a buffer for growing unemployment in other 
sectors, from the mid-1990s unemployment and underemployment increased in rural 
areas  as  the  sector  became  increasingly  ‘under  strain’  (Spoor  2006:198).    The 
government retained the Soviet state order system for cotton and for grain, purchasing 
these products well below official market prices, which exacerbated hardship in rural 
areas (Economist Intelligence Unit 1996c:44).   Large-scale state and co-operative 
farms,  many  of  them  insolvent,  started  to  shed  labour,  while  their  remaining 
employees - on very low wages - became the ‘working poor’ (Spoor 2006:201).  Thus 
in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with bread much more expensive than pre-1995 
and rural incomes declining, food insecurity remained a major issue.  Given also that   86 
in both countries wedding ceremonies are traditionally very expensive and a focus for 
conspicuous demonstrations of wealth (Tett 1996; Agadjanian and Makarova 2003), 
this  undermined  people’s  ability  to  finance  the  costs  of  a  wedding  and  of  family 
formation.   
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, the countries became increasingly reliant on locally 
produced grain as imports remained well below Soviet levels.  Both pursued a policy 
of increasing the share of agricultural land devoted to wheat production – although, 
while  production  levels  started  to  increase,  productivity  was  actually  declining 
(Economist  Intelligence  Unit  2000).    In  both  countries,  household  garden  plots 
provided a safety net for many households, providing a valuable means of subsistence 
in  the  absence  of  sufficient  income
33,  although  the  small  amount  of  suitable  land 
available  has  restricted  the  size  of  the  individual  plots  (Spoor  2006).    Families 
therefore became increasingly dependent on, and therefore vulnerable to short-term 
disruptions in, the quality of the local food harvest.  
 
In 2000 and 2001, both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were affected by a severe drought, 
estimated to be the worst for 70 years, and part of a regional shortage of rainfall which 
also affected Iran, Afghanistan, Western Pakistan and Turkmenistan (IRI 2001), but 
not Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  This led to an almost total failure of the rainfed 
wheat  crop  and  significant  drops  in  the  irrigated  wheat  yield  (FAO/WFP  2000).  
Indeed, water flows in the two main sources of irrigation, the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya, were reported to be only 40% of the average (FAO 2001).  Overall wheat 
production,  which  had  increased  since  the  mid-1990s,  dramatically  declined  -  in 
Tajikistan  from  475,000  tonnes  in  1999  to  255,000  tonnes  in  2000  (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2001c) and 300,000 tonnes in 2001 (World Food Programme 2003), 
and in Uzbekistan from 3.6 million tonnes in 1999 to 3.2 million in 2001 (FAO 2001).  
These declines had a serious effect on food security.  In Tajikistan, for example, there 
was a 63.6% increase in the price of foodstuffs in 2000 (Economist Intelligence Unit 
2001c).  Especially vulnerable were those in rural areas whose household crop had 
                                                 
33  For  example,  following  the  1995  crisis,  Harris  (1998a:665-6)  notes  that  villagers  in  Khatlon, 
Tajikistan  decided  to  devote  more  of  their  private  household  plots  for  growing  wheat  rather  than 
vegetables.     87 
failed.  The situation was particularly acute in the second year of drought in 2001, 
reflecting the cumulative effect of persistent water and food shortage, as people had 
exhausted whatever coping strategies remained.
34  As many as one million people in 
Tajikistan faced malnutrition and potential starvation (Economist  Intelligence Unit 
2001a)  and  were  dependent  on  international  aid.    About  40%  of  Uzbekistan’s 
population lived in the affected areas (WHO 2000).  While there is no evidence for a 
change in the rate of first union formation during the first year of drought, the effect 
on nuptiality in the second year was significant.  The rate of first union formation in 
2001, during the second year of the drought, was just 75% (p=0.030) of pre-drought 
(1999) levels in Tajikistan, and 84% (p=0.047) of pre-drought levels in Uzbekistan 
(Figure 4.3; Table 4.4).  Following the drought, rain during the 2001-2002 cropping 
season was in line with the long term average, and production in 2002 recovered to 
1999 levels.  Rates of first union formation have increased gradually since 2001, but 
in 2005 had yet to recover to pre-drought levels. 
 
The  annual  pattern  of  trends  in  first  union  formation  therefore  highlights  the 
importance of particular crisis periods in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  However, the 
impact  on  nuptiality  has  also  been  long-lasting,  with  no  immediate  significant 
rebound  following  sharp  declines.    As  Palloni  et  al.  (1996:107)  argue,  ‘when  the 
economic effects of the crisis are long-lasting, a more permanent disequilibrium in the 
marriage markets sets in, and the making up of postponed marriages ceases to be a 
feasible option.  The consequence is an increase in the proportion of members who 
never marry’.  Indeed, underlying the specific crises in 1995 and 2000-2001 was the 
longer-term  economic  shift  away  from  Soviet-style  central  planning,  which  co-
ordinated trade between republics, to increased self-reliance in food supply – both at 
the  national  level  (as  imports  declined)  and  at  the  household  level  (as  families 
increasingly came to rely on household plots).  At the same time, there was a shift 
from subsidised and stable food prices to market-driven pricing, prone to fluctuations.   
 
                                                 
34 The UN’s humanitarian aid co-ordinator in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, pointed out that ‘families who 
survived last year by selling their cows and chickens now have no other means of coping.  Some 
households have sold the glass out of their windows and the wooden beams from their roofs to raise 
money for food’ (Reported in the Guardian, ‘Drought hit states facing famine’, October 30 2001).   88 
Overall,  these  changes  represented  a  shift  from  a  situation  in  which  minimum 
consumption levels were assured to a post-Soviet context in which this was no longer 
the case.  Those countries most reliant on imports during the Soviet era – Uzbekistan 
and particularly Tajikistan - were least well placed to provide for their population.   
They saw the most severe declines in nutrition (Table 4.1) and the most significant 
declines in nuptiality.  In contrast, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which had been less 
reliant on imports during the Soviet era and which did not experience the 2000-2001 
drought, were – after the shock of the first few years of independence – better able to 
provide  for  the  population.    From  the  mid-1990s,  the  level  of  undernourishment 
stayed low in Kazakhstan and decreased in Kyrgyzstan (Table 4.1), and the declines 
in first union formation in these two countries have been relatively small (Figure 4.1). 
 
4.5.2 The rise of labour migration 
 
The post-communist period has seen the emergence of new and significant patterns of 
international  labour  migration  (see  Rios  2006).    These  movements  should  be 
distinguished from the ethnic repatriation of the non-titular population (for example, 
of Russians from the Central Asian republics to Russia) in the  years immediately 
preceding and subsequent to independence.  In the Tajik case, economically-driven 
labour migration started to emerge in the mid-1990s (Umarov 2006) and for many it 
has ‘offered the only alternative to going hungry’ (Olimova and Bosc 2003:8).  Much 
of the movement is undocumented and so not recorded in official figures.  Olimova 
and Bosc (2003), using survey data, estimated that in 26% of Tajik households at least 
one household member had worked abroad at some point between 2000 and 2003.  
They identified several types of movement: traders who undertake short-term shuttle 
tours several times a year; seasonal workers, who return to Tajikistan each winter; and 
those who work abroad for several years at a time and visit their families infrequently.   
 
Since  the  vast  majority  of  migrants  are  men  of  working  age  who  are  working  in 
Russia  (Mughal  2007),  the  effect  is  to  remove  many  eligible  bachelors  from  the 
marriage market.  Thus Harris (1998a:661) reports, of the Gharmi villages in Khatlon, 
Tajikistan that ‘the absence of young men of marriageable age has made it extremely 
difficult to find spouses for the girls and there are increasing numbers of unmarried 
girls as old as 22 or 23 [which was previously unheard of]’.  Indeed, the scale of   89 
labour migration in Tajikistan is likely to be one of the key reasons for the persistence 
of low rates of first union formation since the mid-1990s.  Given also the significant 
labour migration from the other Central Asian republics since the mid-1990s (see, for 
example,  Ergeshbayev  2006;  Maksakova  2006),  it  would  be  interesting  for  future 
research  to  examine  the  relationship  between  these  movements  and  trends  in  first 
union formation in more detail – though this may be hampered by a lack of reliable 
data on migration levels over time.   
 
4.5.3 The role of ideational change 
 
This paper has highlighted the importance of economic change, and the implications 
for food security, to changes in the rate of first union formation in post-Soviet Central 
Asia.  But there have also been changes in the ideational sphere.  In the Tajik case, 
Harris (2006) observes changes, for example, in young people’s attitudes to romantic 
friendships, and in women’s clothing, since the Soviet era, particularly in the capital 
Dushanbe.  She also notes the emergence of ‘modernist’ family styles, characterised 
by a higher degree of individualism and in which children have considerable say in 
the  choice  of  their  spouse.    This  contrasts  to  the  ‘traditionalist’  model,  strongly 
collectivist, in which marriages are arranged by family members.  However, as she 
points out (p.152) the number of modernistic families in the republic is very small – at 
most representing 1% of families in the conservative rural areas of Khatlon, and 10% 
in the capital Dushanbe.  Overall, traditionalist values remain dominant.  Indeed, the 
post-Soviet period has seen a revival of Islamic practices (including, for example, 
increased observance of Ramadan) as religion becomes a more important feature of 
public and cultural life (Tazmini 2001) - although it is unclear that there is a serious 
religious  resurgence  (Harris  2006)  and  the  impact  on  gender  roles  has  yet  to  be 
evaluated (Falkingham 2000).  In any case, the virginity of brides remains highly 
valued,  and  the  movement  of  unmarried  women  outside  the  home  tends  to  be 
restricted by their families (Harris 2004).  Thus childbearing outside marriage remains 
rare, explaining why there has been as dramatic a drop in the rate of first births in 
Tajikistan as there has been in the rate of first union formation (chapter 2).  Marriage   90 
remains  highly  valued,  and  the  ceremony  remains  the  focus  of  conspicuous 
demonstrations of wealth
35.   
 
Meanwhile, there is no evidence that girls are staying in education for longer in the 
post-Soviet period in Tajikistan.  In fact, there is evidence of a decrease in educational 
enrolment after age 12, mainly among girls (Baschieri and Falkingham 2008).   Rates 
in the non-compulsory upper secondary ages are especially low, with an enrolment 
rate of 29% in 2003 (TransMONEE 2006), half that of the late Soviet period, with a 
particularly low rate for girls.  While rates of enrolment in tertiary education have 
remained steady in the post-Soviet period, with around 12% of those aged 19-24 years 
enrolled (TransMONEE 2006), the sex gap increased – from 58 girls per 100 boys in 
1990  to  just  34  in  1998  (Falkingham  2000)  and  35  in  2005  (UNESCO  2007).  
Increasingly in the post-Soviet period, in the absence of alternative accommodation, 
newly  married  women  become  kelin,  ‘incomers’,  in  the  home  of  their  husband’s 
family.  As well as childbearing, heavy emphasis is placed on their domestic role in 
the household, to such an extent that uneducated girls, less likely to pursue a job, are 
often  preferred  by  their  prospective  mothers-in-law  (Harris  2006).    Indeed,  as 
Falkingham (2000) argues, there has been a significant gender dimension to the nature 
of post-independence changes in Tajikistan, with women concentrated in the lowest-
paid sectors, including agriculture, education and health, where wages are insufficient 
to live on.  Overall, given the decrease in educational and employment opportunities 
for women, the context in Tajikistan contrasts sharply with the situation in Central 
Europe,  where  postponement  of  family  formation  has  been  attributed  partly  to 
women’s new employment opportunities and career prospects (Sobotka 2004).    
 
Therefore, in post-Soviet Tajikistan – at least thus far – economic factors, rather than 
ideational  changes  and  the  spread  of  new  opportunities  for  women,  are  the  main 
reasons for the decline in the rate of first union formation.  Similarly, the annual 
pattern of change in first union formation in Uzbekistan - with major declines in the 
rate of union formation coinciding with periods of particular food insecurity – also 
                                                 
35 Indeed, in an attempt to limit the amount of money spent on weddings - which could bankrupt a 
household (Gomart 2003) - the president of Tajikistan recently issued a decree limiting the number of 
guests at wedding celebrations.    91 
points towards the importance of economic factors.  Rates of enrolment in higher 
education decreased from 14% in 1991 to 8% in 2003 (TransMONEE 2006), while, as 
in Tajikistan, fewer women pursue higher education than men (UNESCO 2007).  In 
contrast, in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there has been a significant expansion 
of the tertiary sector, with enrolment rates more than doubling between 1996 and 
2003 (TransMONEE 2006; Figure 4.5).  Given that in both countries the sex gap in 
higher education is in the other direction – with an estimated 142 women enrolled for 
every 100 men in Kazakhstan, and 125 women per 100 men in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 
(UNESCO 2007), this represents a considerable increase in female higher education.  
Thus ideational change, and the spread of new opportunities for women, is likely to 
have  played  a  more  significant  role  in  influencing  trends  in  union  formation  in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than in Tajikistan and in Uzbekistan, especially since the 
mid-1990s.  Indeed, declines in first union formation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
over  this  period  have  been  concentrated  at  the  younger  ages,  consistent  with  the 
influence of increased female participation in higher education, while the rate at older 
ages has remained stable (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.5 Higher education enrolment
1 in four Central Asian republics, 1989-2003 
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4.5.4 Relating Central Asia to post-communist Europe 
 
The principles which are helpful in understanding changes in union formation in post-
communist  Europe  are  also  helpful  in  Central  Asia.    Just  as  in  post-communist 
Europe, there is considerable cultural diversity – with a particular cleavage between 
Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan,  where  female  roles  have  traditionally  been  more 
conservative, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where gender roles have traditionally 
been more egalitarian (Jones and Grupp 1987).  As in post-communist Europe, there 
have also been big differences in the economic performance of the former Communist 
states: Uzbekistan and, in particular, Tajikistan have experienced greater problems 
with food insecurity than Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  It is interesting that Tajikistan, 
which has experienced the most severe economic problems of all, has maintained a 
similar  distribution  of  age  at  first  union,  with  declines  in  the  rate  of  first  union 
formation in all age groups – in contrast with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where 
declines  since  the  mid-1990s  have  been  specifically  at  the  younger  ages.    This 
resonates with the pattern described by Sobotka (2004), in which those countries that 
had experienced a more successful transition showed the most significant increase in 
the mean age at first birth.   
 
As in post-communist Europe (Frejka 2008), the underlying root cause of the changes 
in first union formation in Central Asia has been the shift from state socialist regimes 
to  market  economies.    This  perspective  accommodates  both  the  importance  of 
economic change across the region and the possibility that the capitalist restructuring 
has started to foster ideational change and greater individual autonomy (Lesthaeghe 
and Surkyn 2002), reflected in the spread of female higher education, in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan.  It also provides a framework for considering economic influences 
on union formation which cannot be simply reduced to ‘crisis’ explanations.  Thus in 
Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan  it  has  been  the  longer-term  change  from  reliance  on 
centrally-planned food imports to increased self-sufficiency, and from subsidised to 
free-market pricing, which has effected a one-off transition to a  context in which 
minimum  consumption  levels  are  no  longer  guaranteed.    This,  as  the  paper  has 
illustrated,  has  led  to  periods  of  acute  food  crisis.    However,  these  crises  are 
symptoms of a population which is now, unlike the past, vulnerable to short-term 
changes in food supply, either from reductions in import levels (as in 1995) or, as   93 
reliance on local crops increased, on adverse local climatic conditions (as in 2000-
2001).  Even outside these crisis periods, basic foodstuffs now demand a significant 
share of the household budget – a feature of market conditions which can be expected 
to continue to have an important influence on union formation even as nutrition levels 
start to improve.  Likewise, the increasing dependence on income from international 
labour migration
36 is a form of economic change which, given the absence of males 
for extended periods, may have a long-lasting influence on patterns of first union 
formation. 
 
4.6 Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
This paper extends previous research on first union formation in post-Soviet Central 
Asia (Dommaraju and Agadjanian 2008) by extending the period of analysis to the 
mid-2000s and, in including Tajikistan, extending the cross-country comparison to 
four  of  the  five  Central  Asian  republics.    It  finds  that,  while  rates  of  first  union 
formation peaked in the early 1990s, there was a sharp decrease in subsequent years – 
such that rates are considerably lower than in the 1980s.  It also finds clear differences 
between the republics in terms of the extent of the decline.  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
which  experienced  the  most  severe  declines  in  food  security,  have  also  seen  the 
sharpest declines in first union formation.  Indeed, Tajikistan, which had the highest 
rate  in  the  late-Soviet  period,  had  the  lowest  rate  by  the  turn  of  the  millennium, 
reflecting a collapse in rates of first union formation across age groups.   
 
There are a number of interesting avenues for future research.  First, while this paper 
has focused mainly on the importance of changes in food security for understanding 
changes  in  first  union  formation  in  Central  Asia,  the  potential  importance  of 
ideational change and the spread of new opportunities for women could be explored in 
more  detail,  particularly  for  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan.    Second,  as  mentioned 
earlier,  our  understanding  of  trends  in  union  formation  would  improve  through 
research into the relationship with trends in international labour migration.  Third, 
                                                 
36 To illustrate, Mughal (2007:30) estimates that remittances sent by absent international migrants to 
families represented over a quarter of Tajikistan’s Gross Domestic Product in 2004; globally, only in 
Tonga and Moldova do remittances make up a bigger share.   
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trends in first union formation for four of the five ex-Soviet Central Asian republics 
have been presented, but the picture would be completed by a study which examines 
recent changes in Turkmenistan.  Fourth, the problem of food insecurity persists in 
Tajikistan, which has been identified by the United Nations as one of the 12 countries 
most severely affected by the recent increase in food prices (OCHA 2008).  It will be 
interesting to see if this most recent period of food crisis has led to further declines in 
the rate of union formation.   
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5. Spousal separation, selectivity and contextual effects: exploring the 
relationship between international labour migration and fertility in 
post-Soviet Tajikistan 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the sparse literature on the impact of temporary migration on 
fertility in origin areas.  It examines the case of male labour migration from post-
Soviet  Tajikistan,  a  significant  and  relatively  recent  phenomenon.    Fertility  and 
migration models are solved simultaneously to account for cross-process correlation.  
There is clear evidence for a short-term disruptive effect of spousal separation, but it 
is  too  early  to  assess  the  implications  for  completed  fertility.    While  there  is  no 
evidence for unobserved selectivity at the couple level, there is a significant positive 
correlation between the migration and fertility processes at the community level.   
 
Keywords:  labour  migration,  fertility,  spousal  separation,  selectivity,  multiprocess 
model, Tajikistan.   96 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This paper examines the relationship between men’s temporary international labour 
migration  from  Tajikistan  and  their  spouse’s  fertility.    There  is  an  established 
literature examining the links between spatial mobility and childbearing, including a 
number of papers in a recent special issue of Demographic Research (Volume 17).  
However, most of this research has tended to focus on the effects of long-term moves.  
As Lindstrom and Giorguli Saucedo (2002:1341) point out, ‘the impact of temporary 
migration  on  fertility  in  origin  areas  has  received  little  attention’,  despite  the 
importance of this form of migration in many parts of the world.  In Central Asia, as 
in parts of Eastern Europe, temporary international labour migration has become one 
of the defining features of the region’s post-Soviet demography.  In Tajikistan, this 
has  been  particularly  significant:  to  illustrate,  Mughal  (2007:30)  estimates  that 
remittances  sent  by  absent  international  migrants  to  families  represented  over  a 
quarter of Tajikistan’s Gross Domestic Product in 2004; globally, only in Tonga and 
Moldova do remittances make up a bigger share
37.   
 
Most  studies  linking  migration  and  childbearing  have  tended  to  treat  one  as  an 
important ‘parallel career’ in shaping the other.  Here, following Kulu and Milewski’s 
(2007) advice, the approach is to examine the interdependencies between the two.  
Joint modelling of fertility and migration equations not only provides an estimate of 
the influence of spousal separation on fertility, but also some insight into the extent to 
which migrants are selected for unobserved characteristics associated with fertility. 
 
5.2 Theory: temporary migration and childbearing 
 
Four  areas  of  the  migration-fertility  relationship  are  of  particular  relevance  to  the 
study of temporary migration and childbearing. 
 
                                                 
37 According to a more recent estimate, remittances made up 46% of GDP in Tajikistan in 2008, a 
higher figure than for any other country (Ratha et al. 2008).   97 
5.2.1 Disruption 
 
The  potentially  disruptive  influence  of  spousal  separation  on  fertility  is  well 
recognised.    Mathematical  models  have  shown  the  potential  for  repeated  seasonal 
migration to lower birth rates, analogous to reducing fecundability to a new lower 
constant  level  (Bongaarts  and  Potter  1979;  Menken  1979).    The  ‘efficiency’  of 
spousal separation in reducing natural marital fertility is known to vary according to 
length of separation, length of postpartum amenorrhea and fecundability (Millman 
and Potter 1984).  Meanwhile, we would expect the cumulative impact of spousal 
separation  to  be  greatest  in  areas  of  relatively  high  fertility  and  low  modern 
contraceptive prevalence.  However, there have not been many empirical illustrations 
of the effect of separation on fertility in particular populations.  At an aggregate level, 
van de Walle (1975) links the relatively low levels of marital fertility in nineteenth 
century Ticino, Switzerland to the regular seasonal pattern of male absence.  Massey 
and  Mullan  (1984)  use  cross-sectional  individual-level  data  from  a  rural  town  in 
Mexico to show that women with husbands absent through migration (leaving at some 
point between 1976 and 1978) were significantly less likely to have a child aged one 
or two (born in 1976 and 1977), while Chen et al. (1974) argue that monthly variation 
in the number of days males are absent partially explains the striking seasonal pattern 
in births found in Matlab, Bangladesh over the two-year observation period. 
 
Empirical studies into the effect of separation are helpful in illustrating the impact on 
annual birth probabilities of a particular temporal pattern of male absence.  They also 
provide insights into the possible longer-term implications of separation for fertility 
which purely mathematical studies, given the complexity of human behaviour, cannot.  
For example, as Millman and Potter (1984) acknowledge, their simulation does not 
allow  for  a  potential  increase  in  the  frequency  of  intercourse  after  separation  has 
ended, and therefore a higher post-reunion conception rate relative to a non-separation 
scenario, which might partially offset the effect of separation.  It also does not allow 
for any dependency between the timing of separation and a woman’s reproductive 
status.  This may bias estimates of the impact of separation on fertility if, for example, 
in order to meet current income deficits the risk of migration increases following a 
birth.  Overall, our understanding of the relationship between temporary migration 
and  fertility  would  benefit  from  more  empirical  work  to  complement  and  inform   98 
mathematical simulations – but such work has been limited, until recently, by a lack 
of individual-level data with information on both migration and fertility behaviour 
over time. 
 
Lindstrom and Giorguli Saucedo’s (2002; 2007) research into the interrelationships 
between Mexico-US migration and fertility is therefore particularly valuable.  They 
use data from the Mexican Migration Project, containing retrospective migration and 
fertility histories for both Mexicans in the sending communities and those in the US 
areas in which they tend to settle.  They show that, contrary to the independence 
assumption in Millman and Potter’s (1984) simulations, the likelihood of husband’s 
migration  is  greatest  in  the  year  during  which  a  birth  occurs,  and  in  the  years 
immediately following.  They provide clear evidence of a disruptive effect on fertility: 
in the Mexico sample, spousal separation of 4-7 months lowers the odds of a birth in 
the subsequent year by 15%, while a separation of 8-12 months lowers the odds by 
32%.  Importantly, however, despite this short-term disruption, there is no evidence to 
suggest  a  significant  effect  of  separation  on  cumulated  fertility.    Lindstrom  and 
Giorguli  Saucedo  conclude  that  Mexican  couples  are  able  to  make  up  for  lost 
reproductive time following the periods of separation.  The lack of impact on the total 
number  of  births  also  reflects  the  particular  pattern  of  temporal  absence:  most 
separations are relatively short in duration and repeated long separations are unusual.   
 
5.2.2 Adaptation/ assimilation  
 
Much of the literature relating long-term migration to fertility behaviour evaluates the 
relative importance of socialisation and adaptation in a particular context.  From the 
socialisation perspective, migrant fertility is heavily influenced by preferences and 
behaviour  in  the  origin  environment;  in  contrast,  the  adaptation/assimilation 
hypothesis  argues  that  migrant  fertility  comes  to  resemble  behaviour  at  the 
destination.  Lindstrom and Giorguli Saucedo (2002) distinguish the importance of 
adaptation, rooted in economic theories of fertility stressing the role of income and the 
relative  costs  of  and  preferences  for  children  in  decisions  regarding  family  size 
(Becker 1991), from that of assimilation, the gradual process in which migrants adopt 
the  norms  and  cultural  values  of  the  population  at  destination.    In  the  case  of 
temporary migration, the former may influence behaviour during the temporary stay   99 
within the different economic context at the destination, but the assimilation of values 
has the potential for a more long-lasting impact on fertility behaviour even after return 
to the origin environment.  Indeed, they find evidence that, among couples in their 
Mexico sample and after controlling for the effects of separation, each additional year 
of women’s cumulated US migration experience lowers the odds of a birth in a given 
year by 4%.  Interestingly, any effect of men’s cumulated migration experience on 
fertility is in the opposite direction.  Therefore, to the extent to which the assimilation 
of cultural values serves to reduce the fertility of temporary migrants, it is specifically 
women’s migration experience that seems to be significant. 
  
5.2.3 Contextual influence of community migration patterns 
 
According  to  the  diffusion  hypothesis,  assimilated  cultural  values  may  not  only 
influence individual couple’s fertility, but also the behaviour of others in the area to 
which  they  return.    This  theory  therefore  highlights  the  ‘contextual’  influence  of 
migration  patterns  within  a  community.  The  potential  importance  of  diffusion 
increases with both migration prevalence and the length of history of the migration 
stream.  Further, as Lindstrom and Giorguli Saucedo (2002) show, just as the gender 
composition is key to the assimilation process, so too it seems to play a key role in 
diffusion.    They  find  that  women  living  in  Mexican  communities  with  a  high 
prevalence of female migration are significantly less likely to give birth in a given 
year,  and  have  significantly  fewer  children,  than  those  living  in  areas  with  a  low 
female migration prevalence.  On the other hand, those living in areas with a high 
prevalence  of  male  migration  are  more  likely  to  give  birth  in  a  given  year  after 
controlling for separation effects.  Male migration, they argue, may actually serve to 
strengthen traditional family behaviour by providing extra income and hence both 
easing any economic pressures to forgo childbearing and reducing a woman’s need to 
work  outside  the  home.    Similarly,  Agadjanian  et  al  (2008b)  show  that  high 
community levels of male migration in rural Mozambique are associated with a higher 
probability of birth in a given  year, and  also speculate that migration’s economic 
benefits  might  serve  to  strengthen  the  family  system  and  the  community’s  social 
fabric. 
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5.2.4 Selectivity  
 
Importantly, migrants tend to be selected for certain characteristics associated with 
fertility.  Even before long-term moves, migrant fertility behaviour often mimics the 
fertility  behaviour  of  women  in  the  migration  destination  (White  et  al.  1995; 
Chattopadhyay et al. 2006).  A recent body of research illustrates how migration itself 
is often prompted by decisions connected with marriage and family building and that 
the  tendency  for  women  to  have  elevated  first  birth  risks  after  internal  migration 
should  be  understood  within  this  context  (Gabrielli  et  al.  2007;  Milewski  2007; 
Nedoluzhko and Andersson 2007).  While migrants may be selected for observed 
characteristics such as marital status, age and educational background, they may also 
differ in harder to measure characteristics including fertility preferences or openness 
to  innovation  (Lindstrom  and  Giorguli  Saucedo  2002).    Importantly,  the  potential 
direction of selectivity varies from place to place.  On the one hand, migrants may 
possess motivational characteristics also associated with lower fertility, including a 
desire for social mobility; on the other, it might be the economically disadvantaged, 
with a propensity for high fertility, who are more predisposed to migrate (Singley and 
Landale  1997).    Massey  and  Mullan’s  (1984)  study  of  migration  from  Mexico 
provides an example of the former mode of selection.  After controlling for the effects 
of separation, wives of legal migrants had significantly lower fertility compared to 
those married to illegal migrants.  This they interpret as a reflection of differences of 
wealth and outlook between the two groups, with the wives of legal migrants having 
acquired a concept of upward mobility.   
 
5.3 Context: fertility in, and labour migration from, Tajikistan 
 
During Soviet times, Tajikistan had the highest fertility of all the Soviet republics, 
with census data showing the highest average annual rates of population growth in 
each of the periods 1959-1970, 1970-79 and 1979-1989 (Anderson and Silver 1989).  
Fertility peaked in the mid-1970s at 6.3 children per woman and subsequently started 
to decline, mirroring wider Soviet trends, reaching a figure of 5.04 by the time of 
independence in 1991 (TransMONEE 2006).  Despite this decline, by the end of the 
Soviet  era,  Tajikistan  was  still  regarded  as  ‘pre-transitional’  (Anichkin  and 
Vishnevskii 1992:61).  Central Asia had the highest fertility rates in the Soviet Union,   101 
with Tajikistan showing the highest rates of all (Turner 1993) and the ideology of 
large families ‘well established’ among the local population (Harris 2002:219).  In 
post-Soviet times, total fertility has continued to decline and was estimated at 3.96 for 
the 2000-02 period
38, but this remains the highest figure across the former Soviet 
Union.    Modern  contraceptive  prevalence  has  increased  but  is  still  quite  low, 
estimated at 30% of women in union in 1999 (Falkingham 2000), with use confined to 
women at higher ages and parities.  Indeed, given both that the cumulative impact of 
spousal separation tends to be greatest in areas of relatively high fertility, and that 
labour migration from Tajikistan is significant, of the ex- socialist and Soviet states in 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe we might expect Tajikistan to show the most marked 
fertility response to temporary labour migration. 
 
Recent labour migration should be distinguished from earlier migration movements. 
Tajikistan was affected by a huge wave of out-migration of the non-ethnically Tajik 
population in the  years immediately preceding and subsequent to independence in 
1991.    The  civil  war  in  the  early  post-independence  years  led  to  the  internal 
displacement of around 500,000-600,000 people, while an estimated 70,000-100,000 
fled to Afghanistan (Foroughi 2002; Lynch 2002).  Virtually all of these migrants had 
returned  to  their  permanent  place  of  residence  by  1997  (Rowland  2005).    But 
according  to  Olimova  and  Bosc  (2003),  it  was  not  until  the  mid-1990s  that 
economically-driven ‘labour migration’ started to emerge – and levels have probably 
been growing ever since.  They estimate that in 26% of all households at least one 
household member had worked abroad at some point between 2000 and 2003.  They 
identify several types of movement: traders who undertake short-term shuttle tours 
several times a  year; seasonal workers, who  return to Tajikistan each  winter; and 
those who work abroad for several years at a time and visit their families infrequently.  
Both Olimova and Bosc (2003) and Mughal (2007) present data showing that the vast 
majority of migrants are men of working age who are working in Russia.  Mughal 
argues that this represents a ‘brawn’ (rather than a ‘brain’) drain, given that only 7% 
of  the  migrants  from  his  survey  in  the  region  of  Khatlon  had  tertiary  education, 
compared to around 20% of the working male population as a whole.   
                                                 
38 This estimate is based on the author’s calculations using the birth history component of the 2003 
Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS).   102 
The context of the labour migration process has implications for the nature of the 
migration-fertility relationship in Tajikistan.  It is at this stage overwhelmingly sex 
selective, with very few women working abroad for significant periods and most men 
travelling alone
39.  The adaptation hypothesis, regarding a couple’s fertility behaviour 
at destination, is therefore less relevant.  Perhaps most importantly, and unlike some 
of the more established labour migration streams analysed in the literature, labour 
migration  from  Tajikistan  is  a  relatively  new,  ‘young’,  phenomenon.  
Methodologically,  therefore,  it  would  be  difficult  to  investigate  the  effect  of 
assimilation net of separation
40.  For these reasons, this paper focuses on examining 
the  importance  of  the  remaining  areas  –  disruption,  the  contextual  influence  of 
community migration patterns, and selectivity – in the Tajik context.  Disruption is 
expected to be an important short-term influence on fertility, particularly given the 
quite high levels of fertility and low modern contraceptive prevalence.  Lindstrom and 
Giorguli  Saucedo  (2002;  2007)  conclude  that  the  effect  of  spousal  separation  on 
fertility  in  Mexico  is  temporary  and  couples  are  later  able  to  make  up  for  lost 
reproductive time; it will be interesting to see whether in Tajikistan, in the relatively 
short span of years analysed, the couples in which males have spent some time abroad 
have  also  been  able  to  compensate  for  these  periods  of  absence.    In  terms  of 
contextual influences, since past studies have argued that its effects are strongest in 
places with a long history of migration and where there is a high prevalence of female 
migration, we would not expect to find strong evidence for diffusion in Tajikistan.  
Finally, given the tendency for labour migrants from Tajikistan to be relatively poorly 
educated, we might expect migrants to be selected for high fertility.   
 
5.4 Data  
 
                                                 
39 The TLSS survey data confirm that very few women migrate to work abroad.  Of the 3,490 couples 
analysed, 546 men (15.7%) and 23 women (0.66%) had spent three months or more abroad between 
1998 and 2003.  Therefore, of those who had spent this amount of time abroad, just 4% were women. 
40 Lindstrom  and Giorguli Saucedo (2002) use husband’s total US experience, lagged by two years, as 
a measure of assimilation.  This is in a context of a long history of Mexico-US migration; in the Tajik 
context, with limited potential for the accumulation of labour migration experience, any measure of 
assimilation is likely to be confounded with the potentially disruptive effect of separation and any 
‘catching up’ in the conception rate following spousal reunion.     103 
This  study  uses  the  2003  Tajikistan  Living  Standards  Survey  (TLSS),  part  of  the 
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys project overseen by 
the World Bank.  This was a nationally representative survey of 4,160 households 
across 208 primary sampling units (‘communities’).  The survey recorded complete 
birth histories for women aged 15-49 years, with exact dates of birth, together with 
the  international  migration  history  of  each  member  of  the  household,  providing  a 
valuable  chance  to  link  fertility  and  migration  behaviour.    The  migration  history 
consists of the number of months an individual spent abroad in each of the years from 
1998 to 2003 inclusive.  A longer history would have been preferable, but given that 
labour migration is a very recent phenomenon – with movements only starting in the 
mid-1990s – the survey provides coverage of most of the years of labour migration up 
to the time of the survey.  Pragmatically, too, since migration histories are likely to be 
recalled with less accuracy than birth histories, restricting retrospective questioning to 
the five years before the survey may minimise recall error.  Importantly, migration 
histories  were  collected  for  each  individual  irrespective  of  whether  they  were 
currently residing in Tajikistan.  If a particular member was currently abroad, another 
member of the household would provide the information on their behalf
41.  Since the 
focus here is the effect of labour migration on marital fertility, only married couples 
are included in the analysis.  The spouse code in the survey roster was used to link the 
woman’s fertility history with her spouse’s migration history, creating a couple year 
dataset for the years 1998-2002 inclusive.  The temporary international migration of 
the spouse was operationalised as a period of absence from the household, measured 
in months spent abroad in a given calendar year. Years before the couple were in 
union were excluded from analysis
42.  The analysed dataset contains 16,139 couple 
years to 3,490 couples across 208 communities.   
                                                 
41 Migration histories were only collected for those listed as ‘household members’ on the household 
roster.    The  definition  of  a  household  member  is  not  straightforward  -  and  may  well  have  been 
interpreted in different ways by different households.  The potential omission of longer-term labour 
migrants, particularly if they have stopped sending remittances and failed to maintain contact with the 
household,  is  noted.    Any  such  omissions  would  be  expected  to  lead  to  an  under-estimate  of  the 
influence of spousal separation on fertility.  
42  The  woman’s  age  x  at  the  survey,  and  the  woman’s  age  at  marriage  y,  are  only  measured  in 
completed years.  The woman’s age at t years before the survey is calculated as x-t.  Couple years were 
excluded from the analysis if y>(x-t).    104 
5.5 Method 
 
Given the lack of empirical research on the impact of temporary migration on fertility 
in  origin  areas,  this  paper  examines  the  relationship  between  men’s  international 
labour  migration  from  Tajikistan  and  their  spouse’s  fertility.    The  first  step  is  to 
examine  the  potentially  disruptive  effect  of  male  spousal  absence  on  the  odds  of 
conception in a given year.  Dates of birth are shifted back nine months to reflect the 
dates  of  conception  leading  to  live  births.  The  dependent  variable  in  the  fertility 
model is a binary variable ytjk indicating whether couple j in community k conceived 
in year t.  A multilevel discrete-time logistic regression model is fitted to allow for the 
hierarchical structure and to correct the estimated standard errors to allow for the 
clustering of observations at the couple and community level (Goldstein 2003).  The 
model can be expressed as: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 log( )
y
tjk
y
tjk
p y y y y y
jk k tjk tjk p u v x z β β γ
− = + + + +               (5.1) 
where 
( ) y
tjk p  is the probability of a conception in a given year, ztjk indicates spousal 
absence with coefficient γ, and 
( ) y
tjk x  represent a vector of controls with coefficients 
β
(y).  In this three-level framework, the intercept term is split into three components, 
reflecting  the  average  intercept
( )
0
y β ,  a  couple-specific  random  effect 
( ) y
jk u   and  a 
community-specific random effect
( ) y
k v . The couple and community random effects are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variances 
2
( ) u y σ  and
2
( ) v y σ .  The 
baseline log-odds of conception is defined by the time since union (for conceptions 
leading to first births) or the time since the previous birth (for conceptions leading to 
higher order births).  Apart from educational background, there are no controls for 
socio-economic  status,  which  is  likely  to  be  correlated  with  both  fertility  and 
migration.    The  survey  did  collect  a  wealth  of  data  on  household  income, 
consumption and expenditure, but these were not used as covariates since all relate to 
the  period  immediately  preceding  the  survey  only;  Hoem  and  Kreyenfeld  (2006a; 
2006b) warn against an anticipatory approach which conditions on the future
43.   
 
                                                 
43 Educational background is also only measured at the time of the survey but, since the vast majority 
of individuals in union have already completed their education, is included as a time-invariant control.   105 
Given that migrants may be selected for certain unobserved characteristics associated 
with fertility, a multiprocess (or ‘joint ‘or ‘simultaneous’) model is also fitted to allow 
for the joint determination of fertility and migration processes.  This approach has 
been recently used in the demographic literature to analyse correlated processes like 
childbearing  and  union  dissolution  (Steele  et  al.  2005;  Leone  and  Hinde  2007), 
mobility and union dissolution (Boyle et al. 2008) and internal migration and fertility 
(Kulu 2008).  To my knowledge, this is the first time it has been used to analyse the 
relationship  between  temporary  international  labour  migration  and  fertility.    An 
equation predicting spousal migration in a particular year, fitted simultaneously with 
equation (5.1), is given by:  
( )
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where 
( ) z
tjk p  is the probability of spousal absence in a given year and 
( ) z
tjk x  represent a 
vector of controls with coefficients β
(z)44.  As with the equation for conceptions, the 
intercept term is split into three components - the average intercept 
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z β , a couple-
specific random effect 
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k v .  The model 
allows  for  selectivity  at  the  couple  and  community  levels  by  allowing  for  cross-
process correlation between the random effects at these levels.  Thus (
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44 There are no controls for duration since previous migration because the 2003 TLSS data does not 
record  information  on  migration  before  1998.    Since  the  migration  information  from  1998  -  2002 
consists of the number of months of absence in each of the five years, rather than spells (start and end 
dates) of migration episodes, the data are organised by years within couples, rather than migration 
‘spells’ within couples.  Equation (5.2) therefore predicts the log odds of spousal absence through 
migration in a given year, rather than the log-odds of the hazard of migration at a given time since 
previous migration.  Equation (5.1) similarly predicts the log-odds of conception in a given year, but a 
control for time since union/time since previous birth is included.   106 
In this way, the extent to which male-migrant couples are selected for unobserved 
couple-level characteristics associated with fertility can be gauged by examining the 
direction and significance of the correlation ( uyz σ ) between the ujk terms in the two 
equations.  Similarly, a significant covariance ( vyz σ ) between the vk terms may be 
interpreted  as  evidence  for  selectivity  -  this  time  at  the  community  level.  
Alternatively,  it  may  be  indicative  of  the  contextual  influence  of  community 
migration  patterns  on  fertility  behaviour:  a  negative  covariance,  such  that  after 
controlling for covariates communities with a relatively high number of temporary 
migrants also have a relatively low number of conceptions, would be consistent with 
the diffusion hypothesis; a positive covariance would be consistent with the idea that 
migration’s economic benefits can serve to strengthen the family system.  Besides 
illustrating  the  importance  of  selectivity  and  possible  contextual-level  effects,  the 
multiprocess  model  has  the  benefit  of  providing  an  estimate  of  the  influence  of 
spousal separation on fertility which is adjusted for selectivity bias at the couple and 
community levels. 
 
Identification of the multiprocess model is achieved through within-couple replication 
of conception and migration information across years.  The model is therefore fitted 
under the assumption that all sources of correlation between the two processes are at 
the couple and community levels.  Following Steele et al. (2004), it is fitted as a 
multilevel  bivariate  model  by  creating  a  dummy  variable  indicating  the  type  of 
response to interact with the covariates of interest.  In this case, therefore, for each 
couple year there are two responses (migration/conception).  Estimation is through 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, using MLwiN version 2.01 (Rasbash 
et al. 2004)
45.  Browne (2002) provides details of using MCMC methods in MLwiN. 
                                                 
45 Initially, model parameters are estimated using quasi-likelihood methods.  As Rasbash et al. (2004) 
explain, each binary response is transformed to a continuous linear model using a first order marginal 
quasi-likelihood (MQL) Taylor series approximation, and the model is then estimated using iterative 
generalised least squares.  However, this method can produce estimates of the variance parameters for 
the random part of the model which are biased downwards. Therefore, Bayesian MCMC simulation-
based methods are used, with the MQL estimates providing starting values.  As Steele et al. (2005) 
explain, a chain of random draws is taken from the conditional distribution for each parameter, and a 
point estimate is obtained by taking the mean of the parameter values across all the chains.  For the 
single process logistic models presented here, 80,000 chains are used, with the first 5,000 representing   107 
5.6 Results  
 
Of the 3490 couples studied, 394 (11.3%) male spouses lived abroad for at least one 
month during the period from 1998 to 2002.  Of the 16,139 couple years analysed, in 
788 (4.9%) of them the male spouse was abroad for at least one month in a given year.  
For these 4.9%, Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of months away.  It is possible that 
there is some element of respondent digit preference (‘rounding’) for answers of six 
and 12 months.  However, given the previous research of Olimova and Bosc (2003), 
the overall bimodal pattern probably reflects the real underlying distribution: a  peak 
at six months reflecting seasonal workers, who return to Tajikistan each winter; and 
the peak at 12 months reflecting those who work abroad for several years at a time 
and visit their families relatively infrequently. 
 
Figure  5.1  Number  of  months  spent  abroad  by  male  spouse  in  years  of  labour 
migration 
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Source: author's analysis of Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (2003). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the ‘burn-in’ period in which draws are discarded before convergence is achieved; for the multiprocess 
model, 500,000 chains are used, with a burn-in of 20,000.   108 
5.6.1 Disruption 
 
Table 5.1 presents results from the single-process model examining the relationship 
between spousal absence and odds of conception in a given year.  The categories 
chosen for the spousal absence variable reflect the nature of the distribution: months 
with sparse numbers are grouped together (one to five; seven to 11) while the peaks at 
six and 12 months have their own category.  Since in Tajikistan the timing of first 
order  conceptions is very  strongly  related to the timing of marriage, with a rapid 
progression from first marriage to first birth, separate models are fitted for first and 
higher order conceptions (Table 5.1).  There is some evidence for a disruptive effect 
of spousal separation on fertility for childless women, with all durations of spousal 
absence  showing  a  reduced  odds  of  conception  compared  to  the  no-migration 
reference category.  However, this effect is only significant for one of the categories 
(one to five months) and overall, given the relatively small number of cases in each 
category, there is a lack of statistical power to test for differences.   
 
The model for higher order conceptions, benefiting from the pooling of cases across 
parities, provides a clearer picture.  Interestingly, there is no evidence to suggest that 
periods of absence of up to six months in a given year, characteristic of seasonal 
migration movements, result in a reduced odds of conception - suggesting that in 
these instances couples are together long enough to make up for lost reproductive 
time.  For absences of seven to 11 months, there is some evidence for a reduction in 
conceptions  (p=0.11).    For  absences  of  12  months  in  a  given  year,  there  is 
unambiguous evidence of a disruptive effect (p<0.01).  Given that spousal absence 
was  recorded  in  months  only,  that  there  are  any  conceptions  at  all  in  these  latter 
instances  may  reflect  the  ‘rounding-up’  of  responses  of  near-total  annual  absence 
when the spouse was in fact  present for a period of some weeks.  It may also reflect 
errors  introduced  by  the  assumption  of  a  nine-month  period  of  gestation  when 
backdating the date of birth to the date of conception.  
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Table 5.1 Factors influencing odds of conception in a particular  year: odds ratios 
from single process models for a) first conceptions b) higher order conceptions 
Na  Nb  Variable  a. first 
conception 
b. higher order 
conceptions 
    Spousal absence in year (months)         
2072  13280    0  1    1   
16  142    1-5  0.31†  0.690  1.05  0.213 
20  175    6  0.47  0.715  0.98  0.246 
16  226    7-11  0.63  0.715  0.69  0.226 
12  180    12  0.74  0.737  0.25**  0.408 
             
    Controls (varying by year)         
    Female centred age
a   0.86**  0.034  0.92**  0.008 
    Female centred age squared
a  0.99**  0.002  1.00**  0.001 
    Parity
b         
  2002    1  -    1   
  2800    2      0.72**  0.075 
  2866    3      0.57**  0.091 
  2535    4      0.51**  0.109 
  1628    5      0.51**  0.132 
  1106    6      0.47**  0.166 
  1066    7+      0.71*  0.171 
    Years since union
c         
604      0   1    -   
481      1   0.99  0.131     
258      2   1.02  0.165     
137      3   0.55*  0.233     
98      4   0.47**  0.283     
555      5+  0.37**  0.220     
    Years since previous birth
d         
  3001    <1   -    1   
  2661    1-2       1.13†  0.068 
  3122    2-4       0.82**  0.073 
  2406    4-7       0.62**  0.096 
  2813    7+       0.46**  0.132 
    Year         
450  2519    1998  1    1   
444  2653    1999  1.46*  0.153  1.16†  0.077 
426  2799    2000  1.10  0.161  0.93  0.081 
397  2961    2001  1.38*  0.163  1.04  0.078 
419  3071    2002  0.78  0.169  0.69**  0.085 
             
    Controls (time invariant)         
    Female highest educational level         
105  442    Missing/none/primary  1.06  0.252  1.02  0.140 
410  1520    Secondary basic  1.05  0.130  1.01  0.081 
1499  11210    Secondary complete  1    1   
122  831    Higher  0.55†  0.316  0.87  0.132   110 
 
    Region         
563  3789    Khatlon  1    1   
227  1710    Dushanbe  1.66*  0.258  0.73**  0.123 
383  2646    Regions of Republican 
    Subordination  1.04  0.160  0.96  0.079 
751  4523    Sogd  0.88  0.137  0.60**  0.074 
212  1335    Gorno-Badakhshan  1.14  0.213  0.68**  0.108 
    Type of Region         
1593  9761    Rural area  1    1   
543  4242    Urban area  1.06  0.250  0.80  0.141 
    Proportion of households in 
community engaged in agriculture          
1588  10075    Most households  1    1   
235  1287    Only some  0.82  0.250  0.95  0.148 
313  2641    None  0.71  0.307  1.11  0.165 
    Constant (baseline)  -1.35**  0.308  -0.70**  0.129 
   
2
u σ   0.007  0.008  0.002  0.002 
   
2
v σ   0.008  0.010  0.019  0.014 
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics. 
N gives the number of couple years in each category for categorical variables: Na for the single process 
model; Nb for the multiprocess model. 
a  Mid-year age, in completed years.  
b At beginning of the year. 
c The difference between the woman's mid-year age and her age at first union (completed years only).  
Couple years before union are excluded from analysis.  
d Time, at the beginning of the year, since the previous birth (includes fractions of a year).  
Source: author's analysis of Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (2003). 
 
A Poisson model was fitted to assess the cumulative impact of periods of spousal 
absence on the total number of conceptions over the period
46.  Table 5.2 presents the 
results.    Over  the  five  years  considered,  there  is  no  evidence  that  women  whose 
spouses were away for less than a year in total had fewer conceptions leading to live 
births than those whose spouses were present for the whole time.  However, women 
whose spouses were away for a total period of between one and two years, or of more 
than two years, did have significantly fewer births.  Of course, given the relatively 
short span of years analysed - and indeed the short history of labour migration from 
Tajikistan - it is too early to assess the implications for completed fertility.  What is 
clear  is  the  impact  of  spousal  separation  on  cumulated  fertility  thus  far;  future 
research  should  examine  whether  these  couples  are  able  to  compensate  for  these 
periods of absence in subsequent years.  
                                                 
46A negative binomial model was also fitted but the ancillary parameter α, an estimate of the degree of 
overdispersion, was not significant.     111 
Table 5.2 Factors influencing total number of conceptions leading to live births, 
1998-2002: parameter estimates from single process Poisson model 
N  Variable     
  Cumulative number of months of spousal 
separation          
3096    0  (ref.)       
63    1-5  -0.04    0.146   
142    6-11  0.09    0.089   
100    12-23    -0.32*    0.129   
89    24+  -0.21†    0.132   
  Controls          
  Female centred age
a   -0.08**    0.006   
  Female centred age squared
a  -0.01**    0.001   
  Parity
b         
971    0  (ref.)       
401    1  0.01    0.064   
528    2  -0.12†    0.070   
505    3  -0.22*    0.084   
437    4  -0.27**    0.102   
284    5  -0.20    0.126   
189    6  -0.02    0.152   
175    7+  0.39*    0.166   
  Female highest educational level         
123    Missing/none/primary  0.04    0.099   
443    Secondary basic  0.02    0.058   
2723    Secondary complete         
201    Higher  -0.18†    0.107   
  Region         
931    Khatlon   (ref.)       
410    Dushanbe   -0.14    0.092   
661    Regions of Republican    
  Subordination  -0.02    0.056   
1156    Sogd   -0.34**    0.051   
332    Gorno-Badakhshan   -0.29**    0.079   
  Type of Region         
2469    Rural area  (ref.)       
1021    Urban area  -0.14    0.102   
  Proportion of households in community engaged 
in agriculture          
2533    Most households  (ref.)       
331    Only some  -0.05    0.105   
626    None  0.01    0.119   
  Constant (baseline)  0.25**    0.072   
 
2
v σ   <0.01    0.058   
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics.   
N gives the number of couples in each category for categorical variables. 
a Age at time of the survey (completed years).  
b At beginning of 1998. 
Source: author’s analysis of Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (2003).   112 
5.6.2 Selectivity and contextual influence of community migration patterns 
 
Models  presented  thus  far  have  been  single-process;  in  other  words,  they  fail  to 
account  for  the  possible  selectivity  of  spousal  migration  status  for  unobserved 
characteristics associated with fertility.  The results of the multiprocess model, which 
does  account  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  by  simultaneously  fitting  logistic 
equations  for  the  migration  and  conception  processes,  are  shown  in  Table  5.3
47.  
Interestingly, there is no evidence for a selection effect at the couple level:  uyz σ , the 
correlation  between  the  couple-dependent  random  effects  in  the  conception  and 
spousal  separation  equations  is  insignificant  (p=0.36).    In  other  words,  after 
controlling  for  certain  time-varying  (including  age,  parity,  years  since  previous 
conception  and  year)  and  time-constant  (including  educational  background  and 
region) variables, there is no evidence to suggest that there are unobserved factors that 
result in the selection of couples more or less likely to have children into spousal 
separation through male labour migration. 
 
On the other hand, there is evidence for a significant positive correlation between the 
community-dependent  random  effects  in  the  conception  and  spousal  separation 
equations  ( vyz σ =  0.16;  p=0.076):  after  controlling  for  the  observed  covariates 
including the couple-level effect of separation, there is a tendency for communities 
with an above-average level of male migration to also have an above-average level of 
fertility.  
                                                 
47 Here, given the small number of couple years at parity 0 in which spousal separation occurred, only 
the multiprocess model for higher order conceptions is considered.   For simplicity, spousal separation 
is reduced to a binary variable (absent for 0-5 months/6-12 months), such that the spousal separation 
equation is a logistic model.  Retaining the categories used in the single-process model in Table 1 
would  have  required  simultaneously  fitting  logistic  (conception)  and  ordinal  (spousal  separation) 
equations, which cannot be accommodated in MLwiN.     113 
Table 5.3  Factors influencing odds of conception in a particular year: odds ratios 
from single- and multiprocess model for higher-order conceptions 
 
N  Variable  Single-process  Multiprocess
a 
  Spousal absence in year (months)         
13421    0-5  1    1   
582    6-12  0.69*  0.145  0.62 **  0.156 
           
  Controls (varying by year)         
  Female centred age
b   0.92**  0.008  0.92**  0.008 
  Female centred age squared
b  1.00**  0.001  1.00**  0.001 
  Parity
c         
2002    1  1    1   
2800    2  0.72**  0.075  0.71**  0.076 
2866    3  0.58**  0.088  0.57**  0.090 
2535    4  0.51**  0.106  0.51**  0.108 
1628    5  0.51**  0.129  0.51**  0.132 
1106    6  0.47**  0.162  0.46**  0.165 
1066    7+  0.71**  0.168  0.70**  0.171 
  Years since previous birth
d         
3001    <1   1    1   
2661    1-2   1.13†  0.066  1.13†  0.067 
3122    2-4   0.82**  0.072  0.83**  0.073 
2406    4-7   0.61**  0.094  0.62**  0.095 
2813    7+   0.45**  0.130  0.46**  0.131 
  Year         
2519    1998  1    1   
2653    1999  1.16†  0.078  1.16  0.078 
2799    2000  0.93  0.080  0.93  0.080 
2961    2001  1.04  0.078  1.04  0.079 
3071    2002  0.69**  0.084  0.69**  0.085 
           
  Controls (time invariant)         
  Female highest educational level         
442    Missing/none/primary  1.01  0.139  1.03  0.142 
1520    Secondary basic  1.01  0.081  1.01  0.083 
11210    Secondary complete  1    1   
831    Higher  0.87  0.131  0.87  0.133 
  Region         
3789    Khatlon  1    1   
1710    Dushanbe  0.72**  0.123  0.72**  0.128 
2646    Regions of Republican 
      Subordination  0.97  0.078  0.98  0.081 
4523    Sogd  0.61**  0.073  0.60**  0.075 
1335    Gorno-Badakhshan  0.68**  0.107  0.67**  0.110 
  Type of Region         
9761    Rural area  1    1   
4242    Urban area  0.81  0.139  0.81  0.142   114 
  Proportion of households in 
community engaged in agriculture          
10075    Most households  1    1   
1287    Only some  0.94  0.146  0.94  0.149 
2641    None  1.10  0.160  1.11  0.165 
           
           
  Constant (baseline)  -0.706**  0.124  -0.714**  0.126 
 
2
( ) u y σ   0.004  0.003  0.046**  0.010 
 
2
( ) v y σ   0.019  0.013  0.022*  0.011 
 
2
( ) u z σ   14.88**  2.576  14.80**  2.462 
 
2
( ) v z σ   4.80**  1.369  4.376**  1.239 
  uyz σ       0.140  0.154 
  vyz σ       0.164†  0.093 
           
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics. 
N gives the number of couple years in each category for categorical variables. 
a The migration equation in the multiprocess model predicts the log-odds of the male spouse being 
absent for six months or more in a year.  Controls are as for the fertility equation in the table above 
except male age and age squared, and male highest educational level, replace the female equivalents.  
Because the research focus is on fertility, the covariate coefficients for the migration equation are not 
presented. 
b  Mid-year age, in completed years.  
c  At beginning of the year. 
d Time, at the beginning of the year, since the previous birth. 
Source: author's analysis of Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (2003). 
 
Therefore,  there  is  certainly  no  evidence  for  the  diffusion  of  assimilated  cultural 
values relating to fertility – which would have predicted a negative community-level 
relationship  between  international  migration  and  fertility.    Instead,  the  results  are 
consistent with those of Lindstrom and Giorguli Saucedo (2002) and Agadjanian et al 
(2008b).  In both these studies a contextual community-level variable indicating the 
prevalence of male migration was significantly positively correlated with the odds of 
conception in a given year, after controlling for direct separation effects.  Both studies 
suggest  that  the  economic  benefits  of  migration  may  serve  to  strengthen  family 
systems within the community.  However, the migration context in Tajikistan is very 
different to Mexico and Mozambique respectively.  By the beginning of 2003, the end 
of the period analysed with the survey data, Tajik communities may have experienced 
international labour migration for a maximum of eight or nine years – compared to the 
communities in Mexico which have experienced labour migration for generations.  It 
is unclear whether, over such a short period, the possible strengthening community-  115 
level  role  of  migration  would  have  had  time  to  take  effect.    In  the  Tajik  case, 
therefore, the correlation between migration and fertility at the community level may 
be more likely to simply reflect selectivity, rather than the contextual influence of 
community migration patterns.  It is possible, for example, that both migration and 
high  fertility  would  be  more  prevalent  in  communities  in  the  more  remote 
mountainous areas; indeed, Olimova (2005) notes the connection between altitude and 
migration behaviour in Tajikistan.    
 
Accounting  for  the  positive  correlation  between  community-level  migration  and 
fertility behaviour in a multiprocess model increases the size of the effect of spousal 
absence on the odds of conception in a given year: compared to an absence of 0-5 
months, absence of 6-12 months is associated with a 38% decrease, rather than a 31% 
decrease, in the odds of conception (Table 5.3).  Negative selection would have led to 
overestimation of the effect of spousal separation in the logistic and Poisson models 
presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.   Instead, if anything these single-process models 
underestimate the disruptive influence of spousal separation on fertility.   
 
5.7 Discussion and directions for future research 
 
This  paper  adds  to  the  very  small  number  of  studies  examining  the  impact  of 
temporary migration on fertility in origin areas using individual-level data.  While 
past studies have tended to be based on data collected from a particular region within 
a country, this paper is able to make use of a nationally representative survey which 
had  collected  both  birth  and  migration  histories.    Following  Massey  and  Mullan 
(1984),  Lindstrom  and  Giorguli  Saucedo  (2002;  2007)  and  Agadjanian  (2008),  it 
helps to illustrate the clear short-term disruptive influence of temporary migration and 
spousal separation on fertility.  It finds no evidence for selectivity at the couple level 
after  controlling  for  common  covariates.    However,  it  does  find  evidence  for  a 
positive correlation between the migration and fertility processes at the community 
level.  Accounting for this correlation leads to an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
spousal separation on fertility, exemplifying the utility of a multiprocess approach. 
 
The  research  does  have  its  limitations.    The  multiprocess  model  allows  for  the 
possibility  that  unobserved  time-invariant  characteristics  are  correlated  with  both   116 
migration and fertility but does not account for any changes in unobservables which 
affect both processes.  Further, it does not accommodate possible reverse causation.  
A fully structural model, allowing for the effect of conception in a given year on 
spousal absence as well as vice versa, would require instruments related to one of the 
processes and not the other (Steele 2005).  A further limitation is that the analysis is 
restricted  to  couples  in  union.    Therefore,  while  the  direct  effect  of  male  labour 
migration on marital fertility is considered, the possible impact on marriage itself is 
not.  Harris (1998a) reports, of the Garmi villages in Khatlon, that ‘the absence of 
young men of marriageable age has made it extremely difficult to find spouses for the 
girls and there are increasing numbers of unmarried girls aged 22 or 23 [which was 
previously  unheard  of]’.    Future  quantitative  research  on  the  gender  imbalance-
marriage link would provide further insights into how childbearing has been affected 
by male labour migration. 
  
Since  international  labour  migration  from  Tajikistan  is  a  relatively  recent 
phenomenon, its impact on completed fertility levels is not yet clear.  Lindstrom and 
Giorguli Saucedo (2002; 2007) show that Mexican couples are able to make up for 
lost reproductive time following the periods of separation.  In Tajikistan, we might 
expect the effect of separation on cumulated fertility evident in Table 5.2 to weaken as 
time progresses, allowing for periods of recuperation as spouses return after spells 
abroad.    However,  much  depends  on  the  future  pattern  of  labour  migration.    In 
Mexico couples have been able to compensate for absence because the periods are 
relatively short in duration and repeated long separations are unusual.  The long-term 
impact on fertility in Tajikistan may also be limited if seasonal migration comes to 
dominate international labour movements.  However, Mughal (2007:84), examining 
statistics  from  the  Russian  border  service,  notes  the  increasing  annual  number  of 
‘non-returnees’ to Tajikistan, hinting at the consolidation of a trend towards longer-
term stays and more permanent settlement in the last few years – which would be 
more likely to affect completed fertility levels.  It will also be interesting to monitor 
the gender composition of labour migrants in future years.  If women start to migrate 
in large numbers as well as men, the assimilation and diffusion of adopted cultural 
values relating to fertility behaviour may be expected to exert a downward influence 
on fertility to add to any longer-term impacts of disruption.   
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More generally, more research is needed on the relationship between migration and 
fertility in the post-socialist context.  In both Central Asia and Eastern Europe, there 
have been striking changes in marital and fertility behaviour since the beginning of 
the 1990s, and new and significant international labour movements have emerged.  
Future work examining the links between these trends would be most welcome. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Understanding recent trends in marriage and fertility in Tajikistan 
 
While  there  is  an  established  literature  on  marriage  and  fertility  change  in  post-
socialist Central and Eastern Europe, there is comparatively little work on post-Soviet 
Central Asia.  Least of all has been known about the nature of trends in post-Soviet 
Tajikistan – a republic potentially of particular interest since, of all the former ex-
socialist and ex-Soviet states, it had the highest fertility at the time of independence 
and has experienced the most acute social and economic problems since then. 
 
This thesis, in light of this research need, has aimed to describe and understand recent 
national-level trends in marriage and fertility in Tajikistan.   
 
Chapter 2 established the nature of these trends.  It showed that, in the early 1990s, 
total fertility decline was driven by a decline in higher-order fertility.  From the mid-
1990s, it was driven by declines in first-order fertility – in turn largely a reflection of a 
significant decline in the rate of first marriage.  It also examined the nature of year-to-
year fluctuations in marriage and fertility, noting the significant decreases associated 
with the periods of food crisis in 1995 and drought in 2000-01.   
 
Given  the  particular  importance  of  changes  in  marriage  in  Tajikistan,  these  were 
placed  within  a  wider  Central  Asian  context  in  Chapters  3  and  4.    Chapter  3 
documented the increase in the first marriage rate in Tajikistan during the transitional 
years immediately before and after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.  It showed 
that this increase, in common with other Central Asian republics, was most marked at 
younger  ages.    Chapter  4  examined  the  subsequent  decrease  in  the  rate  of  first 
marriage across the region.  Chapter 2 had argued that changes in food security were 
key  to  understanding  the  decline  in  the  marriage  rate  in  Tajikistan.    Chapter  4 
extended  this  argument,  noting  that  it  was  Tajikistan,  which  saw  the  most  severe 
declines  in  food  security,  which  also  saw  the  biggest  collapse  in  rates  of  first 
marriage. 
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Not  only  have  the  economic  changes  in  the  post-Soviet  period  had  lasting 
implications for marriage behaviour, but also they have prompted new and significant 
international labour movements.  In turn, as the couple-level analysis in chapter 5 
shows, these movements have had a short-term disruptive effect on fertility – though 
it is too early to assess the implications for completed fertility levels.  The chapter 
also illustrated a significant correlation between the fertility and migration processes, 
showing that communities with an above-average level of male migration also tend to 
have an above-average level of fertility after controlling for observed covariates. 
 
6.2 Context and post-Soviet demographic change 
 
This research serves to illustrate the importance of context to an understanding of 
post-Soviet demographic change.  Each of the former Soviet Central Asian republics  
experienced  a  shrinkage  of  the  national  economy  in  the  years  after  independence 
(TransMONEE  2006).    But  Tajikistan  was  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  changes 
associated with the end of the Soviet system: at the time of independence it was the 
most  subsidised  republic,  receiving  47%  of  its  total  government  revenues  from 
Moscow, and it also had the highest inter-republic trade deficit (Foroughi 2002).  The 
withdrawal of subsidies and disruption of trading relationships therefore contributed 
to acute post-independence economic decline in a republic which was already the 
poorest  of  the  former  Soviet  states  (Atkinson  and  Micklewright  1992:134).    In 
particular, Tajikistan had been heavily reliant on imports for its grain supply, with the 
lowest  local  per  capita  grain  production  of  any  of  the  Central  Asian  republics.  
Therefore,  while  in  each  Central  Asian  republic  the  population  experienced  the 
removal of the three pillars of the former Soviet system - guaranteed employment, 
subsidised and stable pricing, and social benefits and services (Standing 1996:230) - it 
was in Tajikistan that the end to the assurance of minimum consumption levels was 
most  acutely  felt,  reflected  in  a  decrease  in  food  security  and  an  increase  in 
undernourishment.    The  particularly  sharp  declines  in  rates  of  union  formation  in 
Tajikistan are consistent with the results of past studies documenting clear declines in 
nuptiality as a response to food insecurity (Lee 1981; Galloway 1988).   
 
Meanwhile,  the  smaller  declines  in  nuptiality  in  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan,  less 
reliant on subsidies and food imports at the time of independence, took place in a   120 
context of relative food security.  Increases in higher educational enrolment in these 
countries suggest that ideational changes may have played a more important role in 
post-Soviet changes in family formation than in Tajikistan.  Overall, identifying a 
‘root cause’ of demographic change in the region as the replacement of the Soviet 
regime  by  market  economies  in  newly  independent  states  (Frejka  2008)  helpfully 
accommodates  both  ideational  and  economic  explanations  for  recent  demographic 
change  -  according  to  each  republic’s  particular  context.    This  perspective,  while 
recognising  the  importance  of  particular  periods  of  crisis  to  the  pattern  of 
demographic change in Tajikistan - as described in chapter 2 – also locates these 
particular periods within the longer-term transition from reliance on centrally-planned 
food imports to increased self-sufficiency and from subsidised to free-market pricing.  
This transition has seen the country as a whole, and individuals at the household level, 
become vulnerable to short-term periods of acute food shortage in the absence of 
guaranteed supplies provided by the Soviet state
48.    
 
6.3 Implications for contraceptive policy in Tajikistan 
 
Quantitative evidence provided in chapter 2 illustrates the robustness of higher order 
birth rates from the mid-1990s: despite annual fluctuations in the intervening period, 
the  level  of  higher  order  childbearing  in  2001  was  similar  to  that  in  1993  after 
controlling for compositional influences
49.  Importantly, this lack of decline in higher 
order fertility should be understood in the context of qualitative evidence for an unmet 
need for contraception (Harris 2002).  Economic change has provided impetus for 
fertility decline.  Women look back to the Soviet era with fondness, citing the security 
of people’s lives, stable prices and higher material standard of living (Kanji 2002) - 
including a system of family benefits which had been among the most generous in the 
world,  comprising  payments  for  maternity  leave,  one-off  birth  payments,  monthly 
                                                 
48  A  man  interviewed  in  a  report  of  the  International  Federation  of  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent 
Societies (2001) during the drought in 2001 pointed out the contrast with the Soviet era, when the ‘state 
was able to help its people’ during difficult times. 
49 The caveat noted in chapter 2 is repeated: since the analysis is restricted to women aged 34 and 
under, there could have been a significant reduction in fertility at higher ages which has remained 
undetected.    Nevertheless,  for  the  ages  considered,  it  is  clear  that  the  decline  in  higher  order 
conceptions to in the late 1980s and early 1990s has not been sustained.   121 
child allowances and  free pre-school  and child care (World  Bank 1993).   Indeed, 
women  in  Khatlon,  where  Harris  (1998a)  carried  out  her  research,  use  the  Soviet 
period as a yardstick with which to compare their present difficulties.  In particular, 
the  post-independence  period  has  brought  ‘a  new  awareness  that  couples  simply 
cannot afford to have the same numbers of children as before.  Previously, villagers 
did not think much about the number of children they wanted…or about controlling 
fertility.. today, however, increasing numbers of women realise they cannot manage to 
feed the children they have’ (p.664-5).  These women ‘made it very clear that their 
major concern was control over their fertility’ (Harris 1998b:200).  Harris’ (2002:221) 
judgement is that fertility would fall further if ‘adequate’ access to contraceptives 
could be supplied. 
 
More widespread use of modern contraception has been hindered by three factors 
(Harris 1998a).  First, affordability: although they have been supplied free of charge 
by the United Nations Population Fund, many clinics have charged for their provision.  
Second,  medical  staff’s  lack  of  encouragement  for  women  to  use  them,  partly  a 
reflection of past Soviet-held opposition to their use, such that ‘women are usually 
only offered contraceptives if they themselves find the clinic and then specifically ask 
for them’ (Harris 1998a:665).  Third, and related, is the relative lack of knowledge 
among  the  general  population  in  the  use  of  contraception  (Harris  1998b).    These 
factors help to explain why abortions have actually been on the increase among the 
Tajik population since independence, despite the costs involved (Harris 1998a:670). 
 
This  has  important  implications  for  Tajikistan’s  demographic  policy.    President 
Rakhmonov,  concerned  about  the  rate  of  population  growth,  has  recognised  the 
importance  of  reducing  fertility  (United  Nations  Office  for  the  Coordination  of 
Humanitarian Affairs 2003).  Indeed, he has argued that rapid population growth had 
contributed to the impoverishment of the country (Davlatova 2002).  In this respect 
the continued decline in total fertility from the mid-1990s is to be welcomed.  But 
realisation that this has been largely driven by a reduction in first order fertility- in 
turn a function of declines in marriage rates - rather than by the decreases in higher 
birth rates seen in the early post-independence years, should provide further impetus 
to efforts to improve contraceptive education and availability.  Legislation was passed 
in June 2002 aimed at encouraging the use of contraception.  Subsequent surveys will   122 
be needed to assess whether the increase in modern prevalence, from 27% in 2000 and 
34% in 2005 according to the respective MICS surveys, has continued in the latter 
half of the decade. 
 
6.4 Directions for future research 
 
6.4.1 Extending existing themes 
 
Individual  chapters  in  the  thesis  have  ended  by  describing  how  their  particular 
research themes could be developed in the future.  To summarise, research on trends 
in aggregate fertility and marriage rates would benefit from work further extending 
their spatial and temporal scope.  An examination of recent demographic trends in 
Turkmenistan, the one Central Asian republic not considered here, would represent a 
valuable addition to the literature.  Analysis of more recently collected survey data for 
Tajikistan would both help to corroborate the trends calculated in this thesis and  to 
illustrate the nature of demographic change over the past few years.  In particular, 
data from the 2007 Tajikistan Living Standards Survey will shortly become available.  
It  will  be  interesting  to  note  from  these  data  whether  higher  order  fertility  has 
remained fairly robust to change or whether, consistent with the recent government 
drive  to  increase  modern  contraceptive  prevalence,  it  has  started  to  decline.  
Continuing to estimate trends in contraceptive prevalence using survey data is itself 
an important research need. 
 
This  thesis  adopted  a  period  perspective  to  the  description  and  understanding  of 
demographic  trends  –  and  provided  evidence  of  a  clear  demographic  response  to 
period conditions.  In contrast, a cohort series of marriage rates, arising as ‘averages 
of  (more  fundamental)  period  movements’  (Ní  Bhrolcháin  1992:610),  would  have 
failed to identify the importance of the 1995 food crisis or the 2000-01 drought
50.  
Future work, extending the spatial and temporal scope of the existing analysis, would 
benefit from retaining a period approach to measurement.   It would also be helpful to 
                                                 
50 The evidence for an age-period interaction effect, illustrating different impacts of particular periods 
on the rate of first marriage for different age groups of unmarried women, is also noted.    
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retain the focus on the study of the macro-level determinants of post-Soviet marriage 
and  fertility  change.    As  Ní  Bhrolcháin  (1992:607)  has  argued,  macro-level 
determinants have been relatively neglected in the demographic literature. 
 
6.4.2 Complementary qualitative insights 
 
Given the lack of information on recent demographic change in Tajikistan, the thesis 
has  focused  on  quantitative  analysis  to  establish  the  nature  of  these  trends.    But 
further qualitative research would also add to our understanding.  Harris (2002:224) 
advocates  research  into,  for  example,  ‘attitudes  of  different  social  groups  towards 
ideal family size and the use of birth control’ and ‘who is responsible for decisions 
affecting  the  real  numbers  of  children  produced,  and  how  these  decisions  are 
reached’.  Given the particularly distinctive changes in the rate of first marriage in the  
late-Soviet and post-Soviet period, research which is able to probe in more detail how 
the decisions regarding union formation are made and how ceremonies are planned – 
and in particular how both of these aspects may be affected by periods of conspicuous 
consumption or of food scarcity - would be most valuable. 
 
6.4.3 The social impact of demographic change 
 
Illustration  of  the  scale  of  post-Soviet  demographic  change  in  Tajikistan  prompts 
interest in the social impacts of such changes.  In particular, the marked decrease in 
the  rate  of  union  formation  has  potential  implications  for  the  welfare  of  women.  
Traditionally marriage in Tajikistan has been virtually universal, and this remained 
the case throughout the Soviet era.  Following marriage, women become part of the 
husband’s household.   But the post-Soviet decrease in rates of first marriage will 
translate into a sharp increase in the proportion of women who remain never-married.  
Meanwhile women’s chances of being financially independent are limited by the post-
Soviet tendency for prioritising male education and an associated higher dropout of 
secondary education amongst girls (D'Hellencourt 2004) and by the concentration of 
women in poorly paid sectors including education and agriculture (Falkingham 2000; 
United  Nations  Development  Programme  2000).    Olimova  and  Bosc  (2003:111) 
report that some women have resorted to becoming ‘kept women’ in order to survive: 
‘A young woman who is unable to marry and who has little chance of employment   124 
becomes a burden to her family.  If the family cannot afford to support her, paid 
cohabitation may be her only option’.  Such arrangements, they point out, are often 
with young single male migrants who are at home in Tajikistan for a few months each 
year.  There are also journalistic accounts of a strong increase in polygamy (Eshanova 
2002; Greenberg 2006). 
 
The extent of labour migration in Tajikistan, alluded to in chapter five, has social 
implications  beyond  contributing  to  gender  imbalance  in  local  marriage  markets.  
Women  have  become  increasingly  relied  upon  for  providing  agricultural  labour.  
Harris  (2006:148)  argues  that  the  migration’s  sex-selective  nature,  leading  to  a 
sizeable pool of unmarried young women, plays a role in the growing instability of 
marriages such that ‘if families do not like one kelin [‘incomer’; term for the newly 
married wife in her husband’s household] they can easily get another’.  Meanwhile 
the composition of the family has changed, with a decrease in the number of nuclear 
families and an increase in female headship of households (Olimova and Bosc 2003), 
and  there  is  concern  about  the  impact  of  labour  migration  on  family  life,  child 
discipline  (Olimova  and  Bosc  2003)  and  children’s  educational  enrolment  and 
attendance (Clifford 2008).  
 
Quantifying  the  extent  of  these  social  changes  is  not  straightforward.    None  are 
recorded adequately in registration statistics: ‘kept women’ represent, by their very 
nature, unofficial and temporary partners; polygamy is illegal; and since the religious 
ceremony nikoh often remains unregistered as an official marriage, so the dissolutions 
of these unions are not recorded as ‘divorces’.  In addition, thus far survey birth and 
union  history  modules  used  in  the  country  have  not  included  questions  to  allow 
measurement  of  these  phenomena.    Specially  designed  survey  questions  may  be 
required.  
 
6.4.4 Demographic change in Central Asia 
 
The  collapse  of  socialism  in  Tajikistan  has  indeed  provided  ‘rich  material  for  an 
examination of the effects of dramatic sociopolitical and economic change on marital 
and  fertility  behaviour’  (Agadjanian  1999:426).    This  research  has  illustrated 
significant change in marriage and fertility behaviour in Tajikistan – changes which   125 
are  distinctive  in  the  context  of  the  Soviet  era,  and  in  the  context  of  post-Soviet 
changes in other Central Asian states.  But, compared to the established literature on 
demographic  change  in  post-socialist  Europe,  demographic  change  in  Tajikistan 
specifically - and in Central Asia more widely - remains under-researched (Gentile 
2007).    Extending  the  spatial  and  temporal  scope  of  this  work,  interweaving 
complementary qualitative insights and developing our understanding of the social 
implications of demographic change are challenging, yet potentially fruitful, avenues 
for future research.   
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Table A1  Factors influencing odds of higher order conception in a particular month
1, 
Tajikistan 1989-2002 
 
N  Variable  Odds ratio 
  Year     
18584    1989  1   
20542    1990  1.03  0.075 
22405    1991  0.94  0.067 
24049    1992  0.84*  0.060 
25981    1993  0.71**  0.052 
28002    1994  0.69**  0.052 
30308    1995  0.76**  0.050 
32379    1996  0.64**  0.046 
33980    1997  0.69**  0.047 
35812    1998  0.74**  0.047 
37576    1999  0.69**  0.050 
39648    2000  0.78**  0.057 
41405    2001  0.65**  0.050 
43029    2002  0.75**  0.054 
  Parity     
83700    1  1   
99210    2  0.70**  0.025 
88795    3  0.65**  0.030 
75288    4  0.59**  0.033 
46963    5  0.66**  0.043 
29772    6  0.67**  0.061 
26940    7+  0.94  0.082 
  Years since previous live birth     
101683    <1   1   
97502    1-2   9.56**  0.691 
109394    2-4   17.05**  1.185 
72888    4-7   10.54**  0.844 
69201    7+   5.44**  0.559 
  age  1.23  0.032 
  age_sq  1.00  0.000 
       
 
1 For woman months at ages 15-34 inclusive.  Woman months at parity 0 excluded. 
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics. 
N gives the number of woman months in each category for categorical variables. 
Source: author's analysis of TLSS (2003).   128 
Table A2  Relative risks of first birth within union, Tajikistan 1986-2004
1 
 
Variable  Relative risk 
Year     
  1986  1.08  0.115 
  1987  1.02  0.129 
  1988  1.07  0.129 
  1989  1   
  1990  1.12  0.121 
  1991  1.00  0.106 
  1992  1.15  0.115 
  1993  0.97  0.102 
  1994  1.08  0.111 
  1995  1.14  0.122 
  1996  0.79*  0.092 
  1997  0.96  0.106 
  1998  1.15  0.132 
  1999  1.16  0.131 
  2000  1.16  0.128 
  2001  0.85  0.100 
  2002  1.11  0.122 
  2003  1.06  0.109 
  2004  1.06  0.111 
Years since first union     
  <1   1   
  1-2   2.88**  0.122 
  2-3  1.72**  0.121 
  3-4   1.10  0.111 
  4-5   0.84  0.114 
  5+  0.26**  0.034 
     
  Nb  4089   
  Nwy  8687   
 
1 For women aged 15-29 inclusive.   
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics. 
Nb  and  Nwy:  number  of  first  births,  and  number  of  years  of  exposure,  in  total  analysis  period  for 
sampled women. 
Source: author's analysis of MICS (2005).   129 
Table A3  Relative risks of first union, Tajikistan 1986-2004
1 
 
Variable  Relative risk 
Year     
  1986  1.06  0.136 
  1987  0.95  0.116 
  1988  0.91  0.095 
  1989  1   
  1990  1.30*  0.148 
  1991  1.14  0.125 
  1992  1.34*  0.151 
  1993  1.35**  0.156 
  1994  1.13  0.120 
  1995  0.79*  0.086 
  1996  0.79*  0.090 
  1997  0.90  0.105 
  1998  0.77*  0.081 
  1999  0.62**  0.072 
  2000  0.66**  0.066 
  2001  0.45**  0.055 
  2002  0.46**  0.053 
  2003  0.48**  0.050 
  2004  0.50**  0.054 
Age group     
  15-17   1   
  18-20  4.97**  0.264 
  21-29  4.64**  0.295 
     
  Nu    4506   
  Nwy  38098   
 
1 For women aged 15-29 inclusive.   
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics. 
Nu and Nwy: number of  first  unions, and  number of  years of exposure, in total analysis period for 
sampled women. 
Source: author's analysis of MICS (2005).   130 
Table A4  Relative risks of first birth, Tajikistan 1986-2004
1 
 
Variable  Relative risk 
Year     
  1986  1.18  0.138 
  1987  1.18  0.161 
  1988  1.09  0.125 
  1989  1   
  1990  1.20†  0.128 
  1991  1.29*  0.147 
  1992  1.39**  0.155 
  1993  1.30*  0.153 
  1994  1.50**  0.173 
  1995  1.37**  0.162 
  1996  0.85  0.110 
  1997  0.95  0.111 
  1998  0.99  0.120 
  1999  0.95  0.111 
  2000  0.82†  0.093 
  2001  0.61**  0.074 
  2002  0.68**  0.081 
  2003  0.54**  0.062 
  2004  0.55**  0.064 
Age group     
  15-17   1   
  18-20  12.45  0.974 
  21-29  18.55  1.462 
     
  Nb    4412   
  Nwy  45585   
 
1 For women aged 15-29 inclusive.   
†p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.  Standard error in italics. 
Nb  and  Nwy:  number  of  first  births,  and  number  of  years  of  exposure,  in  total  analysis  period  for 
sampled women. 
Source: author's analysis of MICS (2005). 
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